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Abstract 
 
Frankensteinian monsters have appeared on our screens since the early days of 
cinema.  Indeed, across the history of film we see Mary Shelley’s “hideous 
progeny” rewritten as alchemical creations, animated corpses, lumbering fiends, 
robots, cyborgs, replicants, dinosaurs, artificial intelligences and digital 
constructions.  In particular, Shelley’s text shares its speculative depiction of a 
posthuman future with fantastic and science-fictional cinema of the digital age.  
At the same time, posthuman bodies are being created by filmmakers.  New 
possibilities in the digital imaging of human presence – from the replacement of 
actors with computer-generated imagery to the quest for photorealism in digital 
animation – themselves evoke the Frankenstein tale and consequently make 
interesting contributions to the evolving Frankenstein myth. 
 
This thesis investigates the retelling of Frankenstein in popular cinema of the 
digital age.  Through close analysis of a series of chosen texts, I examine the 
figure of the Frankensteinian monster and his/her/its equivalents in today’s 
popular culture: posthuman figures who negotiate uneasily with the organic 
world, boundary creatures who both define and unsettle our understandings of 
human being.  I consider the way the tale, its themes and characters have both 
endured and evolved over time.  I also examine the way these new filmic 
“machines” and animated “monsters” embody crucial problems associated with 
the technologies that screen them and the media that contain them. 
   iii 
My concern in this project is twofold.  Firstly, I seek to map the (changing) 
relationship between Frankenstein and film.  Since the early 1900s, cinema has 
provided a fertile ground for the retelling of Shelley’s tale.  At the same time, 
cinema itself has always been a sort of Frankensteinian experiment: a means of 
breathing life into stillness, of constructing and re-constructing human presence, 
of stitching together fragmented moments to create a semblance of wholeness.  
In the digital age, this experiment grows and changes: new modes of production 
are continually being trialled, allowing us to re-create and re-present human 
presence in new and often bizarre ways.  The figure of the Frankensteinian 
monster confronts and responds to these concerns, embodying and performing 
the uncanny, spectacular, mechanical, or organic-mechanical nature of screen 
presence. 
 
Secondly, this thesis reads the Frankensteinian monster as a mythic figure for the 
digital age.  I move towards the assertion that Frankenstein is a tale about the 
artificial body and its negotiation with a lost or disrupted origin in the organic 
world, and that this particular problem reverberates strongly in an age of digital 
representation.  The analyses that constitute this thesis contribute to the argument 
that each time the Frankenstein tale is retold, re-technologised, and re-imagined 
using new filmic techniques, the problem of the screen body and its troubled 
origin stories is revisited and complicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Preface: Frankenstein in the digital age  
 
Nearly two hundred years after Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein was first 
published, I am watching Frankenstein, the 1910 Edison Studios film, on 
YouTube.  I have seen the film many times before, but never quite like this: the 
monster’s body, creepily emerging from its alchemical cauldron, flickers like all 
images from old films but is framed by my computer screen.  Attached to my 
laptop, I feel particularly “plugged in” to this media experience: in this moment I 
am a PhD student more than a cinema spectator, my fingers on the keyboard 
ready to pause, think, write; I am the figure envisioned by N. Katherine Hayles 
when she observes that “an experienced computer user feels proprioceptive 
coherence with the keyboard, experiencing the screen surface as a space into 
which her subjectivity can flow”.
1  Like Frankenstein’s monster – who is 
rewritten in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as the cyborg, the 
organic/technological hybrid – I am, in this moment, mechanically enhanced. 
 
Frankenstein’s monster, it seems, is alive and well in cyberspace; and when we 
encounter him/her/it on YouTube we might be tempted to ponder the 
applicability of Shelley’s tale to media culture at the beginning of the twenty-
first century.  Mark Poster makes evident such applicability when he uses the 
term “High-tech Frankenstein” to describe the construction of posthuman 
identities in cyberspace: this High-tech Frankenstein, he tells us, is “a figure for 
                                                 
1 N. Katherine Hayles, “The Condition of Virtuality”, in The Digital Dialectic: 
New Essays on New Media, ed. Peter Lunenfeld (London: MIT Press, 1999), 88.   2 
the relation of humans online to machines” and “functions as an opening to 
globalized, machinic post-humanity”.
2  We can also suggest that there is a 
wonderful correlation between the monster’s fragmented body and cyberspace 
itself as a fragmented medium, a space defined by its non-linearity and also by its 
“monstrous” otherness to film and literature.  In this sense, the Edison film is 
imbued with new meaning when screened online.  Some would counter that 
watching such a text in this form strips away the magic, wonder, and sense of 
inventiveness that surrounded this early venture into filmmaking.  Yet we can 
also argue that the Frankenstein tale has here been re-technologised for a digital 
era – a significant claim given that re-technologising the tale for a new era (and a 
new medium) is exactly what the Edison film itself achieved in 1910, bringing 
cinematic “life” to Shelley’s narrative in an act of techno-production as 
spectacular as Victor Frankenstein’s own. 
 
The appearance in cyberspace of this earliest filmic adaptation of Shelley’s novel 
also attests to the longevity of the Frankenstein tale – to its current cultural 
relevance and to its continuing ability to incite cultural interest.  As many 
theorists have recognised, Shelley’s writing had a certain preemptive quality: her 
novel demonstrates both an awareness of the future (she writes of scientific 
endeavours and possibilities, of fantastic shifts in the meaning and experience of 
human being and human embodiment) and a sense of science-fictionality that has 
allowed her work to resonate into her own future (the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries).  Adopting an archaic term used by Shelley herself, Jay Clayton offers 
                                                 
2 Mark Poster, “High-Tech Frankenstein, or Heidegger Meets Stelarc”, in The 
Cyborg Experiments, ed. Joanna Zylinska (London and New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2002), 29-30.   3 
a discussion of Frankenstein’s “futurity”, which he opens with the following 
question: 
 
In an age of reproductive technology, cloning, artificial intelligence, and 
robots, has Frankenstein’s futurity come to pass?  Are we living in the time 
Mary Shelley foreshadowed?
3 
 
To Clayton’s question we can add another: would the “futurity” that Shelley 
envisioned have included either the filming of her tale or the reproduction of 
such a text in cyberspace?  Probably not, although here are two striking acts of 
techno-production that mirror the processes at the heart of the Frankenstein tale.  
I am reminded of this as I watch the Edison film on YouTube; I am also 
reminded of the related notion that the tale’s longevity is linked to the 
reproductive powers of visual media – to its constant screening and re-screening, 
framing and re-framing in popular culture. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the filmic reworking of Frankenstein rather than 
with the tale’s applicability to the study of new media or its re-screening on 
video sharing websites like YouTube.  Nevertheless, this viewing of the 
Frankenstein tale – not only in its earliest filmic form, but also as part of a new 
media experience – offers a suitable starting point for a study that frames itself 
with the phrase “Frankenstein in the digital age”.  Viewers of the Edison film on 
YouTube might be quietly reminded that Mary Shelley’s monster is a figure well 
suited to the digital age: for he/she/it is posthuman, postorganic, constructed, 
fragmented, a technological other, a body removed from nature.  As this thesis 
                                                 
3 Jay Clayton, “Frankenstein’s Futurity: Replicants and Robots”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Mary Shelley, ed. Esther Schor (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 84.   4 
will suggest, these aspects of Shelley’s monster have allowed him/her/it, over the 
years, to embody the strangeness of cinematic presence; but framed here by the 
mechanisms of cyberspace, this posthuman figure also seems startlingly 
emblematic of the postcinematic aspects of today’s media culture – of the threat 
to cinema posed not only by new modes of media viewing but also by digital 
effects and the overall digitising of film. 
 
Shelley’s monster is also a figure constantly re-imag(in)ed in media culture, a 
figure taken apart and rewritten (“pieced together”, we might say) to confront 
new cultural worlds and new cultural problems.  In this particular instance – the 
re-screening of the Edison film on YouTube – there is less a “rewriting” of the 
monster than a transference of an earlier image of him/it; the tale is “retold” in a 
new medium but in an old form.  Other recent texts more actively rework the 
tale.  Let us turn from this media experience to another.  Some time before 
beginning this research project, I was watching the anime Ghost in the Shell on 
DVD: a spectacular film created by Mamoru Oshii in 1995, and also a text that 
interweaves Shelley’s tale with a cyberpunk ethos and blends both with a 
characteristically “anime” attitude towards technology, subjectivity, and 
(post)embodiment.  I was entranced by this film’s dark depiction of a postorganic 
world; by its appropriation, re-membering, and remembering of the Frankenstein 
tale; by its new vision of a constructed body and also by its evocation of 
questions that were explored two hundred years ago by Shelley.  Where does the 
soul reside?  What does it mean to “be” a body?  What is the artificial body’s 
relation to the organic world?  I was also fascinated by the way these questions 
seemed to resonate with the processes of digital animation that created the film.   5 
 
Edison’s Frankenstein
4 and Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell speak strangely to one 
another.  They are nearly a century apart in context: the former appearing at the 
beginning of the 1900s when cinema was in its infancy, and the latter at the close 
of the century in a period (and a medium) that can be described as postcinematic.  
If I were to assess these two texts with the hindsight offered by the process of 
researching and writing this thesis, I would suggest that what they share is an 
oscillation between visibility and invisibility, presence and absence.  Both films 
make visible Shelley’s monster: they project him/her/it onto a screen, they offer 
enduring images of a textual body, a literary creation.  Significantly, they both 
feature spectacular creation scenes that “give birth” to the “monster” before our 
eyes.  Yet both films also allow their monsters to vanish.  In Edison’s 
Frankenstein, the monster loses first his body and then his image, becoming a 
reflection in a mirror that dissolves into the reflection of his creator, Victor 
Frankenstein; in Ghost in the Shell, digital “monster” Kusanagi falls backwards 
and vanishes from the screen, a moment of vulnerability, of elusive and illusive 
embodiment, that becomes in this iconic film a fantastic addition to the scene of 
creation.  This thesis attempts to explain what such making visible – and then 
making invisible – of the monster might mean.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 As I will discuss in my analysis of this film in Chapter Two, it is convenient to 
refer to this text as “Edison’s Frankenstein” because of the link between the film 
and Edison as a historical figure; however, the film was written and directed by 
J. Searle Dawley, and received no creative input from the inventor himself.   6 
Project aims 
 
The aim of this project is to track the retelling of Frankenstein5 in popular 
cinema of the digital age.  I consider both the evolution and the endurance of the 
tale: I address the reshaping of this tale to confront new contextual 
circumstances, but I also identify those aspects of the tale that have remained 
constant and that seem well-suited to the cultural and technological climate of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  In this sense, the object of 
analysis for this thesis is the “monstrous body” of Frankenstein popular culture 
itself.  In his analysis of the ongoing adaptation of another great Gothic text – 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula – James Holte refers to the “shape shifting” power of 
Dracula, which matches the continual transformation of the text as it is reworked 
in popular culture.
6  In a similar manner, we might speak of the “fragmented” 
body of the Frankensteinian monster and its link to the fragmentation involved in 
the cultural reworking of the tale: each adaptation in popular culture involves a 
process of “sewing together” disjointed images, characters, and concepts from 
the novel itself, so that in the early twenty-first century we can describe 
“Frankenstein” as a mega-text,
7 a monstrous fragmented body.  While 
Frankenstein has of course been adapted and retold in numerous popular texts – 
                                                 
5 Throughout this thesis, the name “Frankenstein” will be used to refer not to any 
specific text but to the tale in its mythic form.  I will use the italicised 
Frankenstein when referring either to Shelley’s novel or to specific filmic 
adaptations of this text. 
6 James Craig Holte, Dracula in the Dark: the Dracula Film Adaptations 
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), xiii. 
7 In a slightly different manner, Damien Broderick uses this term  to describe the 
science fiction genre, which consists of an “extensive generic mega-text built up 
over fifty years, even a century, of mutually imbricated sf texts”.  See Damien 
Broderick, Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 59.   7 
from comics to television shows, novels to fan fiction – I limit my discussion to 
cinematic texts, for reasons that will become apparent below. 
 
The term “digital age” is used in this project to suggest a set of intertwined 
cultural concerns, theoretical understandings, and technological developments, 
rather than to indicate a definite time period.  I use the term in a similar manner 
to Elaine Graham, who, in her discussion of popular representations of the 
posthuman, refers to a “biotechnological and digital age”.
8  In the twenty-first 
century, Graham argues, “the implications of digital, genetic, cybernetic and 
biomedical technologies is precisely what (and who) will define authoritative 
notions of normative, exemplary, desirable humanity”.
9  This is a period defined 
by its own set of critical understandings about embodiment, technology, 
subjectivity, organicism, and “life”.  Informed by developments in 
biotechnology, science, and medicine as well as in digital media, the digital age 
emerges as a period in which life can be artificial, embodiment can be virtual, the 
organic and the technological permeate and penetrate one another.  This is a 
period, furthermore, in which the Frankenstein myth is more relevant than ever; 
but it is also a period in which this myth is vigorously reworked. 
 
These developments in biotechnology, medicine, science, and media – and the 
shifting understandings of body, technology, and “life” that they initiate – are 
paralleled and contributed to by developments in the digital imaging of human 
presence on screen.  Most importantly for this study, then, the “digital age” is a 
                                                 
8 Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 10. 
9 Ibid., 11.   8 
period defined by advances in filmmaking – by the rise of digital effects and the 
emergence of digital animation.  Throughout the course of my research, I have 
found that the problems confronted by the figure of the Frankensteinian monster 
– problems relating to mechanical reproduction, the suspension of mortality, the 
presence of a “soul”, the negotiation with organic origins, and the irresolvable 
tension between “nature” and “technology” – resonate with the processes 
involved in both digital animation and live-action filmmaking in the digital age.  
Digitally animated bodies in particular are theoretically and culturally received 
as posthuman, as postorganic, as monstrous and/or mechanical; and when these 
bodies appear in fantastic and/or science fiction films (from effects-driven 
Hollywood blockbusters to dark and confronting anime like Ghost in the Shell) 
this link to the Frankenstein myth is often played upon through strategies of 
metaphor, intertextuality, and self-reflexivity.  In this project, I will therefore 
consider the figure of the Frankensteinian monster not just as a fantastic being 
imagined by Shelley in the 1800s or as a cinematic figure brought to life by early 
filmmakers, but as a mythic figure for the digital age. 
 
Underpinning this investigation will be a broader exploration of the strength and 
strangeness of the relationship between Frankenstein and film.  Here is a tale that 
has been cinematically adapted many times, a process that contributes to the 
astounding cultural resonance of Shelley’s now two-hundred-year-old text.  
These intertwined concerns – the tale’s durability and its screenability – are 
described in varying terms by analysts of both the novel and its filmic 
adaptations.  George Levine and U.C. Knoeplfmacher, for instance, write of the 
“durability and power of the novel”, adding that “Frankenstein continues to be   9 
read, the book’s sales periodically increased by its latest popular manifestation in 
film or television”.
10  Yet the screening of the tale does not merely increase the 
popularity of the novel – in the sense that, perhaps, filmic adaptations of J.K. 
Rowling’s Harry Potter series have done in recent years – but eclipses it.  As 
Albert Lavalley points out: 
 
Most of us first became acquainted with Frankenstein and his terrifying 
creation not through the pages of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel but through 
our childhood Saturday afternoons at the movies or leisurely sessions 
before the family television set.  By the time we read the novel the images 
from various films are so firmly imprinted on our minds that it is almost 
impossible not to filter the events and images of the book through the 
more familiar ones of the films.
11 
 
At the same time, cinema itself has always been a sort of Frankensteinian 
experiment: a means of breathing life into stillness, of constructing and re-
constructing human presence, of stitching together fragmented moments to create 
a semblance of wholeness.  In the digital age, this experiment grows and 
changes: new modes of production are continually being trialled, allowing us to 
re-create and re-present human presence in new and often bizarre ways.  In its 
filmic form, the figure of the Frankensteinian monster has always confronted the 
uncanny, spectacular, mechanical or organic-mechanical nature of filmic 
presence; and across the history of cinema this figure has been remoulded, a 
transformation that responds not only to changes in the social/political/cultural 
world around us but also to technological developments that alter the way we, as 
                                                 
10 George Levine and U.C. Knoeplfmacher (eds), The Endurance of 
Frankenstein: Essays on Mary Shelley’s Novel (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), xii. 
11 Albert J. Lavalley, “The Stage and Film Children of Frankenstein: A Survey”, 
in The Endurance of Frankenstein: Essays on Mary Shelley’s Novel, eds. George 
Levine and U.C. Knoeplfmacher (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979), 243.   10 
audiences, receive and engage with media texts.  This thesis will map such a 
transformation, bringing the various filmic “machines” and animated “monsters” 
that function as reworkings of the Frankensteinian “Creature” into dialogue with 
the shifts in filmic technology they fantastically represent. 
 
This thesis recognises that much has already been written about the relationship 
between Frankenstein and film.  It is early cinema, however, and particularly the 
films of James Whale, that figure most prominently in these investigations.  
Scholarship in this area is somewhat limited, to the extent that there is a sort of 
“canon” of Frankenstein films (which includes the 1910 Edison Studios film and 
the James Whale films Frankenstein and Bride of Frankenstein).  While 
acknowledging the existent academic work on these texts, I will contribute to this 
area of study by moving beyond early cinema and journeying into a world of 
digital and animated monsters.  In this sense, the thesis offers a re-examination of 
the relationship between Frankenstein and film. 
 
Alongside its interest in Frankenstein, this thesis also recognises the importance 
of the “techno-body” as a mythic figure, a metaphor, and an object of both 
fantasy and theory.  We find such a figure at work in the writing of cultural 
theorists such as Donna Haraway and N. Katherine Hayles; we also find 
glimmers of Frankenstein in the work of these theorists, who map a posthuman 
condition and who mobilise the allegorical power of science fiction and fantasy 
in a theoretical space.  This thesis has been written at a time when theoretical 
interest in the posthuman is high – and also at a time when we witness the 
collapse of the posthuman and the postcinematic.  Today, posthuman bodies are   11 
often represented in popular culture using postcinematic technologies; these 
bodies are the monsters, the aliens, the fantastic others of our popular texts, and 
they express anxieties not only over changing definitions of human presence but 
also over changes and threats to cinematic modes of representation.  This 
territory has been explored by many theorists, particularly those who write about 
science fiction cinema, including Vivian Sobchack, Garrett Stewart, Scott 
Bukatman, Charles Tryon, and J.P. Telotte.  This thesis is located in dialogue 
with the writing of such theorists, and acknowledges the importance of the 
techno-body as a figure who might confront the cinematic – and the 
postcinematic – technologising of organic presence. 
 
Locating Frankenstein: on genre and choice of texts 
 
This thesis acknowledges and mobilises the mythic quality of the Frankenstein 
tale, recognising that this tale originates in a novel written in 1818 by Mary 
Shelley but, today, is not confined (or even, some would argue, clearly linked) to 
Shelley’s narrative.  Other theorists, particularly those who discuss filmic 
adaptations of Shelley’s novel, refer to this “mythic” quality of the tale.  Lavalley 
reminds us that Frankenstein: 
 
has always been viewed by the playwright or the screenwriter as a mythic 
text, an occasion for the writer to let loose his own fantasies or to stage 
what he feels is dramatically effective, to remain true to the central core of 
the myth, and often to let it interact with fears and tensions of the current 
time.
12 
 
                                                 
12 Lavalley, 245.   12 
William Nestrick writes in a similar manner about various avant garde 
adaptations of Frankenstein in the 1960s and 1970s, films that “reanimate the 
myth of Frankenstein” for a new context.
13  He writes: 
 
The importance of Frankenstein to film has always been more than the 
history of the film versions of the novel.  Since the sixties, the most avant 
garde filmmakers have returned to the myth as homage, as illusion, as 
model for their own relationship to film.
14 
 
Levine and Knoeplfmacher also address the mythic quality of the tale and its 
images, which occupy a deep position in the cultural mindstream: 
 
If popular culture has adapted [the tale], no part of culture can ignore it.  Its 
key images and the central structure of the narrative itself enter both our 
private and culturally shared store of dream, fantasy, and myth.
15 
 
Following in the footsteps of these theorists, we can consider “Frankenstein” as a 
loose tale separated from the original novel: it is a story about techno-genesis, 
about artificiality, about postorganic presence, a story about the monstrous 
and/or mechanical body, and it is constituted not only of Shelley’s writing but of 
images from various films that place themselves in dialogue with the novel.  We 
might also remind ourselves that, in writing Frankenstein, Shelley herself was 
retelling an older tale.  As its full title suggests, Frankenstein (or, “The Modern 
Prometheus”) draws its inspiration from the ancient Greek myth of the rebellious 
Titan, Prometheus, who stole the spark of life from the Gods and created 
                                                 
13 William Nestrick, “Coming to Life: Frankenstein and the Nature of Film 
Narrative”, in The Endurance of Frankenstein: Essays on Mary Shelley’s Novel, 
eds. George Levine and U.C. Knoeplfmacher (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979), 315. 
14 Ibid., 308. 
15 Levine and Knoeplfmacher, xiii.   13 
humankind out of clay; a myth that would have been known to Shelley 
particularly in the form of its retelling by the Roman poet Ovid.  Here, then, is a 
tale already buried under many retellings, one that articulates a cultural 
fascination with the act of techno-production in its oldest sense.   
 
Nearly two hundred years later, this mythic tale is told and retold with renewed 
fervour in both fantastic and theoretical spaces.  Thus, as already noted in this 
introduction, we can be aware of “Frankenstein” without having ever 
encountered Shelley’s novel.  I am reminded here of a conversation I had with a 
student I was tutoring, many years before I began this project.  She arrived at my 
house one day for her weekly session and glumly informed me that she “had to 
read some old novel called Frankenstein”.  I was surprised that she had never 
heard of the novel.  Mary Shelley?  The monster, the mad scientist?  Only when I 
described a scene from cinema – the monster coming to life in a shower of 
electricity, the scientist cackling “it’s alive!” – did a glimmer of recognition 
come into her eyes.  Carl Freedman offers a similar anecdote: 
 
I have taught Frankenstein more frequently than any other work of prose 
fiction, and I have encountered many students who were surprised to learn 
that the whole Frankenstein story is derived from a single literary text – not 
to mention a novel written in a florid style by a young Englishwoman in 
the early nineteenth century.  They seemed to have vaguely assumed that 
‘Frankenstein’ referred just to a vast collective or anonymous saga, 
expressed in films, television programs, comic books, and other such 
forums.
16 
 
For Freedman, this did not necessarily suggest an ignorance on the part of the 
students but was indicative of the mythic, extra-textual nature of the story itself: 
                                                 
16 Carl Freedman, “Hail Mary: On the Author of Frankenstein and the Origins of 
Science Fiction”, Science Fiction Studies, 29, 2 (2002), 254.   14 
the notion, in other words, that “Shelley’s work has entered our cultural 
bloodstream in a way that is true of the work of very few, if any, other canonical 
English authors”.
17 
 
In choosing texts for analysis in this project, I have been governed by an 
awareness of this mythic quality of the tale.  In the spirit of Nestrick, I consider a 
number of films that “reanimate the myth” of Frankenstein for a new context.  I 
refer to these films as “retellings” rather than “adaptations” of the tale, a choice 
that indicates my desire to move beyond the aforementioned “canon” of 
Frankenstein films.  Caroline Joan Picart touches on the difference between 
“adaptations” and “retellings” in her analysis of filmic versions of Frankenstein, 
which she divides into two groups: those “that re-envisage the original (such as 
the Universal and Hammer series) within a horror genre” and those that 
“reimagine that narrative within a different genre, such as comedy or science 
fiction”.
18  This thesis is generally concerned with the latter group of films, and 
particularly with science-fictional reworkings of the tale.  I agree with Picart that 
discussions of Frankenstein in film need to address texts other than literal 
(horror) adaptations of Shelley’s novel.  Consequently, this thesis will refer to 
films that play with the novel’s tropes, scenes, images, and themes but do not 
necessarily claim the status of “adaptation” – films that, in Frank Smooth’s 
words, “extend the myth outward a considerable distance”.
19 
                                                 
17 Freedman, 254. 
18 Caroline Joan Picart, “Introduction: Diffusing Beyond Horror: Frankenstein’s 
Enduring Resurrections”, in The Frankenstein Film Sourcebook, eds. Caroline 
Joan Picart et al (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), xi. 
19 Frank Smooth, “A Note on the Entries”, in The Frankenstein Film Sourcebook, 
eds. Caroline Joan Picart et al (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 
xvii.   15 
 
In concurrence with Picart, I also propose that such texts are often more “active” 
than literal adaptations: that their engagement with Shelley’s tale is frequently 
more fruitful.  Picart argues that literal adaptations of Frankenstein are “pre-
set”
20 by the structure of the original narrative, but that looser retellings outside 
the horror genre allow Shelley’s tale to be challenged and subverted.  Citing the 
seminal science fiction films Blade Runner and the Alien saga as examples, 
Picart writes that in such texts: 
 
Despite the persistence of traditional themes (the parthenogenetic birth; the 
scientist as father-mother), various transgressions, which had not been 
possible in traditional iterations of the Frankenstein myth, now become 
crucial to the unfolding of the narrative.
21 
 
These science-fictional retellings show us how the Frankenstein “myth” might 
(like all good myths) be subverted and reworked to address concerns that were 
silenced in earlier versions of the tale.  Films that play with the strict gender roles 
assigned to Shelley’s characters provide the simplest example of such 
subversion: and indeed, many of the texts analysed in this project are similar to 
the Alien films because they undertake a re-gendering of the Frankenstein tale, 
giving voice to female monsters and/or stripping the monstrous/mechanical body 
of its gender inscriptions. 
 
Given the science-fictional nature of many of the films under scrutiny in this 
project, a deeper assessment of the relationship between Frankenstein and the 
science fiction genre is warranted at this stage.  There are some assertions that 
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Shelley’s Frankenstein was the “first” science fiction novel; most famously, 
these come from Brian Aldiss in his book Billion Year Spree: the History of 
Science Fiction.
22  Building on Aldiss, other theorists have taken up this claim.  
Carl Freedman, for instance, refers to Mary Shelley as the “founder of science 
fiction”,
23 noting that Shelley had “never heard the term [science fiction], and 
she may well have had no conscious notion that she was inventing a new genre.  
But that is precisely what she did”.
24  Other theorists recognise the influence that 
Shelley’s text has had on the development of the science fiction genre, and/or the 
science-fictional aspects of Shelley’s writing: Darko Suvin, for instance, reads 
Frankenstein as a “hybrid of horror tale and philosophical SF” and analyses the 
novel in detail for its contribution to the science fiction genre.
25  This thesis 
acknowledges the debt owed to Shelley’s text by today’s science fiction writers 
and filmmakers; it also acknowledges, however, that such generic placement of 
Shelley’s text is problematic.  Elaine Graham identifies a common argument that 
Shelley’s Frankenstein “must be read more as a work of occult or Gothic 
literature than as an early example of science fiction shaped with any degree of 
credibility by the scientific practices of its day”.
26   Other theorists, however, 
contend that the novel disrupts the general rules of Gothic literature with its 
depiction of an act inspired by science (if not literally scientific in nature).  In 
this vein, Brian Stableford argues that: 
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Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1973). 
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24 Ibid., 254. 
25 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History 
of a Literary Genre (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 127. 
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Victor Frankenstein might be regarded as a distant literary cousin of the 
diabolically-inspired (or seemingly diabolical) villains of the Classic 
Gothic novels, but his personality and his ambitions are very different.  
Although he takes some early inspiration from occult writings of a kind 
which the inquisitorially-minded might regard as the devil’s work, he 
undertakes a decisive change of direction when he decides that it is modern 
science, not ancient magic, that will open the portals of wisdom for 
scholars of his and future generations.
27 
 
Freedman pinpoints a similar shift in Victor’s interests – from the alchemical and 
the occult to the scientific – and argues that from this moment “the text explicitly 
operates under the science-fictional protocols that are stubbornly alternative to 
both known reality and unknowable impossibility”.
28  When Victor animates his 
monster, then, he employs technologies
29 that are both scientific and imaginary, 
both possible and impossible, thus preempting, engaging, or initiating 
(depending on one’s perspective) a science-fictional mode of storytelling. 
 
It is not my intention in this project to constrain myself within the generic 
boundaries of science fiction, or to enter into any detailed discussion of “genre” 
itself.
30  That the texts considered here are mostly science-fictional in nature 
shows my interest in the process of reworking Frankenstein outside the horror 
                                                 
27 Brian Stableford, “Frankenstein and the Origins of Science Fiction”, in 
Anticipations: Essays on Early Science Fiction and Its Precursors, ed. David 
Seed (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 48. 
28 Freedman, 256. 
29 It is important to acknowledge, however, that such “technologies” are 
notoriously hazy and are never specifically named by Shelley; instead, she 
shrouds Victor “scientific” act in a sense of secrecy and semi-religious mystique. 
30 For an outstanding discussion of whether we can or should refer to “science 
fiction” as a “genre” see Damien Broderick, “SF as a Mode”, Meridian 11, 2 
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Annette Kuhn, “Introduction: Cultural Theory and Science Fiction Cinema”, in 
Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema, ed. 
Annette Kuhn (London and New York: Verso, 1990), 1-12.  For other 
discussions of genre see Barry Keith Grant, Film Genre Reader (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1990), and Stephen Neale, Genre and Hollywood 
(London: Routledge, 2000).     18 
genre as well as my support for the argument that Shelley’s novel is primarily (if 
not exclusively) a science-fictional – rather than a horror or Gothic – text.  
Neither is it my intention, however, to claim that Shelley’s novel was the “first” 
work of science fiction.  Of all such discussions, I find Adam Roberts’ words on 
the subject to be most helpful.  Roberts describes Frankenstein as “the originary 
scientific fable about the power of the scientist to create, matched with the 
unforeseeable nature of the consequences of that creation”;
 31 thus, he tells us, 
Shelley’s novel contains “SF in nascent form”
32 even if it was not the “first” 
science fiction text. 
 
Furthermore – and as I will discuss in chapters ahead – popular culture of the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has seen to a science-fictionalising of 
Shelley’s tale.  From Fritz Lang’s early science fiction film Metropolis to the 
anime Ghost in the Shell and concurrent Hollywood sci-fi films like AI: Artificial 
Intelligence and The Matrix, we find that the Frankenstein tale has been rewritten 
as a science fiction story about mechanical and/or digitised bodies.  This, as 
theorists such as Clayton
33 and Roberts
34 have pointed out, is due to the influence 
of seminal science fiction writers like E.T.A Hoffman and Isaac Asimov on the 
project of retelling Shelley’s Frankenstein.  Thus, we can justifiably study 
Frankenstein’s filmic “futurity” by focusing upon robots, cyborgs, replicants, and 
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This will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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avatars, claiming that today’s Frankenstein films are less likely to be horror texts 
than science-fictional tales involving mechanical or otherwise artificial figures.  
At the same time, we can identify horror and Gothic tendencies in many of 
today’s science fiction texts.  As Stableford notes, “[a] great deal of the fiction 
nowadays categorized as science fiction is horrific, and much of it is born of a 
fear or even a deep-seated hatred of the scientific world-view”;
35 thus its 
resonance with Shelley’s Frankenstein.  We can refer back to Aldiss here who 
states that “[s]cience fiction was born from the Gothic mode, is hardly free of it 
now.  Nor is the distance between the two modes great”.
36 
 
Informed by this generic intersection between Frankenstein, the Gothic, and 
science fiction, this thesis frequently draws upon the work of those who write 
about science fiction film (as well as those who write about Frankenstein).  I 
have found such theoretical work beneficial because it often brings the 
technologies of cinema into the analytical equation.  Scholarship of science 
fiction cinema currently seems to revolve around the understanding that science 
fiction films participate in “the articulation of meta-cinematic reflections on the 
nature and limitations of the film medium”, as Charles Tryon puts it.
37  
Discussing such self-reflexivity, Roberts refers to the “metaphoric”
38 aspect of 
depictions of technology in science fiction cinema; using the icon of the space-
ship as an example, he argues: 
 
                                                 
35 Stableford, 48. 
36 Aldiss, 18. 
37 Charles Tryon, “Virtual Cities and Stolen Memories: Temporality and the 
Digital in Dark City”, Film Criticism 28, 2 (2004), 42. 
38 Roberts, Science Fiction, 147.   20 
The technology we fans admire so completely, the space-ships that we 
consider so cool and which are deployed on the screen before us in so 
exciting a fashion, are nothing more than the external trapping of the 
technology that we are really admiring, the technology of cinema itself.
39 
 
In particular, of course, we are “admiring” the special effects technologies – 
these days often digital and thus other to the cinematic – that produce these 
fantastic images.  This has led analysts such as Barry Keith Grant to state that 
“the genre’s reliance on special effects is itself an enactment of science fiction’s 
thematic concern with technology”.
40 
 
Throughout this project, I will place my readings of various Frankenstein films 
within this analytical framework.  Cinematic adaptations of Frankenstein in all 
genres contain depictions of technology that function as “metaphorically” as 
Roberts’ “space-ship”: when such films depict the “instruments of life”
41 that 
animate the monster’s body, they cannot avoid an accompanying depiction of the 
cinematic apparatus itself.  What we find in adaptations of Frankenstein, 
furthermore, is that the body is at the centre of this metaphoric play.  Shelley’s 
tale is a tale about (techno-)embodiment in its most fantastic, monstrous, and 
problematic sense; and the various Frankensteinian monsters that have appeared 
on our screens across the history of cinema not only stand in for the filmic 
apparatus but confront cinema’s technologising, decorporealising, and 
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fragmenting of organic presence.  These are the “filmic machines” and 
“animated monsters” that this thesis takes as its subject. 
 
An outline of the chapters and a trajectory (of sorts) 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  My first chapter functions as an 
introductory investigation of Frankenstein and will lay the theoretical 
groundwork for the analyses that follow.  Here, I introduce Mary Shelley’s novel 
as a text that has inspired much of the research involved in this project.  I 
consider the metaphoric link between “text” and “body” that defines Shelley’s 
novel: a story about techno-genesis and creativity that can be read as a fantastic 
depiction of writing a novel.  This text/body link has driven many recent 
retellings of Shelley’s Frankenstein, including two non-filmic works that are 
discussed here in conjunction with the original text: Victor Kelleher’s novel Born 
of the Sea and Shelley Jackson’s hypertext Patchwork Girl.  This chapter also 
offers a theorising of the monster’s body: a fragmented body onto which are 
projected the tensions between nature and technology; a postorganic body 
forever in negotiation with its lost origins in the organic world.  These aspects of 
Shelley’s Creature, I argue, allow him/her/it to operate in dialogue with the 
techno-bodies – both popular and theoretical – that inhabit our late 
twentieth/early twenty-first century world.  This chapter thus maps the 
theoretical resonance of the Frankenstein tale; in particular, I compare Shelley’s 
monster to the theoretically delineated “cyborg” as imagined by Donna Haraway 
and others. 
   22 
My second chapter assesses the relationship between Frankenstein and cinema.  
This relationship, as many theorists have recognised, is built on fantasy, 
metaphor, and an inside/outside play: filmic versions of the Frankenstein tale are 
defined by a wonderful self-reflexivity, because filmmaking itself is a 
“Frankensteinian exercise in artificial reproduction”, as James Heffernan reminds 
us.
42  This chapter unpacks the notion of artificial reproduction as a bridge 
between cinema and the Frankenstein tale, drawing upon the work of Walter 
Benjamin and his discussion of cinema as “mechanical reproduction”.  My 
analyses begin with the 1910 film Frankenstein.  Depictions of the monster in 
this early film, especially in the moment of his/its alchemical creation, express 
all that is fantastic, supernatural, and strange about cinematic presence.  Later 
adaptations would turn the creation scene into a moment of electric spectacle.  
That Shelley wrote of a certain technologising of the “life force” in Frankenstein 
makes her work preemptive of cinema and resonant with cinema’s own 
production of electric “life”; this brings a certain self-reflexivity to the creation 
scenes of James Whale’s Frankenstein and Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.  We can also 
consider Kenneth Branagh’s 1994 adaptation, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, in 
this context, although Branagh’s obsession with both authenticity and organicism 
brings a new concern to the tale in its filmic form and is, we might suggest, 
symptomatic of an age dominated by digital spectacle. 
 
Chapter Three investigates the way Frankenstein has been reshaped in cinema of 
the 1990s and post-millennium.  This chapter moves beyond both the literal 
                                                 
42 James A.W. Heffernan, “Looking at the Monster: Frankenstein and Film”, 
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adaptations discussed in the previous chapter and the “myth of animation”
43 that 
links them to cinema: in the digital age, I contend, new concerns have eclipsed 
cinema’s powers to animate and/or galvanise the body.  We find that the monster 
is rewritten in this period as a simulacrum, a replicant, a cyborg, an artificial 
being.  The emphasis in these new retellings also frequently shifts from the 
constructed and fragmented body to the construction and fragmentation of the 
subject in a hyper-mediated world.  We can read the science fiction films Blade 
Runner and Strange Days in this regard: they are loose retellings of Frankenstein 
that dwell upon new themes of mediation, spectatorship, and artificial memory.  
The period in question is also marked by developments in both biotechnology 
and digital media, which contribute to a crucial shift in the cultural conception of 
“life” itself.  This shift informs the retelling of Frankenstein in such texts as 
Jurassic Park, The Fifth Element, and The Matrix.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the incorporation of digital effects into the Frankenstein myth and 
the related emergence of “digital monsters”: figures who embody the otherness 
of postcinematic technologies. 
 
In Chapters Four and Five, I shift my attention from “filmic machines” to 
“animated monsters”.  Chapter Four addresses new modes of digital animation 
and the related attempt to digitally reconstruct the organic body (and landscape).  
Drawing upon the theoretical work of N. Katherine Hayles, I use the condition 
known as “posthumanism” to forge a link between these new modes of digital 
animation (which frequently usurp human presence) and the Frankenstein tale 
(which revolves around a posthuman body).  In today’s screen culture, I argue, 
                                                 
43 Nestrick, 292.   24 
the posthuman and the postcinematic collapse, and both find (apocalyptic) 
expression in science-fictional and fantastic tales that engage the Frankenstein 
myth.  At the same time, new possibilities in the digital imaging of human 
presence – from the replacement of actors with computer-generated imagery to 
the quest for photorealism in digital animation – themselves evoke the 
Frankenstein tale and consequently make interesting contributions to the 
evolving Frankenstein myth. 
 
Chapter Five moves into the dark and fantastic world of Japanese animation or 
“anime”.  As theorists such as Susan Napier have observed, the body in anime is 
transformative and magical, fragmented and broken, transcended and posthuman, 
monstrous and mechanical.
44  These “strange bodies” are imprinted with the 
otherness of the medium that contains them: a medium that has always occupied 
the position of other to the cinematic and that is, increasingly, postcinematic.  A 
space is opened up here for fantastic new retellings of Frankenstein that address 
animation as a mode of production (itself a means of “breathing life into dead 
matter”
45) while reworking the tale in response to notions of embodiment, 
technology, and subjectivity that are deeply embedded in Japanese culture.  I 
offer the film Akira as an example of an apocalyptic rewriting of Shelley’s text 
(and of the monstrous/mechanical body it contains). 
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Chapters Four and Five also present detailed analyses of two figures that I read 
as Frankensteinian monsters for the digital age: the motion-capture 
character/actress Aki Ross from the photorealistic digital feature Final Fantasy: 
The Spirits Within, and the animated cyborg Kusanagi from Mamoru Oshii’s 
Ghost in the Shell.  As female characters defined by their beauty
46 rather than 
their monstrosity, these figures might seem far removed from Shelley’s monster 
with his “watery eyes… his shriveled complexion and straight black lips”.
47  
Like their predecessor, however, Aki and Kusanagi are mechanical bodies 
defined by problems of (in)visibility, spectral presence, and an uneasy 
negotiation with “nature”.  Imbued with artificial life, their posthuman bodies are 
also emblematic of a digital culture that reconstructs the organic and de-
organicises the screen.  My intention is that this thesis should culminate in a 
dialogue between these two bodies and the mythic figure that the Frankensteinian 
monster has become. 
 
Each of these chapters focuses upon a selection of films that offer significant 
retellings of Frankenstein.  It is not my intention that these analyses should 
constitute an exhaustive or encyclopaedic assessment of filmic adaptations of 
Shelley’s tale.  Instead, I use the individual films as examples and have found it 
more beneficial to read their dialogue with Frankenstein in detail than to offer a 
superficial exploration of a larger number of texts.  Certain omissions, however, 
should be acknowledged and explained.  For the most part, my chosen texts are 
films of the 1980s or later.  I use a handful of earlier texts to assess the 
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relationship between Frankenstein and cinema: these include the Edison film, 
James Whale’s Frankenstein, and Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.  I do not refer to the 
Hammer films of the 1950s and 1960s – The Curse of Frankenstein and its 
sequels – which I feel are outside the scope of a project that focuses on 
Frankenstein in the digital age; for a similar reason, I have not examined the 
popular unpackings of the Frankenstein myth that appear in films of the 1970s 
such as The Rocky Horror Picture Show and Young Frankenstein.  Notable 
retellings of the 1990s that are neglected as part of an effort to give form and 
boundaries to a potentially “monstrous” project include Tim Burton’s Gothic 
fantasy Edward Scissorhands, which represents a whimsical and sometimes 
comedic variation on the tale but does not, I feel, address the concerns of the 
“digital age”.
48  I have avoided any detailed discussion of AI: Artificial 
Intelligence, a recent retelling of Frankenstein that has already been analysed in 
great detail by Williams
49 and Clayton.
50  Similarly, I have attempted to limit my 
discussion of Blade Runner – which I do analyse briefly in Chapter Three – 
because of the density of academic scholarship connected to this text.
51  Another 
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and throughout.  Giuliana Bruno offers a detailed reading of the film in her essay 
“Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner”,while Doel and Clarke present   27 
notable omission to this study is the 2008 animation Igor, a comedic retelling 
and gentle subverting of Frankenstein which came to my attention in the latter 
stages of writing this thesis and an analysis of which, I felt, would contribute 
little to my overall argument. 
 
The structure of this thesis reflects my desire to tell a story: one that begins with 
Shelley’s novel and ends with its retelling in digital culture.  It does not, 
however, reflect any desire to create a smooth or continuous history of film, or to 
suggest that literature, film, and animation can – or should – be seen in the same 
terms.  I acknowledge that this project, which takes as its subject the (broken) 
communication between media, is built upon a number of crucial disparities.  
Foremost among them is the disparity between written and visual texts – that 
crucial tension between word and image, novel and film.  This disparity has 
recently entered into theoretical discussions of science fiction cinema.  Annette 
Kuhn, for instance, writes of the need to consider science fiction film in its own 
terms and not as an extension of science fiction literature.
52  Similarly, Brooks 
Landon discusses the disparity between science-fictional works of literature and 
the history of science fiction film, arguing that: 
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while science-fiction writing has always been a narrative medium, science-
fiction film actually began as a non-narrative one, its influences and 
traditions being quite different from those of science-fiction writing.  The 
two media have developed along widely divergent trajectories.
53   
 
For Landon, current science fiction film has more in common with the spectacle 
and visual magic of early cinema than it might do with science fiction novels 
(such as Frankenstein).  Accordingly, Landon recognises a need:  
 
to rethink science-fiction film in film-specific terms, opting variously for 
epistemologically based or image-based criteria instead of the source-based 
or narrative-based assumptions that have so far shaped most discussions of 
science-fiction film.
54 
 
This thesis does not cohere with such a suggestion because it traces the thematic 
and story-based echoes and murmurs between Frankenstein (as both a novel and 
a mythic tale) and certain films of the digital age.  Consequently, the tension 
between film and literature – and the problems initiated by such a tension – 
pervades this thesis. 
 
The disparity between film and literature becomes particularly noticeable and 
especially problematic when we are considering filmic adaptations of great 
literary works.  Once again, this has special relevance for the science fiction 
genre: for, while we might speak of the visual and image-based quality of the 
film medium and trace the history of current science fiction film back to early 
experiments in cinematic spectacle such as George Méliès’ Le Voyage Dans La 
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Lune, we must also acknowledge that many science fiction films of the last thirty 
years are adaptations of famous novels or stories by such varied writers as H.G. 
Wells, Jules Verne, Philip K. Dick, and William Gibson.  As Landon observes: 
 
any rigorous attempt to develop a history, theory, or aesthetic of science 
fiction film must early on confront the special questions posed by the 
adaptation into film of written SF.  That nearly every study of SF film 
almost routinely assumes adaptations to be intellectually inferior to the 
written narratives preceding them suggests one aspect of this issue, while 
the fact that many of the SF films generally regarded as ‘classics’ are 
themselves adaptations suggests another.
55 
 
Landon goes on to discuss the problem of authorship in Blade Runner, where 
collaborating screenwriters each contributed to a script that was (somewhat 
famously) redrafted many times.  The image of Frankenstein’s monster, 
fragmented and sewn-together, might be metaphorically deployed here.  
Likewise, the relationship between written text and filmic adaptation can be seen 
in terms of the adaptation as a problematic (or monstrous) “child”, difficult to 
love; it is the same relationship that Shelley writes of in her novel.  Ultimately, 
the problems of originality and authenticity that Shelley’s narrative negotiates 
are also the problems faced by any author (or filmmaker) who attempts to rewrite 
and “adapt” the novel.  Thus James Heffernan asks us to consider if filmic 
versions of Frankenstein can ever “be anything more than vulgarizations or 
travesties of the original?”.
56 
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1991), 90-91. 
56 Heffernan, 136.   30 
If Frankenstein is a tale most famous in both its written and filmic forms, then 
the disparity between film and literature – as well as those problems associated 
with the very process of “adaptation” – cannot be avoided in any real assessment 
of the text.  Indeed, it has seemed more appropriate, to me, to embrace this 
disparity as a meaningful, if unavoidable, aspect of this project.  After all, 
Frankenstein is a story about fragmentation, about the very disparity between 
body parts and the jarring mis-relationship between constructed body and natural 
world.  We can evoke the figure of the Frankensteinian monster as a metaphor 
for the troubled relationship between writing and film, a body onto which the 
fantastic tensions between word and image can be projected. 
 
The second major disparity that this thesis incorporates is that between film, in 
its traditional, photographic sense, and digital animation.  It should therefore also 
be acknowledged that there has been much theoretical murmuring in recent times 
about the need to consider digital media as distinct from (and not as an extension 
of) cinema or photography.  Sean Cubitt writes of a perceived need to “define the 
digital in terms of its difference from the photomechanical media”, noting 
however that this can be a problematic approach because it “rests implicitly – 
and sometimes explicitly – on a conceptualisation of the mechanical photograph 
as normative, and the digital as a deviation from that norm”.
57  This conception, 
he tells us, needs to be overturned “if digital criticism is to come of age”.
58  
Interestingly, N. Katherine Hayles addresses similar concerns in her reading of 
Shelley Jackson’s hypertext Patchwork Girl, a digital retelling of Frankenstein 
                                                 
57 Sean Cubitt, “The Distinctiveness of Digital Criticism”, Screen 41, 1 (2000), 
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that will be referred to in Chapter One of this thesis.  Hayles discusses the need 
for “medium-specific analysis” in an age of digital media and electronic writing, 
and calls for a shift “from the language of ‘text’ to a more precise vocabulary of 
screen and page, digital program and analogue interface, code and ink, mutable 
image and durably inscribed mark, texton and scripton, computer and book”.
59 
 
While this project does not venture far into the realm of electronic literature, it 
does bring novels into dialogue with films, digital animation into dialogue with 
live-action cinema, and refers to various other media texts (including television 
shows and hypertexts like Patchwork Girl itself) along the way; thus “medium-
specific analysis”, the need to consider each medium in its own terms, and the 
related need to avoid collapsing media into one another, has been a concern 
throughout the research and writing process.  Overall, however, I adopt the 
perspective that what we might think of as “cinema” is not limited to pure, 
traditional, photographic modes of filmmaking; it can potentially include new 
digital modes of production and is expanded and enriched – rather than 
threatened – by these new modes.
60  Thus I use the term “cinema” to refer to 
live-action film, animation, and digital filmmaking.  I also acknowledge that the 
theoretical discussion of media specificity is ongoing and unresolved in an age 
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where texts of different media are never perceived or received in isolation but 
meet each other in the wonderful mess that is called media culture; thus Hayles, 
in calling for medium-specific analysis, notes that this does not mean “media 
should be considered in isolation from one another”.
61 
 
This approach is well-suited to Frankenstein, as it would be to any great literary 
work that has been repeatedly adapted in popular culture and that consequently 
poses a challenge to the very concept of media specificity.  Ultimately, 
Frankenstein is a narrative that has been retold in many technological spaces: 
from early cinema to the science fiction blockbusters of the 1980s and beyond, 
from Shelley’s original novel to novels of the postmodern and postfeminist era, 
from writing to hypertext to anime.  The Frankenstein “mega-text”, therefore, is 
spread across many different modes of production; it is by no means a seamless 
or unproblematic textual “body”.  These shifts in medium, as we shall see within, 
are at least partly responsible for the tale’s endurance and for its evolution – for 
the remarkable transformation that the Frankenstein myth has undergone.  With 
this in mind, let us begin the analytical journey and turn to Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, a literary work that has had a complicated and compelling 
relationship with cinema and whose cultural import resonates into the digital age. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
MAPPING AN APPROACH TO FRANKENSTEIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Elsa Lanchester as Mary Shelley in Bride of Frankenstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Lanchester as the female monster in the same film   34 
The origins of the story: introducing Mary Shelley 
 
The 1935 James Whale film Bride of Frankenstein begins with a curious scene.  
In a peaceful parlour setting Mary Shelley, her husband Percy and the poet 
Byron are depicted discussing Shelley’s novel Frankenstein.  The dialogue is 
playful.  “What of my Mary?” Percy asks.  “She is an angel”, replies Byron.  
Mary smiles sweetly.  “You think so?” she says, with perhaps a glint of mischief 
in her eyes, and begins to tell them how “her” story (which concluded abruptly in 
Whale’s earlier film Frankenstein) ends.  In this retelling of Frankenstein, Mary-
the-writer is made visible; yet she is also made monstrous, her visibility 
complicated by the fact that she is played by Elsa Lanchester, the same actress 
who plays the “Bride”.  By aligning her with the female monster the film reflects 
upon the long-held cultural assumption that there is something “monstrous” 
about a teenage girl who dreams up such a dark and violent tale.  At the same 
time, by writing Shelley into the film Whale and his creative team acknowledge 
a need to refer back to Frankenstein-the-novel in the process of adapting it for 
the screen – even though their film is a “monstrous” reconstruction of the 
Frankenstein tale bearing little similarity to the novel “Mary” refers to in the 
opening scene. 
 
Western culture has long been fascinated by Mary Shelley, and such fascination 
shows no sign of waning in the digital age.  Thus, many decades after Whale’s 
film, director Kenneth Branagh allows his adaptation of Frankenstein to begin 
with a voice-over from “Mary” herself, reciting words that appeared in her 
introduction to the 1831 reprint of the novel: “I busied myself to think of a   35 
story”, we hear Mary say, “that would speak to the mysterious fears of our 
nature”.
1  This ongoing cultural obsession with Shelley is not surprising given 
the astounding details of her rather tragic life; she has, in many ways, become a 
character as remarkable as those she created.  At the same time, what is 
articulated in these two films is an obsession not just with Shelley but with the 
genesis – the origin story – of her novel. 
 
Anne K. Mellor opens her analysis of Frankenstein (the novel) by giving voice 
to this long-lived fascination with the origins of the tale.  “Let us begin, then,” 
she writes, “with the question of origins: why did the eighteen-year-old Mary 
Shelley give birth to this particular idea on this particular night?”
2  The story of 
how Shelley “conceived” Frankenstein – her contribution to the “ghost stories” 
that she, Percy, and Byron decided to create one rainy day while holidaying in 
Switzerland – has entered into literary history as profoundly as the novel itself, 
aided by the 1831 introduction where Shelley famously attempts to “furnish [her 
readers and publishers] with some account of the origin of the story”.
3  This 
enduring focus on origins, inspiration, and the “spark of life” that initiates a tale 
is more than significant given that the novel itself is essentially about 
(biological) origins, (scientific) inspiration, and the mystery of the 
(electric/spiritual) “spark of life”. 
 
                                                 
1 For these words in the context of Shelley’s introduction, see Mary Shelley, 
Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1993), 3. 
2 Anne K. Mellor, “Making a ‘Monster’: an introduction to Frankenstein”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Mary Shelley, ed. Esther Schor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. 
3 Shelley, 1, my emphasis.   36 
At times, our obsession with Shelley and with the origins of her novel – fuelled 
by television docu-dramas bringing Shelley to life and/or depicting the search for 
the “real Frankenstein”
4 – threatens to eclipse the complexities of the tale itself.  
Relatedly, this is a tale that we tend to simplify or reduce to certain memorable 
themes and scenes.  As Siv Jansson points out, our knowledge of Shelley’s 
background and of the details surrounding the creation and publication of 
Frankenstein “have enhanced a ‘Frankensteinian’ mythology which has 
concentrated upon images of fear and monstrosity at the expense of other 
issues”; he further comments that “[t]his is a pity, because Mary Shelley deals 
with a range of significant ideas in her story”.
5 
 
To Jansson’s concern I would add another: the repeated popular adaptation of 
Shelley’s Frankenstein detaches the tale from its writer, inviting us to reduce the 
text to an image of a monstrous body or a scene of techno-genesis (perhaps 
accompanied by the ringing words, “it’s alive!”).  When we approach Shelley’s 
Frankenstein today, we usually do so through the haze of cinematic memory – 
for, as discussed in my introduction, familiarity with the images from any of 
popular cinema’s Frankenstein adaptations often precedes familiarity with the 
novel itself.  In this sense, it is odd that directors like Branagh and Whale should 
attempt to reassert Shelley’s authorship over the Frankenstein tale.  It is also 
significant that I begin this chapter on Shelley’s novel with reference to one of 
the more famous Frankenstein films. 
                                                 
4 I am thinking particularly of an episode of the History Channel documentary 
series Decoding the Past entitled “In Search of the Real Frankenstein” (aired 
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5 Jansson, Siv, “Publisher’s Introduction”, in Frankenstein, or, The Modern 
Prometheus, written by Mary Shelley (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1999), vii-viii.   37 
 
At the same time, of course, Frankenstein is a tale with far-reaching cultural 
import.  Just as we have long been fascinated with Shelley herself, we have – for 
decades – been claiming the Frankensteinian monster as an allegory for techno-
cultural crises and social or scientific developments.  In 1975 – well over thirty 
years ago – Radu Florescu described the cultural resonance of Shelley’s 
Frankenstein in these terms: 
 
Given the recent cyberpunk revolution, the implantation of artificial hearts, 
the latest experiments in freezing bodies in preparation for a hypothetical 
future life, and the advent of the test-tube baby, the Frankenstein myth has 
become more topical than ever before.
6 
 
This assessment of the tale’s relevance comes before certain crucial 
developments of the digital age.  We can make notable additions to Florescu’s 
list: the ability to reconstruct ourselves virtually in media-worlds such as Second 
Life; the steepening of the debates over stem cell research and genetically 
modified food; the threat of climate change; the increasing concern with organic 
purity in all aspects of twenty-first century life.  Florescu was also writing before 
certain crucial theoretical developments of the 1990s and post-millennium, 
developments that saw the “techno-body” enter into a theoretical space and 
become the starting-point for new mappings of subjectivity and embodiment.  
These are some of the concerns that will be taken up below. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to map an approach to Frankenstein.  If Shelley’s 
text is buried under a plethora of rewritings and popular adaptations, this chapter 
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begins with an active re-engagement of Frankenstein-the-novel.  I focus 
particularly on the novel’s depiction of a nature/technology tension, on the 
monster as an artificial body in negotiation with lost origins in nature, and on the 
themes of writing, production, and embodiment that infuse both the novel and 
Shelley’s 1831 introduction.  This analysis of Frankenstein will lay the 
foundation for the chapters to come. 
 
This introductory chapter also contains analyses of two recent retellings of 
Shelley’s novel: Victor Kelleher’s book Born of the Sea and Shelley Jackson’s 
hypertext fiction Patchwork Girl.  Both these later texts offer interesting 
revisions of Shelley’s novel by giving voice to the female monster.  Although 
these are non-filmic texts – and thus, in many ways, beyond the scope of this 
study – they are helpful to consider here as something of a preface to the chapters 
to come.  These texts, I feel, exemplify the reworking of Frankenstein in current 
popular culture, and show us how the tale can be reshaped in a period dominated 
by film, media, and “the image”.  Below, I will consider how both texts subvert 
the original tale and articulate a need or desire to be “faithful” to Shelley’s novel 
as originary text.  This involves a sort of parent/child relationship that is built 
upon themes of memory and origins: two important concerns that will be detailed 
below and revisited throughout this thesis. 
 
Finally, this chapter brings the Frankensteinian monster into dialogue with the 
more recent figure of the techno-body or the cyborg.  This will lead me to the 
theoretical work of writers like Donna Haraway.  We cannot quite call 
Haraway’s famous “Cyborg Manifesto” a “retelling” of Frankenstein, although   39 
she does refer back to Shelley’s text and to the figure of the monster as a strange 
precursor to her cyborg; below, I will consider how Haraway subverts (if not 
retells) the Frankenstein tale by deconstructing its reverential treatment of 
“nature” and its depiction of the monster as an incomplete being who desires a 
proper “origin story”.  These theoretical ruminations will act as a foundation 
upon which the analyses that constitute this thesis can be built. 
 
An overview of Shelley’s Frankenstein 
 
How then might we approach Shelley’s novel in the early twenty-first century, a 
period vastly removed from Shelley’s own and also a period in which 
“Frankenstein” has evolved into a mega-text frequently “(re)animated” by 
popular culture?  We can start with the story itself.  Published in 1818 and 
authored by the eighteen-year-old Shelley, Frankenstein (or, “The Modern 
Prometheus”) tells the story of Victor Frankenstein, a student of the sciences 
who discovers how to create life.  He is driven by desires that Shelley perceived 
to be ingrained in those who study science: Victor longs to “pioneer a new way, 
explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of 
creation”.
7  More specifically, he desires to create a new and better human: a new 
species that would “bless [him] as its creator and source”.
8 
 
These desires drive Victor until he becomes “capable of bestowing animation 
upon lifeless matter”
9 and subsequently creates his “monster”, a hideous creature 
                                                 
7 Shelley, 38. 
8 Ibid., 43. 
9 Ibid., 41.   40 
whom he abandons in disgust and horror.  The monster berates Victor for his 
irresponsible act and implores him to create a female companion, a request that 
Victor partially fulfills before destroying the half-finished “mate”; the monster 
wreaks vengeance on Victor by murdering his friends and family, a sequence of 
violence and destruction that culminates in the death of Frankenstein’s bride, 
Elizabeth, on their wedding night.  Enraged and bereft of everything he 
cherishes, Frankenstein pursues the monster as far as the Arctic, where he dies of 
exhaustion; the monster, full of remorse, disappears into the wilderness, 
ostensibly to kill himself – an act that is never depicted in the text.  The tale is 
framed by the narration of Robert Walton, the explorer who meets Victor out in 
the ice floes of the Arctic Circle and hears his tragic story. 
 
And it is, indeed, a tragic story – with Victor very much the tragic “hero” 
destroyed by his own weakness and hubris.  In seeking to manufacture “life” 
Victor usurps nature, or attempts to subjugate it; he is particularly driven by fears 
and anxieties raised by the prospect of mortality.  As Jack Morgan points out, 
“[o]urs is a psychology correlative to and defined by our biological character, but 
the human psyche is not comfortably at home in this biological landscape it 
cannot fathom, in a nature everywhere characterised by perishableness”.
10  As 
Morgan is well aware, this discomfort and anxiety fuels Victor’s unnatural act.  
In many ways, Frankenstein is thus defined by a struggle between mentality and 
physicality:
11 the basic human desire to win mental dominance over the natural 
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world (and over problems like mortality that are rooted in the biological 
condition) is rendered dramatic in Shelley’s depiction of the conflict between 
scientific mind (Victor) and monstrous body (his Creature). 
 
Yet if Victor is disturbed by the “perishableness” of nature, this is not an attitude 
endorsed by Shelley herself.  In Frankenstein, “Nature” is depicted as everything 
but perishable: it is vivid, vital, majestic, towering, glorious.  This poeticising 
and revering of the natural landscape is evidenced throughout the text.  Early in 
the narration of his tale Victor describes “the majestic and wondrous scenes 
which surrounded our Swiss home – the sublime shapes of the mountains; the 
changes of the seasons; tempest and calm; the silence of winter, and the life and 
turbulence of our Alpine summers”.
12  These sentiments return in the moments 
preceding the fateful wedding night, when – while rowing on Lake Como – 
Elizabeth implores him to:  
 
Observe how fast we move along, and how the clouds, which sometimes 
obscure and sometimes rise above the Dome of Mont Blanc, render this 
scene of beauty still more interesting.  Look also at the innumerable fish 
that are swimming in the clear waters, where we can distinguish every 
pebble that lies at the bottom.  What a divine day! how happy and serene 
all nature appears!
13 
 
Elizabeth herself is Nature incarnate: she is “fairer than a garden rose among 
dark-leaved brambles”;
14 she has “celestial eyes”.
15  She is content to marvel at 
the beauty of the natural world, a marked contrast with Victor who seeks to 
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dissect, investigate, and discover causes.
16  This contrast amplifies the 
unnaturalness of Victor’s scientific ventures, which are depicted as barren and 
transgressive (a male attempt at reproduction) as well as violative and penetrative 
(a rape of Nature).
17 
 
Here, then, is Frankenstein: a novel that has its roots in both the techno-turmoil 
of the Industrial Revolution and the natural splendour of the European landscape 
as perceived by the poets and writers of the Romantic movement.  This is a story 
about the tension between natural and artificial, nature and technology, organism 
and machine, beauty and monstrosity, birth and construction; above all, as 
Mellor points out, the novel “is profoundly concerned with natural as opposed to 
un-natural modes of production and reproduction”.
18  Any such reading of 
Frankenstein can be underpinned by our knowledge of Shelley’s own life: we 
know, for instance, that Shelley had deep anxieties relating to birth, and to her 
status both as mother and as child (not only did her mother, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, die soon after childbirth, but many of her own children did not 
live to adulthood – details which themselves have become objects of fascination 
for readers of the Shelley/Frankenstein text).  Driven, perhaps, by these anxieties, 
Shelley imagines a world where birth can be supplanted by techno-production; 
she questions what it might mean to exist as a parentless and artificially created 
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being; and she probes the emotional recesses of the failed “parent” and 
irresponsible creator, Victor Frankenstein himself. 
 
At the heart of the Frankenstein tale – and also at the core of these tensions 
between nature and technology, reproduction and techno-production – is the 
monster’s body.  We can identify this body as one produced outside nature and 
beyond the organic, a creature of the laboratory and not of the womb.  In this 
sense, the monster is the embodiment of the unnaturalness of Victor’s actions.  
He/it is also, importantly, other.  Frankenstein is a story about otherness, about – 
as Roberts tells us – “the encounter with difference”.
19  This encounter is 
performed again and again in the text as various characters interact with or are 
destroyed by the monster; it is particularly performed in the interactions between 
Victor and his creature.  Significantly, the monster’s otherness is 
technologically-enabled.  He/it is different, monstrous, ugly, because he/it is 
mechanically produced rather than birthed. 
 
This thesis reads the Frankensteinian monster as an artificial being in strange 
negotiation with the organic world.  Indeed, Shelley’s monster is frequently 
depicted traversing the majestic natural landscapes that form such a distinctive 
part of the novel (mountains, forests, the Orkneys, and finally the ice-floes of the 
Arctic circle).  Significantly, the monster begins the narration of his tale with an 
account of his wanderings in the moonlit forest: 
 
                                                 
19 Adam Roberts, Science Fiction (London and New York: Routledge, 2000),  
54.   44 
Soon a gentle light stole over the heavens, and gave me a sensation of 
pleasure.  I started up and beheld a radiant form rise from among the trees.  
I gazed with a kind of wonder.  It moved slowly, but it enlightened my 
path, and I again went out in search of berries… I felt light, and hunger, 
and thirst, and darkness; innumerable sounds rang in my ears, and on all 
sides various scents saluted me: the only subject that I could distinguish 
was the bright moon, and I fixed my eyes on that with pleasure.
20 
 
This strangely moving account of the interaction between an artificial being and 
the natural world from which he is excluded is intrinsically tied to the forlorn 
question that the monster soon asks: “Who was I?  What was I?  Whence did I 
come?”
21  The monster’s desire to know his own history – indeed, his status as a 
being lacking history – is underpinned by his existence as an artificial creation 
with no true link to the organic world.  In this vein, Catherine Waldby describes 
Frankenstein as “one of the earliest attempts to deal with the malleability of life 
and the possibilities of human ‘technogenesis’, the loss of an origin securely 
located in nature”.
22  This, she tells us, leads to the crucial question around 
which the novel is structured: “what does it mean to be embodied when the body 
cannot claim the status of nature?”
23 
 
We might consider how this problem of organic origins – of the instantly created 
being who is excluded from the evolutionary narrative – is articulated in quite a 
different context by theorists today.  Palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, for 
instance, tells us:   
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Living creatures have to have some form of historical continuity, to grow 
and to reproduce, to inherit the characteristics of their ancestors.  But 
artificial systems exist, and ones which are capable of behaving in the same 
way.  The only reason we refuse to say they’re alive is that they’re not 
historically linked to what we call life.
24 
 
This lack of a “historical link” to natural “life” is the very quality that defines 
Frankenstein’s monster; it is also a concern articulated in later discussions of the 
“cyborg” or techno-body, whom we can assess according to the distance he/she/it 
has travelled from an origin located in nature.  Robert Rawdon Wilson tells us 
that the more we technologically enhance or alter our organic bodies and minds, 
the more we will be prompted to look behind us, contemplating what we have 
lost: “each prosthetic modification”, Wilson writes, “also marks the distance I 
will have travelled from my original physical condition”.
25  Similarly, Mark 
Poster’s “High-tech Frankenstein” – employed as a metaphor for the construction 
of posthuman identities in the digital age – is a figure “who will stare backwards 
at us, his/her historical ancestors, like Benjamin’s angel, as if observing a 
monster”.
26  Poster is referring here to Walter Benjamin’s reading of the Paul 
Klee painting Angelus Novus, which represents for Benjamin the “angel of 
history”.  Benjamin writes: 
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This is how one pictures the angel of history.  His face is turned toward the 
past… The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole 
what has been smashed.  But a storm is blowing from Paradise… this storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while 
the pile of debris before him grows skyward.  This storm is what we call 
progress.
27 
 
We can appropriate Benjamin’s “angel” and use it to express the predicament of 
the Frankensteinian monster in all its guises: a technologised or posthuman body 
which, although forever being blown towards the future, is always in negotiation 
with a receding origin in nature.   
 
This problem of “origins”, of a lost link with the organic world, is foundational 
to this thesis.  It is a problem that we feel deeply in the digital age, a period in 
which our relationship with nature and our own organic status are both 
threatened and continually evoked in cultural discourse.  For this reason, 
perhaps, many retellings of Frankenstein in the digital age – particularly those in 
popular cinema – foreground these origin stories and explore the monster’s status 
as a being in exile from nature.  Furthermore, and most interestingly, we can 
view the on-screen body, too, in terms of its troubled origin story, its 
disconnection from an (organic) moment in time.  But I am getting ahead of 
myself here; these concerns will be discussed in the chapters ahead. 
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The 1831 introduction and the text/body link 
 
Originally published anonymously, Shelley’s novel was revised and republished 
in 1831
28 complete with an introduction in which Shelley writes about her own 
writing process.  This introduction has become an important element of the 
Frankensteinian textual “body”, even if it was added as an extra “appendage”
29 
some years after the novel’s first publication.  Here, Shelley details the events 
surrounding the genesis of Frankenstein: she describes the holiday with Percy 
and Byron and the ghost-story challenge, as well as the period of “writer’s 
block” that followed.  What is mythologised in this introduction is the moment 
when Shelley thought of her story, and the dream or vision which presented 
Frankenstein and his monster to her.  Shelley tells us:  
 
When I placed my head on my pillow, I did not sleep, nor could I be said to 
think.  My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the 
successive images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the 
usual bounds of reverie.  I saw – with shut eyes, but acute mental vision – I 
saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had 
put together.
30 
 
This, as Barbara Johnson points out, is a recounting of the novel’s “primal scene 
of creation”.
31  As many analysts have observed, there is a startling parallel 
between this primal scene and the one depicted within the novel: the fantastic 
moment of animation.  Indeed, as Victor describes the period leading up to that 
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“dreary night in November”
32 when the monster comes alive, we can almost 
imagine that we are listening to Shelley herself detailing the writing of 
Frankenstein.  “Winter, spring, and summer passed away during my labours”, 
Victor states, “but I did not watch the blossom or the expanding leaves – sights 
which before always yielded me supreme delight – so deeply was I engrossed in 
my occupation”.
33  Here we catch a glimpse of Shelley the immersed writer, the 
obsessed writer.  We also glimpse the writer who is horrified by her creation, by 
the dark depths of her own imagination: “I had worked hard for nearly two 
years”, Victor tells us, “but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream 
vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart”.
34   
 
Most affecting here is the eerie correlation between Victor’s description of the 
monster and that provided by Shelley in her introduction.  Victor articulates his 
horror at seeing the monster’s “watery eyes… his shriveled complexion and 
straight black lips”;
35 he flees from the room, only to be wakened from sleep by 
the sight of the monster looming over him.  In her introduction Shelley also 
stresses the act of seeing the monster as a crucial stage in creating/imagining 
him; like Victor, she is wakened from sleep by the sight of him, and cannot 
escape his image: “I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out”, she 
writes, “looking on him with yellow, watery, but speculative eyes… I opened 
mine in terror… [but] I could not so easily get rid of my hideous phantom; still it 
haunted me”.
36 
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There is a second creation scene depicted in Frankenstein – a later scene in 
which Victor builds, then destroys the body of the female monster.  Here too we 
find that the creative process is rendered monstrous, with an emphasis not only 
on the act of production but on the agony and uncertainty that precedes it.  Victor 
tells us: 
 
I worked on, and my labour was already considerably advanced.  I looked 
towards its completion with a tremulous and eager hope, which I dared not 
trust myself to question, but which was intermixed with obscure 
forebodings of evil, that made my heart sicken in my bosom.
37 
 
This description of his “labour” takes us, once again, to the fringes of the fictive 
world; again, we hear the voice of Mary-the-writer intermingling with Victor’s.  
Jules Law refers to this second creation scene as an example of the “development 
of violence out of narrative blockage” that recurs in the novel.
38  Law argues that 
the pattern of delay and deferral that precedes the scene – Victor’s 
procrastination as he wanders Europe, dreading the completion of the task he has 
been assigned – mirrors the delay and deferral recounted by Shelley in her 
introduction where she delays linking her dream about the monster to the task of 
thinking up a ghost story.
39  In the novel, this build-up of procrastination 
culminates in the violent destruction of the female Creature and the discarding of 
her fragmented body. 
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The parallels between the novel and its introduction – as well as the broader link 
between Frankenstein’s themes of techno-production and the act of textual 
production behind any book – have been well theorised.  Hayles, for instance, 
refers to a certain Frankensteinian interplay between “monstrous text” and 
“textualized monster”.
40  Johnson discusses such interplay in more detail, 
offering a thorough exploration of the parallels between “Victor’s creation of his 
monster and Mary’s creation of her book”.
41  Johnson observes: 
 
The impulse to write the book and the desire to search for the secrets of 
animation both arise under the same seemingly trivial circumstances: the 
necessity of finding something to read on a rainy day.  During inclement 
weather on a family vacation, Victor Frankenstein happens upon the 
writings of Cornelius Agrippa, and is immediately fired with the longing to 
penetrate the secrets of life and death.  Similarly, it was during a wet, 
ungenial summer in Switzerland that Mary, Shelley, Byron, and several 
others picked up a volume of ghost stories and decided to write a collection 
of spine-tingling tales of their own.
42 
 
Johnson uses these parallels to fuel her argument that the novel is semi-
autobiographical; and in turn, this potentiality for autobiography deepens the 
parallels between Mary and Victor because, as Johnson suggests, “the desire for 
resemblance, the desire to create a being like oneself – which is the 
autobiographical desire par excellence – is also the central transgression in Mary 
Shelley’s novel”.
43  Her ultimate claim is that the novel – with its powerful 
themes of production, creation, and creative agony/ecstasy – can be  “read as the 
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story of the experience of writing Frankenstein”.
44  Interestingly, such self-
reflexive overtones are acknowledged and possibly fuelled by Shelley herself 
who, in her introduction, famously refers to the novel as her “hideous 
progeny”.
45  
 
As this playful statement by Shelley indicates, the 1831 introduction is infused 
with the very themes of procreation and parenthood that punctuate the novel.  
Novelist and literary theorist Gabriel Josipovici tells us that a book is “in one 
sense produced biologically, in the same way as a laugh or a scream has 
biological roots”;
46 he hints here at an understanding of writing as a process of 
“gestation”, for if books are produced biologically then authors are, in part, 
“parents”.  This is a conception that Shelley plays upon in her introduction, 
which she uses not only to “furnish” us with the story’s origin but also to 
position herself as the novel’s mother.  Frankenstein, she tells us, is her 
“progeny” and her “offspring”;
47 she also uses the word “dilate”
48 – expressive 
of childbirth – to describe her creative processes.  Her description of the agony 
associated with her initial inability to think of a “ghost story” conjures an image 
of a woman struggling to conceive: and as Mellor reminds us, Shelley did indeed 
fear “the trauma of barrenness”, both as mother and as writer.
49  As the author of 
Frankenstein, moreover, Shelley was the “mother” of a monstrous child – a 
novel that was “conceived” amidst anxiety and the desire to be accepted as a 
female author within a male domain of authorship; a novel that was heavily 
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edited and altered by Percy Shelley, becoming indeed a monstrous mishmash of 
a text and perhaps prompting the original author/creator to feel ambivalent 
towards it.
50 
 
We might conclude here that Frankenstein is situated around an act of technë, of 
technologically-enabled bringing forth.  While we must be careful not to 
simplify or reduce the text to an image of animation – thus excluding the 
“significant ideas” that Jansson warns us not to neglect – we can wholeheartedly 
claim that animation or techno-creation is at the centre of the text.  We can also 
argue that there are three acts of animation that form the backbone of the 
Frankenstein text: the two creation scenes depicted in the novel, and the creation 
scene that Shelley details in her introduction (and that has become such an object 
of cultural fascination).  As Vivian Sobchack reminds us, writing too is an act of 
technë, for in writing: 
 
objectively material means (technology) and the tropology of subjective 
desire (poiësis) are bound in an irreducible intentional relation as a 
revelatory bringing forth (technë) that, in its diverse historical and personal 
practices, makes matter meaningful and meaning matter.
51 
 
Importantly, Sobchack also describes writing as a hybrid act involving the 
incorporation of a technique or technology into our bodies: 
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Although we may trace letters in the sand, chisel words into stone, or sign a 
childhood pact in the blood from our finger, today in our culture we usually 
write with pencils, pens, typewriters, and ‘word-processing’ computers – 
technologies we differently (and to different degrees) incorporate into our 
bodies and our experience of writing.
52 
 
Shelley of course did not use a computer to write Frankenstein.  Nevertheless, 
the novel – produced by technologies of writing, language, and imagination – 
was not only Shelley’s “progeny” but a technological extension of herself. 
 
When we read Frankenstein and the 1831 introduction, then, themes of 
“writing”, “technology”, and “the body” might justifiably jump into our minds.  
We might wonder about Shelley herself, an imagined body, a gendered body – 
for it is difficult to divorce the dark and monstrous novel she wrote from an 
image of her as a young woman.  We might consider the act of writing 
Frankenstein as an embodied act, an act informed by the memories, experiences, 
desires and agonies inscribed into Shelley’s own body.  We might think about 
how the Frankensteinian tension between nature and technology, organism and 
machine, applies to the act of writing.  Josipovici describes writing as an act 
situated “at the crossroads of the mental and the physical, the orders of culture 
and of nature”.
53  Such a description evokes the figure of the Frankensteinian 
monster, one of fantastic literature’s first “organic machines” and a creature 
occupying the liminal space between culture and nature.   
 
It is therefore interesting that Shelley attempts to naturalise the writing process in 
her introduction, or position it in relation to nature, working to construct an 
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image of herself as a writer in communion with “natural” powers.  Mention is 
made of the natural settings in which the novel was “conceived”: both the 
“pleasant hours” spent by the lake in Switzerland where Shelley and her 
company were holidaying, and the “incessant rain” that drove them to their 
indoor task of inventing ghost stories.
54  Shelley also presents herself as a saintly 
or passive vehicle “receiving” her story in a vision rather than an active 
participant in the writing process.  The “primal scene” she recounts is as organic 
or natural a moment as we could imagine, the writer in a dream-state communing 
with her character.  What Shelley’s introduction cannot avoid, however, is the 
related tension between mentality and physicality.  The introduction details an 
ethereal act of imagination, for Shelley a mental triumph: finally “thinking of a 
story” after days of blockage.  At its core, however, is an undeniable physicality: 
the monster’s hideous body, which Shelley describes in such detail. 
 
Born of the Sea and Patchwork Girl: two recent retellings 
 
If the body of the Frankensteinian monster is Shelley’s “hideous progeny”, 
representative of the novel itself, then the body of the female monster – 
fragmented, unfinished, violently destroyed – is perhaps more interesting than 
that of her male counterpart.  It might be ambitious to claim that she represents a 
darker part of Shelley’s imaginative processes, but we can certainly suggest that 
she embodies an aspect of the story that itself seems aborted or cut short: she 
appears only briefly and is never brought to life; instead she is destroyed and 
thrown into the sea.  Whale’s film Bride of Frankenstein takes up both this 
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unfinished narrative (the story of the female monster) and the monstrous aspects 
of Shelley herself, collapsing them into one with the double-casting of 
Lanchester.  We also find that the female monster, the unfinished narrative she 
represents, and her link to Shelley are of interest to other writers who seek to 
retell Frankenstein (and to give voice to some of the novel’s silences). 
 
One such writer is Australian author Victor Kelleher, whose novel Born of the 
Sea functions as a companion piece, of sorts, to Shelley’s Frankenstein.  Born of 
the Sea takes up the story of the female monster, whom Kelleher names 
“Madeleine”.  In this version of the tale Madeleine survives after she is cast into 
the sea by Victor; she awakens without memory and begins a journey to uncover 
her origins.  This journey leads her first to Victor, then to the male monster, and 
finally to Mary Shelley herself.  A chaste and devotional relationship develops 
between the two, one that draws attention to Mary’s position as both “mother” 
and “author” (Madeleine refers to Mary as “the author of my soul”
55 and 
repeatedly calls her “mother Mary”).  This re-positioning of the writer inside the 
text is neatly justified by the narrative – Kelleher’s fictional Mary researches and 
writes Frankenstein, a novel based on real occurrences, while Madeleine is still 
living.  For the reader, however, Madeleine and Mary’s relationship seems to 
defy the boundary between text and reality.
56 
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Two powerful moments in the novel play on this defiance, and both involve (and 
fetishise) the act of reading (as a response to an original act of writing).  In the 
first, Madeleine learns of her identity and her origins through the writings of 
Victor Frankenstein, who keeps a record of his work in a “leather-bound book”.
57  
In the second, Madeleine is given a copy of the recently published novel 
Frankenstein, and is thus allowed to read her own story.  This latter event 
restructures the relationship between character and writer.  Madeleine narrates 
the scene: “I glanced at the spine”, she tells us, “read the title printed there in 
gold Gothic lettering, and instantly let the thing fall from my hands.  I nearly 
toppled to the floor with it”.
58  She then asks the young man who gifted her the 
book to read from it, and at the same time her narration speaks to Mary the 
author/character:  
 
You, dear Mary, must know what he read to me that night, for of course it 
was your book that he held open in the lamplight; Victor’s family name 
that rolled so easily off his tongue – the names of Frankenstein and Shelley 
bound ineluctably from that moment on.
59 
 
Significantly, Madeleine then “writes” (a letter) to Mary and the two make 
contact: 
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I shall not describe our first meeting in detail [says Madeleine].  There is 
no need, for we were both there!  In any case, what words exist that can 
adequately depict the meeting of fact and fiction?  That magical moment 
when a character steps free of the written text and greets her author; and 
when that same author reaches through the mists of story in order to 
embrace a flesh-and-blood version of someone she has hitherto only 
imagined.  It is akin to stepping through the mirror and greeting our own 
reflection, or parleying with our attendant shadow.
60 
 
Madeleine thus embodies the metaphoric connection between text and body, 
novel and monster; she is the living text that Shelley creates, and a fantastic 
means of giving voice to the (imagined) relationship between Shelley and her 
novel.  What Kelleher creates, furthermore, is a character who is able to address 
their own writer: the bed-ridden Mary, to whom Madeleine narrates her entire 
tale, becomes the audience longing to hear how the story will end, while 
Madeleine, obsessed with her status as a doubly constructed being (first by 
Victor and then by Mary), finds a voice and with it the ability to construct 
herself. 
 
What gives this retelling of Frankenstein such power is the way Kelleher 
mobilises not only the text/body link but the theme of fragmentation that 
accompanies it.  Significantly, Kelleher prefaces his novel with a fragment from 
the original text describing the moment when Victor, having destroyed the 
female monster, observes that “[t]he remains of the half-finished creature… lay 
scattered on the floor, and I… put them into a basket, with a great quantity of 
stones, and… determined to throw them into the sea that very night”.
61  This 
description of the female monster as “half-finished” can be reworked to refer to 
both her body (she was never finished by Victor) and her story, which in 
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Shelley’s novel ended abruptly with her being cast into the sea.  We can surmise 
that Kelleher himself found this ending unsatisfactory, and decided to “finish” 
her story.  Thus, as Stephanie Trigg points out in her review of the novel, 
Kelleher’s aim is to “correct”
 62 rather than just retell Shelley’s tale; he achieves 
this not only by giving voice to a silenced character – itself a major correction 
and clearly a driving force behind Kelleher’s ongoing production of 
“companion” novels to great literary texts
63 – but by finishing this character’s 
incomplete story, or, as Trigg puts it (with yet another engagement of the 
text/body link), by “tying up Frankenstein’s loose threads”.
64 
 
Like Whale’s film Bride of Frankenstein, Born of the Sea demonstrates the 
extent to which retellings of Frankenstein are shadowed by the memory of 
Shelley herself.  The same woman who once wrote a story about fantastic powers 
of resurrection becomes the resurrected body in Kelleher’s novel.
65  Born of the 
Sea also demonstrates an awareness of the notion that all authors who adapt 
Frankenstein must contend with Shelley, must open a relationship with her, must 
remember her (whilst re-membering her story/her monster).  We might question 
why such texts feel the need to defer or refer to her as the “origin” of the story, 
especially when most retellings of Frankenstein violently reconstruct the text.  In 
this sense, the scenes of rape, torture, and suffering that punctuate the narration 
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of Madeleine’s tale are the novel’s most powerful aspect: they further solidify 
the text/body link by demonstrating that a text is also a body that can be violated, 
taken apart, and monstrously sewn back together. 
 
Born of the Sea resembles (or perhaps appropriates) Shelley Jackson’s 
Patchwork Girl, a work of electronic literature made in 1995 using the hypertext 
authoring system Storyspace.  Like Kelleher’s novel, Patchwork Girl tells the 
story of the female monster and places her on a narrative path that leads her to 
Mary Shelley; in Jackson’s version of the tale, the half-finished creature is 
completed by Mary and the two become lovers, their stories intertwining.  What 
Patchwork Girl shares with Born of the Sea is an emphasis on the unnatural 
status of the heroine’s body and also on her fictionality, which is highlighted 
through her engagement with her own author.  Both writers use the theme of 
artificiality to confront deeply embedded cultural understandings of embodiment, 
gender, and agency; both use their writing to give voice to the feminine, the 
monstrous, and the technological, all of which are profoundly othered in 
Shelley’s novel.  Jackson also shares Kelleher’s interest in the particular 
“fragment” of the tale that the female monster represents, and by “completing” 
the body of the female monster she is also completing that unfinished section of 
the Frankenstein narrative.   
 
These notions of fragmentation and the incomplete text/body are doubly 
important in the context of Jackson’s work, however, because Patchwork Girl is 
not a novel but a hypertext – the “story” unfolds in a series of fragments that the 
reader navigates at will.  This metaphoric link between fragmented body and   60 
fragmented text is foregrounded by analysts of Patchwork Girl.  Referring to 
Jackson’s use of works by such varied writers as Donna Haraway,
66 Frank L. 
Baum,
67 and Shelley herself, quotes from whom she interweaves into the 
fragmented textual body she constructs, Clayton calls Jackson’s text “a 
variegated patchwork of ‘original’ writing and borrowed phrases”.
68  Similarly, 
Hayles tells us that “[l]ike the female monster’s body, the body of this hypertext 
is also seamed and ruptured, comprised of disparate parts with extensive links 
between them”.
69  Hayles mobilises Patchwork Girl as part of her discussion of 
electronic literature: like the body of the Frankensteinian monster (or the 
Patchwork Girl herself) hypertexts are, she tells us, “dynamic” and “transitory”,
70 
“mutable” and “transformable”;
71 they are “Generated Through Fragmentation 
and Recombination”.
72 
 
Patchwork Girl is an extraordinarily detailed text which this thesis does not have 
the space to analyse in the depth it deserves.
73  Because this project dwells upon 
filmic retellings of Frankenstein, however, it is interesting to compare the body 
of Jackson’s Patchwork Girl to some of the filmic monsters that will be discussed 
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in the chapters ahead.  Cinema has a tendency to offer revisions of the 
Frankensteinian monster that are defined by their beauty, perfection, or 
seamlessness – we see these characters appearing in films like Metropolis, Blade 
Runner, The Matrix, and The Fifth Element.  These bodies stand in for the filmic 
machine, which works through fragmentation yet gives the illusion of wholeness.  
In contrast the Patchwork Girl “defines herself by her scars”, as George Landow 
notes;
74 thus, she suits the fragmented text (and medium) that frames her.   
 
We can also compare the body of the Patchwork Girl to that of Kelleher’s 
Madeleine, who is altogether a more conservative version of Shelley’s monster.  
Although Kelleher enthusiastically seizes upon the theme of fragmentation in his 
novel, he presents Madeleine as a problematically seamless subject (albeit one 
who occupies a fragmented body).  Trigg touches upon these limitations in her 
review of Born of the Sea, particularly when she questions why Madeleine’s 
“pretty aristocratic head [should] preserve a repressed memory of its past life, 
while her anonymous womb, for example, does not?”
75  If Kelleher shies away 
from such fragmentation of the subject, Jackson does not: indeed, in the section 
of her text entitled “Graveyard” she explores precisely this problematic, giving 
voice to the individual body parts that make up her monster.  The Patchwork Girl 
is consequently a patchwork of different memories, as opposed to Madeleine 
who slowly uncovers the singular memory-narrative belonging to the woman 
whose head she possesses. 
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Despite their differences, it is significant that both Kelleher and Jackson should 
introduce memory – and particularly the memory/body relationship – as a theme 
in their respective retellings of Frankenstein.  Both authors, after all, are adapting 
an earlier text, reconstructing a new “body” from fragmented textual 
“memories”.  With its borrowed writings and self-conscious retellings Patchwork 
Girl in particular functions as a palimpsest, an inscription of the new onto the 
old.  Jackson is keen to open a dialogue between herself and Shelley, as is 
suggested by the hypertext’s playful title “Patchwork Girl, by Mary/Shelley and 
herself” (in which Jackson draws upon the apparently coincidental correlation 
between her first name and Mary’s last name to create a playful “meeting” 
between the two “authors”).   Clayton foregrounds the origin stories embedded in 
this relationship when he suggests that Jackson’s hypertext “works best when 
[she] is most true to her maternal origin – most faithful to Mary Shelley’s 
novel”.
76  In Born of the Sea, the relationship to Frankenstein as an originary text 
is performed through Madeleine’s negotiations with Victor Frankenstein, with 
the male monster, with Mary Shelley, and with the book itself as a physical 
object (which she throws to the floor). 
 
More important to this thesis, however, is the notion of “remembering” the 
organic, of a body’s historical link to nature, and of the disruption of this link by 
scientific endeavours that technologise the scene of creation.  More so than the 
superficial motif of amnesia and recall, this is a powerful theme in Shelley’s 
novel.  As discussed above, the monster’s nightmarish “birth”, a murky meeting 
of science, technology, garish occultism, medicine, surgery, and bodily violence, 
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provides him with a troubled “origin story” that haunts both him and his creator 
throughout the novel; at the same time, the monster as an artificial being is 
marked by his severed link with the organic world and thus by a lack of the 
origin story that an organic being possesses.  This, we might argue, underpins or 
brings new meaning to the memory themes in Born of the Sea and Patchwork 
Girl.  This text/body/memory relationship has become an important part of the 
analytical framework within which this thesis considers Frankenstein. 
 
From Shelley to Haraway: Frankenstein’s theoretical resonance 
 
As the above analyses begin to suggest, the figure of the Frankensteinian monster 
can be drawn into tentative dialogue with figures that populate cultural theory in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  This is a period in which the 
“posthuman body” and relatedly the “techno-body” have theoretical currency.  
Evoking but not specifically referring to Frankenstein, Gail Weiss states that the 
techno-body is: 
 
certainly not a future body but is our own bodies and bodily possibilities to 
the extent that they are discursively represented, psychologically 
constructed, and physiologically reconstructed through technological 
processes which include the pen, the analyst’s couch, the speculum, 
forceps, the surgeon’s knife, the computer, the city and its abjected other, 
the suburb, as well as the unassuming petri dish, that all-important 
maternal substitute, which has displaced the female as the ‘originary’ site 
of genetic experimentation and reproductive speculation.
77 
 
                                                 
77 Gail Weiss, “The Durée of the Techno-Body”, in Becomings: Explorations in 
Time, Memory, and Futures, ed. Elizabeth Grosz (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 163.   64 
With advances in biotechnology in particular, Weiss tells us, we are 
“decorporealizing bodies in order to control, manipulate, and exchange them”.
78  
Thus it is no surprise that Shelley’s text – a fantastic depiction of the 
“decorporealizing” of the body from an early nineteenth-century point of view – 
still has cultural currency today. 
 
In particular, we can place the Frankensteinian monster in dialogue with the 
more recent figure of the cyborg: a theoretically delineated figure that also 
frequently appears in fantastic spaces.  In her book Electronic Eros, Claudia 
Springer discusses the blurring of the boundaries between human and machine in 
the late twentieth century, referring particularly to the rise of the cyborg as a 
dominant cultural figure.
79  She refers to Frankenstein and its cultural/theoretical 
resonance today when she notes that debates over the obsolescence of human 
presence and the creation of artificial life have long raged in both academic and 
popular fields: 
 
In their more esoteric form ideas about posthuman life exist in specialized 
scientific works, but in a more accessible guide they circulate widely 
throughout contemporary popular culture, familiarizing the public with 
posthuman imagery.  Science fiction has treated the concept of simulated 
life for decades, and the scientific creation of human life was a literary 
topic during the nineteenth century, when Mary Shelley wrote the best-
known and most influential example, Frankenstein.
80 
 
The figure of the Frankensteinian monster is thus emblematic of our current 
struggles both with our own obsolescence and with our desires to recreate and 
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technologise life itself.  Anne Balsamo also observes that concerns explored by 
Shelley in 1818 have recently seeped into our social and cultural worlds and into 
theoretical mappings of these worlds.
81  Like Springer, Balsamo is concerned 
with the figure of the cyborg.  She identifies the 1980s as “the decade of the 
cyborg”,
82 writing that “[f]rom children’s plastic action figures to cyberpunk 
mirrorshades, cyborgian artefacts will endure as relics of an age obsessed with 
the limits of human mortality and the possibilities of technological replication”, 
two powerful Frankensteinian themes.
83  Balsamo also notes that “our 
technological imagination imbues cyborgs with ancient anxieties about human 
difference”;
84 in this sense, too, the cyborg intersects with the Frankensteinian 
monster. 
 
Some caution must be exercised, however, when comparing Shelley’s monster to 
the figure of the techno-body or cyborg.  Many analysts of the novel are quick to 
remind us that Frankenstein’s monster is not, in fact, mechanical, but a biological 
creature consisting of sewn-together body parts and transplanted organs stolen 
from various dead individuals.  As James Heffernan observes:  
 
the creature consists entirely of natural body parts, so that he is closer to an 
actual human being with one or more transplanted organs than he is to the 
mechanical men constructed by futurist designers in the 1920s or to the 
cyborg of present-day science fiction.
85 
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Yet if Shelley’s monster is not in the strictest sense mechanical, he/she/it can be 
described as artificial, as scientifically produced rather than organically birthed, 
and as a body defined by his/her/its hybridity: a body that is not all natural.  
Waldby suggests as much when she writes that Frankenstein plays upon “the 
fundamentally mechanical nature of the human body” and depicts the possibility 
of “an interface between electrical life and bodily systems”.
86  Furthermore the 
novel, as Waldby tells us, depicts “a world in which the human body and human 
sociality owe a greater and greater debt to technoscientific and machinic systems 
of production and reproduction, and are less and less able to be thought of 
outside those systems”; a world, in other words, in which “reference to a natural 
humanity is always anachronistic”.
87  Consequently, we can designate the 
monster as a posthuman figure.  William S. Haney tells us that Shelley’s monster 
is in many ways “the archetypical posthuman” because he/she/it is “a merging of 
the given and the produced, biology and technology”,
88 thus exemplifying the 
posthuman condition which, in its simplest form, involves “a human-technology 
symbiosis”.
89 
 
This sort of “merging” and “symbiosis” is precisely what writers like Donna 
Haraway concern themselves with centuries after Shelley’s time.  Writing in the 
1980s, Haraway discusses a figure whom she defines as “a cybernetic organism, 
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a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a 
creature of fiction”.
90  Her famous proclamation is as follows: 
 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, 
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are 
cyborgs.  The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics.
91 
 
Haraway thus appropriates a figure from fantasy and science fiction – the cyborg 
– and introduces it to the academic fields of biology, politics, and gender studies, 
using it to confront established notions and practices of embodiment, technology, 
gender, agency, and power.  She writes at the point of convergence between 
theory and the fantastic: her cyborg is a border-crossing figure, challenging the 
divisions between male and female, human and machine, human and animal, as 
well as that between theory and fantasy.  “The boundary between science fiction 
and social reality is an optical illusion”, she writes, proclaiming to her readers 
that “I am making an argument for the cyborg as a fiction mapping our social and 
bodily reality”.
92   
 
What is important here about Haraway’s work, first and foremost, is her 
understanding that fictional and fantastic bodies can operate in a theoretical way.  
This has relevance for the Frankensteinian monster, a fantastic figure with 
theoretical resonance.  Lucie Armitt argues that studies such as Haraway’s have 
“taken great strides towards showing us how fantasy fictions have provided a 
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whole new vocabulary for conceptualizing the real (and by extension the 
realist)”;
93 she also observes that the cyborg is: 
 
the most important recent concept to have entered the critical discourse of 
the fantastic, not least because it uses an sf (science/speculative fiction) 
motif to explore the philosophical, and therefore paves the way for the 
fantastic to become a means of interrogating texts of all kinds.
94 
 
Indeed, in her “Manifesto” Haraway acknowledges the influence of science 
fiction writers on her work:  
 
I am indebted in this story to writers like Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delaney, 
John Varley, James Tiptree, Jr., Octavia Butler, Monique Wittig, and 
Vonda McIntyre.  These are our storytellers exploring what it means to be 
embodied in high-tech worlds.  They are theorists for cyborgs.
95 
 
In this way Haraway places herself within a trajectory that stretches back past 
generations of (female) science fiction writers to Shelley herself.  That Haraway 
takes on the role of “storyteller” and seeks to explore “what it means to be 
embodied” in her own high-tech world links her to Mary Shelley, who explored 
similar concerns two hundred years prior. 
 
In bringing these two writers into dialogue, however, it is important to stress that 
Haraway subverts the Frankenstein myth.  In particular, she deconstructs the 
nexus of absence and desire that defines the relationship between techno-
body/monster and natural world.  As part of her efforts to disrupt established 
understandings of “organic wholeness”, Haraway stresses that her cyborg has 
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“no origin story”;
96 she defines “origin story” in the “‘Western’, humanist sense” 
as a “myth of original unity… represented by the phallic mother from whom all 
humans must separate” and argues that “the cyborg skips the step of original 
unity, of identification with nature in the Western sense”.
97  Here, she tells us, is 
the crucial difference between her cyborg and its predecessor, the 
Frankensteinian monster: 
 
Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect its 
father to save it through a restoration of the garden; that is, through the 
fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its completion in a finished 
whole, a city and cosmos.  The cyborg does not dream of community on 
the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project.  The 
cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and 
cannot dream of returning to dust… Cyborgs are not reverent; they do not 
re-member the cosmos.
98 
 
In many ways, Haraway’s writing on the cyborg addresses the same question that 
Waldby attributes to Shelley’s Frankenstein – “what does it mean to be 
embodied when the body cannot claim the status of nature?”
99 – but if Shelley’s 
novel offers a mournful silence in answer to this question (the monster is at a loss 
to describe his own unnatural embodiment, and seeks only to approach organic 
status) Haraway responds.  Her cyborg represents meaningful embodiment 
without claiming the status of nature.   
 
Haraway further subverts the Frankenstein myth by taking apart the division 
between natural and unnatural production so central to Shelley’s writing.  
“Taking on the ultimate ‘proof’ of woman as body and thus biological function”, 
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Armitt tells us, Haraway “deconstructs the ‘naturalness’ of this phenomenon, 
biological mothering being replaced by reproductive technology and all 
technology becoming inherently reproductive”.
100  If Shelley’s novel is defined 
by an irresolvable tension between nature and technology, organism and 
machine, reproduction and techno-production, Haraway seeks to disturb such 
boundaries.  This allows her to fulfill what is arguably her ultimate goal: the 
imagining of a “post-gender world”.
101  Here again her Manifesto veers away 
from Shelley’s Frankenstein, in which the characters are as strictly gendered as 
we might expect from a novel published in early nineteenth-century England. 
 
Nevertheless, we can recognise some shared concerns between Shelley and 
Haraway as writers who concern themselves with production, textuality, 
technology, and with the techno-body as fantasy, scientific project, and social 
possibility.  I propose that what the cyborg and the monster particularly share is a 
position at the heart of an apocalyptic narrative.  In her deconstruction of 
millennial culture, Lee Quinby takes Haraway to task for her use of apocalyptic 
rhetoric, arguing that Haraway “claims apocalyptic drama for her cyborg 
figure”.
102  For Quinby, Haraway’s famous statement that “[b]y the late twentieth 
century, our time, a mythic time… we are cyborgs”
103 is a “utopian 
pronouncement” informed by what she terms “technological millennialism”: the 
interweaving of technology into narratives of salvation or catastrophe, a deifying 
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or demonising of technology that is symptomatic of millennial culture.
104  Yet 
Shelley’s novel, too, was a text written at the turn of the century (if not the 
millennium), and more importantly, a text that addresses the social and 
technological upheaval of its time.  If Haraway’s cyborg is “salvific”, we might 
argue that Shelley’s monster is more “catastrophic”: a techno-body with a 
demonic face (who is repeatedly called “daemon” by his creator).  In recent 
popular culture, this has led to a plethora of what Waldby refers to as 
“apocalyptic” readings of the tale.
105  Both the monster and the cyborg, then, are 
threshold figures, emblems of a nearly or newly postorganic future; thus, they 
can be framed by narratives that celebrate or demonise them and the techno-
scientific rewriting of the body they represent. 
 
I dwell upon this relationship between monster and cyborg – as figures of fantasy 
and theory, as boundary-creatures who confront a posthuman future and who are 
inscribed with apocalyptic responses to the technologising of organic presence – 
because cinematic retellings of Shelley’s Frankenstein frequently reconfigure the 
monster as cyborg.  As I will observe in Chapter Two, the influence of other, 
mostly science-fictional texts on the project of retelling Frankenstein has given 
rise to a menagerie of mechanical monsters.  Even the monster of the famous 
James Whale films is somewhat mechanical, while in films of the 1990s and 
beyond we find that hybridity and the interface between organic/mechanical 
components is emphasised.  In this sense, theoretical work on the cyborg 
maintains an important dialogue with Shelley’s novel and its continued 
adaptation in popular culture. 
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The cinematic retelling of Frankenstein will be the subject of the chapters ahead.  
In this chapter I have charted an approach to Shelley’s novel and to the process 
of adapting it, an approach that is particularly defined by themes of writing, 
production, technology, and embodiment.  I have also suggested that we can 
assess the Frankensteinian monster as a body defined not only by its artificiality 
but by problems of originality, authenticity, and organicism.  The recognition 
that one does not originate in nature, I have asserted, creates a crisis for the 
techno-body (although Haraway would suggest that this supposed “crisis” is 
merely an opening for a new and empowered identity to be constructed).  In 
different degrees, this crisis is faced by popular rewritings of the Frankensteinian 
monster.  Kelleher’s Madeleine is a perfect example of this: she, like Haraway’s 
cyborg, is decidedly not “born in a garden”; the fact that she is born “of the sea” 
might be a reference to her creation in the depth of Shelley’s imagination but 
does not provide her with “natural” origins.  The filmic and animated bodies that 
I explore in chapters ahead also grapple with this problem, while cinema itself 
has, over the years, created new variations on the relationship between 
(techno)body and organic world.  In my next chapter, I will continue to draw 
upon these concepts and concerns as I consider what happened when Shelley’s 
novel was first brought to the screen.  73 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
TECHNO-GENESIS AND THE SPARK OF LIFE: 
FRANKENSTEIN AND FILM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Edison Studios’ 1910 adaptation of Frankenstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The robot Maria in Metropolis 
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Interlude: cinema and/as fantasy 
 
In 1896, the pioneer French filmmaker Georges Méliès created a film entitled Le 
Manoir du Diable.  This two-minute-long fantasy depicts a bat flying into a 
castle and then morphing into the Devil, who subsequently brings to life a series 
of supernatural creatures out of a cauldron.  A film with vague Frankensteinian 
overtones – themes of monstrosity and creation – Le Manoir du Diable is often 
identified as the “first” horror film.  Jeremy Dyson goes further and recognises it 
as the first film of the “supernatural horror” sub-genre, which can be defined as 
“the strand of the [horror] genre that deals with the fantastic, the non-ordinary, 
and the metaphysical”.
1  Films in this sub-genre, Dyson argues, “show us a 
glimpse of another world, an impossible world, a world that contains something 
larger than ourselves”.
2 
 
Like most of Méliès’ films, Le Manoir du Diable is a spectacular and early 
example of how editing can be used to create the illusion of magic.  As Dyson 
puts it, the film demonstrates that “technology could be utilized to simulate 
supernatural phenomena”.
3  This is also true of Méliès’ later film Le Voyage 
Dans La Lune, a more famous exercise in using filmic technologies to depict 
fantastic or impossible events.  Importantly, both these films exist on one side of 
a division between “fantasy” and “realism” that defined early cinema.  As Nick 
Lacey reminds us, two distinct readings of the filmic “machine” emerged in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s:  
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Since the early days of cinema the tension between film as a realist 
medium and one that can make the fantastic appear real has been evident.  
The first public screenings by Louis Lumière took place in Paris 1895, and 
were images of real people leaving the factory or a train entering a station; 
a few years later George Méliès was producing A Voyage to the Moon 
(1902).
4 
 
As pioneer films that asked their audiences to occupy very different viewing 
positions, the Lumière brothers’ L’Arrivée d’un Train à La Ciotat and Méliès’ Le 
Voyage Dans La Lune encapsulated these competing notions of cinema.  
Audiences watching the Méliès film were confronted with the fantastic; they 
were invited to suspend their disbelief and enter a realm of impossible 
occurrences.  “On the other hand”, Lacey writes, “the audiences ducked for cover 
as the Lumières’ train entered the station in all too real a fashion”.
5  Arguably, it 
is the understanding of film as a realist medium, a means of framing and 
depicting reality, that came to deeply permeate media culture in the twentieth 
century, and to dominate understandings, both popular and academic, about the 
cultural operations of film.  To this day, rational discourses shape the way we 
engage with, study, and teach all media texts, often at the exclusion of the 
fantastic. 
 
What Méliès seemed to be aware of, however, and to play with enthusiastically 
in his films, is the idea that filmic technologies can not only be used to depict 
fantastic events, but can themselves be seen in a fantastic light.  Tzvetan Todorov 
has famously defined the fantastic as “that hesitation experienced by a person 
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who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural 
event”;
6 he proclaims that the fantastic acts as “a dividing line between the 
uncanny and the marvelous”.
7  Yet cinema, too, evokes this sense of hesitation; 
filmic technologies themselves have long been culturally understood in a manner 
that hovers between the “marvelous” and the “uncanny”.  Cinema’s reproduction 
of “life” invites us to gasp, marvel, bathe in the spectacular, but it also evokes 
anxieties and a sense of unplaceable strangeness.  In this sense, the work of 
“magician” Méliès is more cinematic than that of his realist contemporaries 
because these films explore and flaunt the fantastic aspects of film, 
foregrounding the apparatus and its capacity for spectacle, magic, and 
transformation. 
 
Méliès, of course, never produced an adaptation of Frankenstein (although we 
can hungrily wonder what such a film might have been like).  What then does 
this filmmaker and his tales of ghosts, devils, and spaceships have to do with 
Shelley’s novel?  Two connections can be forged here.  Firstly, Frankenstein 
films – especially the early adaptations – inherit much from Méliès because they 
too depict fantastic and supernatural events.  Thus Dyson, who identifies Le 
Manoir du Diable as the first “supernatural horror” film, also places James 
Whale’s version(s) of the Frankenstein tale within this generic framework, 
writing that Whale’s 1931 film is “in many ways… the prototype for the post-
sound supernatural horror film”.
8  The first and famous Frankenstein films – 
including Whale’s adaptations – can be defined as fantastic texts because they 
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depict at least one supernatural or impossible event: the creation of the monster.  
This, of course, is the turning point in Shelley’s narrative: it is the moment at 
which this narrative shifts and becomes fantastic, horrific, or science-fictional.  
Screen versions of this scene are no different: they are often the most iconic and 
spectacular moments of Frankenstein films, but just as often they are the scenes 
that push the text (and its viewers) into a fantastic space.  These scenes evoke 
Todorov’s sense of fleeting indecision created by an encounter with supernatural 
events; and a similar teetering between the marvelous and the uncanny (or the 
spectacular and the strange) is aroused by the bodies of the various 
Frankensteinian monsters that have appeared in cinema.  Interestingly, an 
oscillation between wonder and fear is often imprinted upon the faces of those 
characters who encounter the monster and/or witness its creation: most notably, 
this position of “inner spectator” is occupied by Victor Frankenstein himself.  As 
I will explore below, moreover, Frankenstein films – which depict the 
“instruments of life”
9 at the heart of Shelley’s tale in ever more imaginative ways 
– also foreground the fantastic aspects of cinema as a mode of production.  This, 
too, they share with the films of Méliès. 
 
Secondly, Méliès can be identified as an example of the filmic director in his/her 
most Frankensteinian capacity.  J.P. Telotte notes that this pioneer filmmaker 
was essentially concerned with “exploring what sort of ‘games’ the camera and 
its evolving techniques might allow one to play with the nature of both the world 
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and its human inhabitants”.
10  Méliès was not only a magician, then, but a 
manipulator of nature akin to Victor Frankenstein himself.  William Nestrick 
brings this aspect of Méliès’ work – and of the director’s role in general – into 
his analysis of the early Frankenstein films, arguing that these early adaptations 
play upon an understanding of the film director as magician and as 
“wondermaker, illusionist, and life-giver”.
11  The self-reflexivity of early filmic 
versions of the tale, Nestrick writes, hinges on “[m]agic and the central relation 
between maker and Monster” which have: 
 
continued to make the novel appealing to film-makers fascinated by the 
independence of their own animated and self-expressive artworks.  If 
Victor follows in the footsteps of Albertus Magnus, Paracelsus, and 
Cornelius Agrippa to learn about the ‘raising of ghosts or devils’ (p.34) the 
first filmmakers also saw themselves in the role of magician, debased in 
the nineteenth century to the theatrical showman.   
 
He continues, observing that “[t]he pioneer Méliès, called the Magician of the 
Screen and King of Fantasmagoria, accidentally brought about a metamorphosis 
such as the artist-alchemists had always promised” when his camera jammed 
while filming traffic outside the Paris Opera and he continued “cranking”, 
lending the finished film a magical and transformative quality.
12  As we shall see 
below, the sort of innovations that Méliès contributed to the art of filmmaking 
were used to depict the metamorphic creation of the monster in the first filmic 
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adaptation of Frankenstein: and interestingly so, given that Méliès himself was 
such a Frankensteinian figure. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to chart the relationship between Frankenstein and 
film.  In the previous chapter I introduced Mary Shelley and her monster; here, I 
begin my study of the filmic monsters that have appeared on our screens since 
the early days of cinema – strange, uncanny, mechanical, or purely fantastic 
bodies upon which are imprinted anxieties, desires, and problems relating to 
cinematic presence and the filmic apparatus itself.  In this chapter I will draw 
from Nestrick and other theorists who analyse Frankenstein films in a manner 
that brings cinema itself into the analytical spotlight.  These theorists concur that 
Frankenstein films offer a fantastic image of the technologies of cinema, the 
filmic “machine” itself.  These connections between cinema and the fantastic 
consequently form an important foundation for a discussion of Frankenstein in 
film. 
 
Just as the previous chapter sought to re-engage Shelley’s novel as an originary 
text, this chapter engages some of the prominent, early, and/or famous filmic 
adaptations of the tale.  I analyse the Frankenstein films by Dawley (1910), 
Whale (1931), and Branagh (1994); I also address Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, an 
early science fiction film with a Frankensteinian creation scene.  These films, I 
propose, are “originary texts” in their own right: their strange and scintillating 
dialogue with Shelley’s novel provides the foundation upon which later and 
looser versions of the tale would operate.  In the analyses that follow I pay 
particular attention to the changing image of cinema that is fantastically deployed   80 
across the scope of these four texts: I follow a trajectory from the eeriness and 
uncanniness of early screen presence to the electric spectacle of the Golden Age, 
moving towards the emerging concern with hybridity and the organic that 
marked the 1990s.  Consequently, this chapter leads us into the digital age and 
towards the very Frankensteinian problems of organicism and fragmented 
presence that define an era of digital filmmaking. 
 
Mirrors, monsters, and mise-en-abyme: the “Edison” film 
 
Let us begin, however, at the beginning.  Frankenstein was first cinematically 
adapted in 1910 in a film produced by Edison Motion Picture Studios.  The film, 
simply entitled Frankenstein, was written and directed by J. Searle Dawley and 
received no creative input from Edison himself; nevertheless, it is difficult to 
view the film without being aware of the link between Victor Frankenstein and 
Thomas Edison as scientists and “inventors”.  The invention that is usually 
associated with Edison is of course the light bulb, which itself is rather 
Frankensteinian (Victor too is a producer of electric “life”).  Significantly, 
however, Edison did his most pioneering work in the field of communication; his 
inventions – most famously the phonograph, and, in visual media, the 
kinetoscope – were the first of the “lively machines” that paved the historical 
path to cinema.  There is consequently some significance to the declaration, in 
one of the film’s titles, that “Frankenstein has discovered the mystery of life”: a 
declaration that is accompanied by the mystery of cinematic life as the jerky and 
flickering images unfold before us. 
   81 
Like all the adaptations that would follow it, this film reworks Shelley’s narrative 
liberally: it begins with Victor Frankenstein leaving for college and discovering 
the “mystery of life”, and depicts his quest to create “the most perfect human 
being that the world has known”; the “evil in Frankenstein’s mind”, however, 
leads to the creation of a monstrous rather than a perfect Creature.  The 
exchanges between monster and creator in this film are dramatic but ultimately 
stripped of the violence that marks Shelley’s novel.  Instead, the film depicts a 
more ethereal struggle: that between Victor and this so-called “evil in his mind”.  
The vanquishing of such evil is conveyed in the astounding image of the 
monster’s reflection disappearing from a mirror – a moment of such maturity and 
artfulness that its presence in such an early film might surprise today’s viewers. 
 
One of the outstanding features of this early venture into filmmaking is precisely 
this self-reflexive preoccupation with visuality, spectatorship, and mirrors.  In 
one particularly memorable shot, Victor sits with a mirror before him that we, the 
audience, can also see.  Momentarily, he too is a spectator watching a “screen”.  
The monster enters the room, appearing first as a reflection in the mirror: he 
confronts Victor, but stops when he catches sight of his reflection, becoming a 
doubled presence confronting himself.  This shot set-up is repeated in the film’s 
climax.  Again, the mirror takes up almost half the screen; the monster rushes in 
and confronts his own image, gesticulating wildly, and then disappears.  When 
Frankenstein enters the scene he finds only the monster’s mirror image, not his 
body.  For a moment Victor looks into the mirror and sees the monster’s image 
reflected back at him; then this image of the monster disappears and is replaced 
by Victor’s own reflection.  Normality is restored.   82 
 
These mirror scenes rework an important moment in Shelley’s novel.  When 
Shelley’s monster, newly made and abandoned, wanders in the forest, he views 
his reflection in a pool of water and consequently discovers his own monstrosity: 
 
How was I terrified when I viewed myself in a transparent pool!  At first I 
stared back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the 
mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster 
that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and 
mortification.
13 
 
This is a very “cinematic” part of the novel – a moment that exemplifies a 
concern with visuality and “the eye” that reverberates throughout the text.  It is 
also a moment that recalls Lacanian notions of the “mirror stage” of 
development, notions that became central to psychoanalytic studies of cinema 
undertaken by theorists like Laura Mulvey.
14   
 
Not surprisingly, this small scene in the original novel becomes a point of energy 
in filmic adaptations of the tale, including the Edison film.  After all, we can read 
the process of cinematically adapting Frankenstein-the-novel in terms of a 
monolithic shift from Shelley’s time – a period when writing was the primary 
vehicle of articulation – to the early years of cinema and the advent of the visual 
age.  Any latent concerns with visuality expressed in the novel would therefore 
have exploded into being with the adaptation of the tale into film.  Furthermore, 
filmic versions of Frankenstein are shaped by what James Heffernan calls the 
visual language of cinema.  Drawing on the work of Christian Metz, Kaja 
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Silverman, and Andre Bazin, Heffernan argues that this “stubborn visuality of 
cinema”
15 inflects upon and alters the tale: 
 
By forcing us to face the monster’s physical repulsiveness, which he can 
never deny or escape and which aborts his every hope of gaining 
sympathy, film versions of Frankenstein prompt us to rethink his 
monstrosity in terms of visualization: how do we see the monster, what 
does he see, and how does he want to be seen?
16 
 
In line with Heffernan, we can suggest that the mirror scenes in the Edison film 
are responding to a cinematic desire to “see” the monster, to frame him and 
render him visible, and also to allow him to function as a spectator.
17 
 
It is the creation scene, however, that is the centrepiece of this film.  In this 
scene, we – and Victor, who is again placed in a spectatorial role – witness the 
monster rising from his alchemical cauldron, his hideous features revealing 
themselves bit by bit.  This is surely one of the creepiest images ever to grace the 
silver screen: the nebulous figure with its outstretched arms has the power to 
chill audiences even a century after its production, and even in an age when 
digital effects can be (and are) used to create endless new variations on the 
horrific, the spectacular, the strange.  In imaging this monstrous body and its 
eerie scene of creation the film relies upon the special effects that defined early 
cinema: the “magic” of editing, in particular, and the related ability to play with 
presence, absence, disappearance, and transformation.  Indeed, in this moment 
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the monster’s body becomes a special effect – a trend that would continue with 
filmic adaptations of Frankenstein across the history of cinema. 
 
Shadowy and indistinct at this point in the film, the monster’s body is also 
momentarily uncanny.  Later it will be more recognisably a human actor “made 
up” as a monster, and thus less threatening; emerging in the creation scene, 
however, it is human-like but also chillingly inhuman, evoking the eerie sense of 
familiar unfamiliarity pinpointed by psychologist Ernst Jentsch in the early 
1900s.  For Jentsch, the uncanny emerges when we have “doubts whether an 
apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object 
might not be in fact animate”.
18  This state of unsettling indecision is played 
upon in the creation scene of the Edison film, as we wait for Frankenstein’s 
“perfect” human to be revealed and slowly begin to wonder what he has created 
instead; is it human, we ask, and if not, why does it seem so alive? 
 
A sense of the uncanny is crucial to the Frankenstein tale in all its forms: this, 
after all, is a tale about bringing the body as “lifeless object” to dubious life.  In 
his analysis of Shelley’s novel Jules Law writes of “a body made newly uncanny 
by Victorian science” that exists at the heart of Gothic literature.
19  In the days of 
early cinema, we find that the body is again made “newly uncanny” by the filmic 
apparatus itself: for the invention of cinema asked us to revise our 
understandings of what is human, what is alive, and what it means to be 
embodied.  What the monster in the Edison film performs, therefore, is the 
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uncanny nature of the filmic image and of cinematic presence.  We can 
consequently read the film as a fantastic depiction of cinema’s power to turn the 
body into something familiar-yet-unfamiliar, something alive-yet-not-alive, 
something supernatural and only dubiously present. 
 
Altogether, the 1910 film emphasises magic rather than science, playing upon 
disappearance and absence/presence rather than technological or scientific 
spectacle.  This foregrounding of magic at the exclusion of science might have 
been a move to distance the film (and its depiction of a deluded, half-mad 
inventor) from Edison himself.  As a result, the film offers an image of cinema 
and its powers of animation in their most magical, supernatural, and uncanny 
sense.  Furthermore, the monster in this film is other and inhuman but not yet 
mechanical: he/it is more ghostly, especially in the moment of his creation.  His 
appearance may remind viewers of the ghostly apparitions captured in spirit 
photography in the nineteenth century: and indeed, he fulfills something of the 
same purpose as these spectral figures, expressing the supernatural or uncanny 
nature of the medium and its replication of human presence.  In contrast, later 
films would depict both the monster and his/her/its scene of creation in more 
mechanical terms.  With this in mind, let us turn now to some of the adaptations 
that followed the 1910 venture. 
 
Electricity and animation: from Whale to Branagh 
 
What we can glean from an analysis of the Edison film is the importance of the 
animation scene as a keystone in the Frankenstein/cinema relationship.  Various   86 
theorists have recognised a link between the Frankensteinian “instruments of 
life”
20 (however they might be depicted or imagined) and the animating powers 
of cinema: Nestrick, in particular, has argued that cinema realizes the very “myth 
of animation” that the Frankenstein tale is founded upon.
21  Relatedly, Esther 
Schor writes of the “reflexivity of the animation scene”
22 in Frankenstein films, 
pinpointing this scene as the moment “in which cinema explores most acutely its 
power to realize a conundrum the novel merely glimpses”.
23  Bouriana 
Zakharieva elaborates on the importance of the animation scene: 
 
what in the novel is alotted a mere paragraph with no details of the actual 
process, only a description of the result – i.e., the appearance of the 
creature, becomes an elaborate, highly visualized scene of creation in the 
films.  This emphasis on the process is dictated not only by the very nature 
of film art with its demands for spectacularness, but it is simultaneously the 
point where film art and scientific creation are able to mutually comment 
on each other.  The film, seen as a generator of life through the mechanical 
movement of pictures, and the Romantic narrative of the creation of an 
artificial being coincide in their principle of animation.
24 
 
When investigating animation as a link between cinema and Frankenstein, we 
cannot avoid a discussion of electricity.  In a passing reference to the Edison 
film, Scott Bukatman mentions “electricity” and “light”: with this first filming of 
the Frankenstein tale, he tells us, the monster is “brought to life” with the “stuff 
of cinema”.
25  This is certainly true insofar as the Edison film, the first of many 
cinematic adaptations of Shelley’s novel, brought artificial “life” to a story about, 
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precisely, artificial life.  Electricity and light however are notably absent from 
the film, the creation scene of which is dark, gloomy, and alchemical.  Later 
adaptations would depict a creation scene that was both spectacular and 
(literally) electrifying.   
 
Shelley herself did not imagine a literally electric scene of creation: her 
description of that “dreary night of November”
26 when the monster comes to life 
is grounded in secrecy and occultism.  Nevertheless, she alludes to a process of 
electric animation and there are references to electricity throughout the text.  
Early in the novel, for instance, Victor describes watching a thunderstorm as a 
young man: 
 
I beheld a stream of fire issue from an old and beautiful oak which stood 
about twenty yards from our house; and so soon as the dazzling light 
vanished the oak had disappeared, and nothing remained but a blasted 
stump… On this occasion a man of great research in natural philosophy 
was with us, and, excited by this catastrophe, he entered on the explanation 
of a theory which he had formed on the subject of electricity and 
galvanism.
27 
 
Shelley also mentions “galvanism” in her introduction, where she speculates 
“[p]erhaps a corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given token of such 
things: perhaps the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, 
brought together, and endued with vital warmth”.
28   
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Electricity also epitomises the sort of technologising and externalising of the 
natural “life-force” that is depicted in Frankenstein.  In her analysis of the novel, 
Waldby tells us that: 
 
Victor Frankenstein treats life as a material quality, one that can be 
understood analytically as mechanism rather than as transcendental 
essence… [he] treats vitality as a separable force, which exceeds its 
location in any particular body.
29 
 
For Waldby, Shelley’s novel is revolutionary in its depiction of life as a force 
that can be “isolated as a capacity, analyzed, quantified, and controlled, 
irrespective of the form of embodiment in which it is temporarily located”, and 
thus rendered “open to instrumentation”.
30  Electricity can be seen in the same 
terms, especially when it is harnessed by media technologies that use it to 
produce disembodied and artificial “life”.  As Jeffrey Sconce tells us, media and 
communication technologies such as telegraphy changed our understandings of 
electricity and also led to a perceived technologising and externalising of 
“natural vitality”: 
 
The focus of much popular scientific interest in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, electricity was for many a mystical and even divine 
substance that animated body and soul.  When harnessed by the telegraph 
and the media that were to follow, this ‘life force’ seemed to allow for a 
mechanical disassociation of consciousness and body.  Telegraph lines 
carried human messages from city to city and from continent to continent, 
but more important, they appeared to carry the animating ‘spark’ of 
consciousness itself beyond the confines of the physical body.
31 
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This comment contributes to Sconce’s argument that media – his study dwells 
upon telegraphy, radio, television, and cyberspace – evince an uncanny 
“liveness” that has long fascinated Western culture.
32  We can, of course, add 
cinema to Sconce’s list.  Images on the cinema screen are unnaturally or 
uncannily “alive”; they represent a disembodied and technologised “vitality”, an 
act of relocating the spark of life “beyond the confines of the physical body”
33 – 
and of rendering such life manipulable, “open to instrumentation”
34 – that finds a 
wonderful parallel in the Frankenstein tale. 
 
Electricity as a signifier of cinematic “life” is famously incorporated into the 
Frankenstein myth by James Whale, whose 1931 film Frankenstein is described 
by Zakharieva as “still… the most influential of the film adaptations”.
35  Whale’s 
film offers us the images most commonly associated with Frankenstein in 
cinema: the vaulted laboratory with its complex apparatus; the ferocious 
lightning storm; the shower of sparks; the supine and bandaged monster covered 
by a sheet.  Whale turns the moment of electric animation into a spectacle; he 
even allows Frankenstein to bring spectators – Elizabeth, his friend Moritz, and 
his professor Waldman – into his laboratory to witness the moment of creation.  
This moves the scene from a solitary event, depicting the solitary toilings of a 
writer, to a performance.  “Quite a good scene, isn’t it?” titters Frankenstein 
hysterically: “One man, crazy, and three very sane spectators!”  These spectators 
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then as watch the lifeless body of the monster is raised skywards on a platform 
while lightning and thunder batter the laboratory; they see the ominous twitching 
of the animated monster’s fingers, and hear Frankenstein’s dramatic 
proclamation, “it’s alive!” 
 
It is significant that “life” in Whale’s film is signified by the uniquely cinematic 
combination of electricity (the lightning) and movement (the twitching of the 
monster’s fingers).  As Sean Cubitt tells us, “the depiction of motion” is the “first 
and most special of all effects… an event as dizzying as the invention of 
perspective in the Quattrocentro”, and an event that invites the crucial question, 
“[w]hat happens when the still photograph begins to move?”
36  Cubitt quotes 
from a review of the first public film screening: “[i]magine a screen”, the review 
commands us, “placed at the end of a room.  On the screen appears a 
photographic projection.  So far, nothing new.  But, suddenly, the image… is 
animated and springs to life”.
37  These words evoke an image of Frankensteinian 
creation.  In Whale’s film, we can argue, the body of the lifeless monster stands 
in for the photographic image, and the first flickers of movement are intensely 
dramatic because they represent a turning point in the history of visual 
representation – the shift from photography to motion pictures. 
 
Decades later, Kenneth Branagh would pay tribute to the electric spectacle of 
Whale’s film in his 1994 adaptation Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.  With its 
unabashed “bigness”, the creation scene of this film reads as a supplication to the 
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life-giving powers of cinema itself: at the climax of the scene we see a wide shot 
of the laboratory, with Victor standing atop the complex apparatus he has 
constructed, naked to the waist, arms upraised, with bursts of flame beneath him 
and flickers of blue lightning all around him.  With shout-outs to previous 
Frankenstein adaptations, the monster’s coming-to-life is signified in Branagh’s 
film by vision and movement: his eyes open, and his fingers twitch.  Upon 
confirmation of this miraculous scientific “birth”, Victor channels his 
predecessor in the Whale film and exclaims “it’s alive!”.  To some extent, the 
scene thus functions as a reanimation of our cultural memories of Frankenstein in 
cinema.  This scene also makes visible Nestrick’s link between Victor 
Frankenstein and the filmic director as “wondermaker, illusionist, and life-
giver”:
38 particularly because Branagh encodes himself into the scene (he plays 
Victor).  The director is rewritten here not as “magician” but as master of an 
electric light show: most appropriate for an era in which special effects dominate 
and in which the most cutting-edge visual effects are created by George Lucas’ 
company, Industrial Light and Magic. 
 
Branagh’s adaptation is a strange film, replete with the problems of authorship 
and originality that seem to surface in most retellings of Frankenstein.  The text 
can be critically approached via the relationship between Branagh (as 
director/father) and Shelley (as writer/mother).  Branagh defers to Shelley by 
including her name in the film’s title; at the same time, he repeatedly mobilises 
his power as adapting writer/director and imposes it on the text.  Shelley’s 
narrative is liberally played with and remoulded in this film: for instance, 
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Branagh underscores Victor’s actions with an Oedipal motive, transforming him 
from over-eager scientist to Freudian victim traumatised by the death of his 
mother.  Branagh also notably includes (or “invents”) a scene in which Victor, 
devastated by his bride Elizabeth’s death, attempts to restore her to life by 
attaching her head to the body of the female monster (which is actually the body 
of Justine, another of the monster’s victims).  These additions to the narrative 
have led analysts like Esther Schor to suggest, with a wonderful play on words, 
that Branagh “deforms Shelley’s plot”.
39 
 
Dyson, too, decries Branagh’s film as “limply directed”, adding that Branagh 
“shout[s] his way through the title role” and proclaiming that the film: 
 
demonstrates so well what is wrong not just with the genre but with 
contemporary Hollywood cinema in general in the way it reeks of 
‘package’ and pre-selling and you can hear the pitch as you sit through the 
opening credits… It’s no surprise that these large-scale remakes failed to 
initiate a 1990s horror cycle to match Universal’s.
40 
 
Interestingly, some of the elements of the “supernatural horror film” that, for 
Dyson, Branagh’s text fails to adopt are inherited by science fiction films of the 
1990s and beyond which engage problems of otherworldly embodiment with far 
more rigour and imagination.  I agree that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is a 
problematic film, not only because of its authorship issues – which seem only too 
appropriate in the context of Frankenstein, a tale about the troubled relationship 
between inventor/father and progeny – but also for its refusal to address the 
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digital age: a film of the 1990s, Branagh’s text is more concerned with repeating 
the Frankenstein motifs of earlier adaptations than with transposing these motifs 
for a new era.  For this reason, the film plays a smaller role in this thesis than 
would initially seem necessary.  I also find that this film has been heavily 
theorised, particularly by Zakharieva: her detailed analysis will be discussed, in 
brief, below, because it in many ways is a more substantial addition to the 
unfolding Frankenstein/film narrative than the text it reads. 
 
Fragmentation and nostalgia for wholeness 
 
The adaptations of Branagh and Whale share more than a scene of spectacular 
electric animation; these directors also agree, to a certain extent, on the look of 
the Frankensteinian monster.
41  I refer here to his physical presence and 
appearance, not his gaze (which has already been discussed): in both texts the 
monster has an imposing physique and is notably scarred.  Fragmentation is a 
visual theme in both films; this reaches its climax in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein when Branagh “sews” together the bodies of the two main female 
characters, Elizabeth and Justine, in a bizarre deconstruction of the myth of 
cinematic “beauty”. 
 
Zakharieva’s analysis of these two films is an important theoretical milestone 
here, because she uses this analysis to shift the emphasis away from Nestrick’s 
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“myth of animation” and towards the monster’s body – a “composite body”
42, 
she tells us, a body defined by its fragmentation.  She writes: 
 
Mary Shelley introduces two innovations to the traditional narratives of 
creation: first, the scientific method and second, the idea of a composite 
body.  In other words, the motif of creation through science – not magic or 
miracle – and moreover, creation through cutting and montage brings the 
ideology of Frankenstein closer to the aesthetics of cinema.
43 
 
She also observes that: 
 
A film individual can be ‘born’ through the montage of different parts of 
different real life individuals.  The same principle of montage accounts for 
the originality of Mary Shelley’s monster.  Or, to paraphrase Nestrick: the 
word that bridges the world of film and man (or monster) is the word 
‘montage’.
44 
 
Although Zakharieva does not refer to digital or animated versions of the tale, 
the fragmentation of which she writes becomes particularly important in the 
digital age when a “film individual” can be created from scratch, from the 
disparate body parts of a series of actors, or through an unsettling mesh of digital 
code and human acting.
45  At the same time, the fragmentation of the filmic 
actor’s body (and consequently of on-screen presence) is a problem that has been 
discussed since the inception of cinema.  In 1935, for instance, Walter Benjamin 
was already telling us that the filmic actor’s “creation” is “by no means all of a 
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piece” because “there are elementary necessities of equipment that split the 
actor’s work into a series of mountable episodes”.
46 
 
Interestingly, however, filmic retellings of Shelley’s tale do not always depict the 
monster as fragmented.  Indeed, one of the major revisions that cinema has made 
to the Frankenstein tale is the re-presenting of the monster as a seamless being, 
an outwardly unproblematic body.  In my next chapter I will discuss films of the 
digital age that, unlike Branagh’s adaptation, rewrite the monster as replicant, 
cyborg, or artificial being, and emphasise perfection rather than fragmentation.  
Such revisions, however, are not unique to the digital age.  I will now turn my 
attention to a film of the 1920s that re-imagines the Frankensteinian monster as a 
seamless and beautiful body. 
 
The film in question is Fritz Lang’s 1927 masterpiece Metropolis.  Lang’s film is 
a science-fictional tale about the oppression of workers in a futuristic city; 
interestingly, the film dwells upon the notion of the city itself as a mechanical 
and automated “body”.  These themes are mirrored in a sub-story about the 
creation of a robot.  At the heart of the film, we find a Frankensteinian creation 
scene in which the mad scientist Rotwang transfers “life” from the captive 
heroine Maria to the robot who takes her form.  Maria lies supine in a glass tube, 
while the robot is seated behind her; both are still.  When Rotwang pulls a lever, 
blinding streams of electricity connect the two, and circles of electric light run up 
and down the robot’s lifeless body.  Harnessing the magic of editing, Lang has 
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the robot’s face dissolve into that of Maria; then the robot opens her/its eyes, 
signifying “life”.   
 
A comparison between Lang’s robot and the Frankensteinian monster produces 
notable similarities and differences.  Like the monster, the robot of Metropolis is 
artificial and electrically animated; however, she is depicted as seamless rather 
than fragmented, beautiful rather than monstrous, defined by perfection rather 
than scars; her otherness lies in her ability to deceive rather than in outward 
ugliness.  It can be argued that Lang’s depiction of this robot/Maria figure is 
infused with a certain “cinematic” nostalgia for corporeality and wholeness.  
Indeed, cinema’s fragmentation of the body creates such nostalgia.  As Brigitte 
Peucker tells us, cinema is a fragmented medium that suffers from “an 
underlying fear of castration and of death” which is allayed by the framing of the 
whole body.
47  Peucker draws a connection between cinema and its roots in early 
photography, a medium that fetishised “the whole body, centred within the 
frame”;
48 she also argues that, despite cinema’s ability to “dismember” the body 
– through editing, and through close-ups of individual body parts – the medium 
is forever “playing on the spectator’s desire for the whole actor”.
49  In a similar 
vein, Tim Armstrong writes that film “offers the cinematic body as recompense 
for the fragmented body of technology”.
50  He also writes of “capitalism’s 
fantasy of the complete body” which is visible “in the mechanisms of 
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advertising, cosmetics, cosmetic surgery, and cinema”.
51  Such fantasies are 
interrupted in filmic versions of Frankenstein where the monster is depicted as a 
problematic body defined by scars.  Yet in Metropolis, the reverse occurs.  
Wholeness, corporeality, and a fantasy of completeness all come into play in this 
film’s creation scene: here the robot is framed in full; its metallic body is rather 
seamless, but even this mechanical exterior disappears when the robot takes 
Maria’s beautiful and perfect form. 
 
This nostalgia for corporeality becomes particularly visible in a later scene when 
the robot-Maria dances seductively, moving in a strangely beguiling and 
sensuous manner.  When I view this scene I am reminded of Cubitt’s discussion 
of the 1935 film Top Hat, in which he argues that actor and dancer Fred Astaire 
“evokes the sensuous embodiment for which the incorporeal cinematic machine 
yearns”.
52  Drawing on the work of French theorist Gilles Deleuze, Cubitt 
describes the filmic apparatus as a “desiring machine” that positions the body as 
an object of yearning; this, he argues, informs the dance scene in Top Hat, which 
involves “a compound of the cinema longing for embodiment, Fred and Ginger 
leaping to escape it”.
53  This “yearning” for “sensuous embodiment” is 
confronted by the body of the robot Maria in Metropolis: when Maria dances, 
she brings embodiment and sensuality back into the incorporeal or de-
corporealised filmic machine.  Like Cubitt’s Astaire, Maria channels a cinematic 
desire for the body and its ability to move, as well as for the organic status that 
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such movement signifies.  That this dancing body is also a robot, a mechanical 
and constructed being, only makes such nostalgia for embodiment more intense. 
 
These expressions of desire and nostalgia are, of course, related to gender and the 
fact that Metropolis re-genders the body of its “monster” as female.  Relatedly, 
Maria-the-robot is seductive rather than monstrous.  Throughout the film, she/it 
is presented as an object to be seen.  In the creation scene both the robot (with 
her metallic though clearly feminine body) and Maria herself are laid out for us 
to view, framed in full; later, when the robot dances seductively for her 
“audience”, she positions herself as an object to be gazed upon.  This recalls 
Heffernan’s suggestion that the emphasis in filmic versions of Frankenstein is 
often on seeing rather than simply reproducing the body.
54  At the same time, 
this figure of woman-as-(mechanical)-other embodies all that is mysterious, 
seductive, and disturbing about cinematic technologies.  This is, after all, a film 
about technological otherness and allure: as Telotte reminds us, Metropolis 
“examines both the seductive lure of the technological and the anxieties that play 
just beneath the surface of that lure”.
55  We can add to Telotte’s comment by 
suggesting that Metropolis self-reflexively depicts both the “seductive lure” of 
filmic technology and the anxieties that such technology evokes. 
 
Finally, I would like to point out that the fragmented monster is replaced in 
Metropolis not only by a perfect and beautiful figure expressive of a desire for 
wholeness, but by a posthuman figure.  Maria lacks the scars and seams of a true 
Frankensteinian monster, and thus expresses a (cinematic) yearning for 
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corporeality; but she is also a mechanical, if still corporeal, creature.  With 
astounding foresight, the creation scene of Lang’s film depicts an interplay 
between human and posthuman presence, mediated by technologies of animation 
that stand in for cinema itself.  This interplay is imaged in the dissolve from 
Maria’s face to that of the robot, and back again.  The final dissolve suggests that 
the robot has “become” Maria and that the boundaries between human and 
posthuman have consequently collapsed; indeed, the fusion of robot and Maria 
creates a being that is neither human nor posthuman but somewhere inbetween, a 
suitable ambassador for a cinematic world where screen presence is similarly 
ambiguous and unplaceable. 
 
Technologising (and re-organicising) the monster 
 
Across the course of these Frankenstein films, an interesting shift in the depiction 
of the monster is evidenced.  With the exception of the Edison film, in which 
alchemy, magic, and monstrosity are the dominating themes, these films share an 
undercurrent of concern with the mechanical status (or lack thereof) of the 
monster’s body; an interplay of technology and organicism that I find 
particularly pertinent.  We cannot claim that such concerns are unique to filmic 
versions of the tale.  After all, Shelley’s novel is defined by its crucial tension 
between “nature” and “technology”; if her monster isn’t entirely mechanical, 
then the technologising of this monstrous body has been the project of popular 
culture in general – from literature to television and beyond – and is by no means 
a defining aspect of filmic adaptations of the tale.  Nevertheless, such interplay 
between organicism and technology is crucial to an understanding of the way   100 
cinema has reshaped the Frankenstein myth and also leads us to problems deeply 
inscribed in the medium of film itself. 
 
Some mention can be made here of the fusion of Frankensteinian monster with 
science-fictional robot.  Jay Clayton tells us that, over the course of the twentieth 
century, a textual cross-breeding occurred whereby Shelley’s tale came to 
intertwine with science-fictional stories about robotic bodies.  “Though the 
Creature in Shelley’s novel was made up entirely of flesh and blood”, he writes, 
“filmmakers, and, later, science fiction novelists, have added a mechanical 
dimension of increasing complexity to her creation”.
56  He refers particularly to 
the work of science fiction writer Isaac Asimov, whose robot tales of the 1940s 
came to influence popular perceptions of the artificial body and consequently to 
inflect upon retellings of Frankenstein.  Metropolis, however, shows us that such 
intertwining of monster and robot predates Asimov.  As Claudia Springer 
observes, robot tales have always contained “Frankenstein themes”.
57  She 
observes these themes at work in the earliest text about robots: Karel Capek’s 
1920 play R.U.R.  After this introduction of the figure of the robot, she notes, 
“robot imagery became a staple of early-twentieth-century science fiction, which 
usually maintained the Frankenstein theme enacted in R.U.R. by depicting robots 
as dangerous entities determined to overthrow humanity”.
58  We can trace the 
connection back further, to a text contemporary with Shelley’s: E.T.A. 
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Hoffman’s story “The Sandman”, in which a man unwittingly falls in love with a 
mechanical woman.  Roberts reminds us that: 
 
Hoffman’s robot is ‘uncanny’, unsettlingly neither human nor non-human; 
a borderline creation of technology that forces the reader to reappraise her 
own relationship to notions of ‘humanity’ and ‘nature’.  In this respect it 
anticipated, by only two years, an even more influential SF tale… in which 
an ‘uncanny’ technological creation unsettles our assumptions about the 
identity of the human.
59 
 
He is referring, of course, to Frankenstein.  What the monster and the figure of 
the robot share, then, is a certain status as a boundary-creature: they are figures 
that unsettle our assumptions about human being, that challenge our ability (and 
our need) to distinguish between human and not-human.  Metropolis exemplifies 
this fusion of monster and robot.  Here the “monster” is rewritten as robot and 
re-gendered as female; Frankensteinian tropes of artificiality and animation are 
applied to a body that is mechanical and beautiful.  This monster/robot is 
certainly deployed in Lang’s text as a boundary-creature, at once testing, 
challenging, and confirming the difference between human and inhuman.  As an 
uncanny body, the robot inherits much from the monster in Dawley’s 
Frankenstein and performs the uncanny status of the filmic image. 
 
Yet the monster of Whale’s film – a more faithful adaptation of Frankenstein – is 
also mechanised as part of the adaptation process.  His/its defining feature is not 
necessarily his scarred visage but the metal bolt through his neck.  Whale’s 
creation scene, too, includes mechanical elements.  Comparing the creation scene 
of this film to its counterpart in the Edison Studios adaptation, we can observe a 
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clear shift from the magical/alchemical to the technological/scientific – and 
perhaps also from the technologies of cinema in their “magical” aspect to an 
image of cinema as machine.  As Zakherieva tells us, Whale’s Frankenstein:  
 
features a very machine dominated scene of creation – the laboratory 
setting is constructivist in style; wheels and relays, electric circuits and 
bulbs, elevating devices, etc., as opposed to tubes and retorts filled with 
colourful liquids of the cliché lab setting.  Whale’s laboratory is a machine 
in itself and what it produces is a semi-machine.
60 
 
Whale’s film is thus allegorically linked to what has been called the “Golden 
Age” of film: the period in which cinema became an industrial “machine”.  As 
Schor observes, Boris Karloff’s lumbering, bolt-necked monster – with his 
“sutured parts, jerky movements, stumbling speech, and hunger for light” – 
makes “a plausible allegory of cinema” itself, especially the industrial and 
technological monster that cinema became in the 1930s.
61 
 
Branagh’s film is somewhat different.  The monster in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein is a very corporeal figure: with his scarred-but-distinctly-human 
face, he/it resembles an organic being who has suffered physical violence rather 
than a fantastic or mechanical creature.  The creation scene in this film also 
demonstrates a strange nostalgia for the organic.  This is a moment of techno-
electric birth: the monster is immersed in amniotic fluid and flushed into the 
world like a monstrously overgrown infant.  The result is a messy hybridity, an 
overstated fusion of machine and organism.  This re-organicising of both the 
monster and the creation scene is set against a dramatic natural backdrop.  With 
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sweeping shots of the natural landscape Branagh returns the presence of 
“Nature” to the Frankenstein tale, remedying its exclusion from earlier 
adaptations.   
 
This re-organicising of the Frankenstein tale has been discussed at length by 
Zakharieva, who analyses Branagh’s film in terms of “the new importance of the 
corporeal (the organic) which is absent from the early film versions (too abstract) 
and from the novel (too psychological)”.
62  She also discusses the hybridity of 
the monster in this film, noting that: 
 
Branagh’s Creature ultimately becomes a sophisticated compound of 
symbolized science, medicine, and technology as cultural phenomena, on 
one hand, and of sublime nature, on the other.  It is a merger of the given 
(the organic) and the produced.
63 
 
Interestingly, Zakharieva compares Branagh’s monster to some of the figures 
that populate the science-fictional and fantastic cinema of the 1990s.  She argues 
that Branagh’s film is “antithetical” to films like James Cameron’s Terminator 2, 
for instance, where the “monster” is depicted as a liquid-metal, inorganic, 
specially-affected body: 
 
the fearful body of the Terminator is totally ‘inorganic’, it is not like the 
composite body of Frankenstein’s creature.  It is an absolute creation of the 
film medium – a harmonious and proportionate naked body emerges on the 
screen; it is unified, powerwise very effective but, as a matter of fact, 
physically absent.  Contrary to Frankenstein’s monster, it is aesthetically 
functional not through its corporeality (complicated and deformed as it is) 
but because of the lack of it.
64 
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Of particular interest is her subsequent suggestion that “[m]odern cyborgs have 
gone far beyond the Romantic and modernist contrast of human versus machine 
– they are the effect of the machine, a mere image, a series of light impulses”
65.  I 
find however that the hybridity emphasised in Branagh’s portrayal of the monster 
functions in a similar manner to representations of what Springer calls the “hard-
bodied cyborg”, a figure contemporary with Branagh’s monster and epitomised 
by the muscular/mechanical body of Arnold Schwarzenegger in the Terminator 
films.
66  While Zakharieva writes of the cyborg as inorganic, “physically absent”, 
and “a mere image, a series of light impulses”, Springer notes that in many 
popular depictions of the mechanical body corporeality is powerfully 
emphasised: 
 
instead of effacing the human body, these texts intensify corporeality in 
their representation of cyborgs.  A mostly technological system is 
represented as its opposite: a muscular human body with robotic parts that 
heighten physicality and sexuality.
67 
 
Branagh’s monster might not be “hard-bodied”, but he, like the Schwarzenegger 
cyborg, is defined by a certain “intensification of corporeality”.  Both figures are 
constructed in a way that brings organic presence back into the body of the 
“machine”. 
 
We can further add to Zakharieva’s work by suggesting that the emerging 
concern with organicism in this film of the 1990s might be symptomatic of the 
digital age.  In a period when digital bodies can be produced – bodies that are 
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mere “light impulses” – there is a counteractive desire to re-organicise the 
screen, to bring organic presence back into the filmic machine.
68  This desire 
links Branagh’s monster to the hard-bodied cyborgs and corporeal machines of 
science fiction cinema in the 1990s.  I reiterate, however, that Branagh’s monster 
is still a problematic body, a body defined by scars: in this way the film, for all 
its failings, makes visible cinema’s own fragmentation of organic presence.  In 
the digital age, we find that the monster is more frequently re-presented as 
seamless – that, indeed, the robot of Metropolis, deceptively perfect, is a more 
influential figure on Frankenstein tales of this period.  I will take this up in 
Chapter Three. 
 
If Frankenstein-the-novel is defined by a tension between nature and technology, 
then clearly this tension extends into the film versions and particularly to their 
depiction of the monster.  The interplay between machine and organism becomes 
a defining feature of these films: the balance tips variously and is reorganised in 
different adaptations, so that in Branagh’s film organicism explodes into the 
mechanical as never before; but the tension, the interaction, is the same.  I 
propose that we can also use this Frankensteinian tension between nature and 
technology, organism and machine, to analyse the filmic body, the bodies that 
appear on our screens.  This argument will be pursued below. 
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Mechanical reproduction (or, the origin stories of the screen body) 
 
This chapter has introduced a number of key themes in the Frankenstein myth 
that function as self-reflexive points of energy in filmic adaptations: animation; 
electricity; visuality and spectatorship; fragmentation and the desire for 
wholeness.  I want to conclude by adding a final theme or concept to this list: 
mechanical reproduction.  This is by no means an untheorised or unrecognised 
connection between cinema and the Frankenstein tale.  It is quite obvious to most 
theorists who study Frankenstein films that “film versions of Frankenstein 
implicitly remind us that filmmaking itself is a Frankensteinian exercise in 
artificial reproduction”, as Heffernan puts it.
69  Nestrick, moreover, tells us that 
the Frankensteinian monster – in all its guises – functions as “our prime image of 
mechanical reproduction”.
70  Indeed, he/she/it can be read in conjunction with 
Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”: like Benjamin’s copied artwork, the monster is defined by a loss 
of “aura”, a gaping and irresolvable absence of the authenticity and organicism 
that defines a “real” person. 
 
In Shelley’s novel, the monster’s mechanically reproduced status allows him/it to 
symbolise the industrial age: her tale allegorises a nation’s move towards 
machine-based manufacturing and the social and technological change that 
followed.  Interestingly, if Shelley’s Frankenstein is a tale about the mechanical 
reproduction of the body, it can also be allegorically linked to photography, the 
invention of which strangely parallels the writing and publication of the novel.  
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The first cameras were developed in the 1820s and 1830s, mere years after 
Frankenstein was first published; Shelley may not have been aware of such 
developments when she wrote the novel, but her monster does function as a 
fantastic suggestion, a preemptive glimmer, of this eerie new means of re-
presenting and technologising human presence.  In filmic versions of the tale, 
however, both the monster’s body and the animation scene attest to cinema’s 
powers of mechanical reproduction, and the cinematic ability to turn human 
presence into a moving image projected endlessly on a screen. 
 
This filmic body, Benjamin tells us, is a body that we the audience view through 
a mediating layer of technology that separates and distances actor from spectator.  
The film audience, he tells us, views a film “without experiencing any personal 
contact with the actor”; consequently, the “[t]he audience’s identification with 
the actor is really an identification with the camera”.
71  This mediating layer of 
technology is what distinguishes film from theatre, in which the audience’s link 
to the actor is more organic.  Indeed, throughout his essay Benjamin investigates 
the difference between stage acting – as an organic, corporeal art form – and 
cinema as a mode of representation defined by an absence of the organic: 
 
The artistic performance of a stage actor is definitely presented to the 
public by the actor in person; that of the screen actor, however, is presented 
by the camera, with a twofold consequence.  The camera that presents the 
performance of the film actor to the public need not respect the 
performance as an integral whole.  Guided by the cameraman, the camera 
continually changes its position with respect to the performance.  The 
sequence of positional views which the editor composes from the material 
supplied him constitutes the completed film.  It comprises certain factors of 
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movement which are in reality those of the camera, not to mention special 
camera angles, close-ups, etc.
72 
 
In film, he continues, “the camera is substituted for the public.  Consequently, 
the aura that envelops the actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he 
portrays”.
73  For Benjamin, then, the cinematic process of mechanical 
reproduction results in both a loss of authenticity – represented by the 
diminishing of the “aura” – and a loss of organic presence.  Both these qualities 
are embodied by the Frankensteinian monster, whether we view him/her/it as a 
mechanical body, a reanimated corpse, a hybrid of machine and organism, or a 
simulation of human presence.  The monster’s metaphoric relevance for film thus 
extends beyond the mechanical and/or fragmented quality of his/her/its body: we 
can take the monster as an icon for the loss of both organicism and originality 
(indeed, for the loss of organic origins), and in this sense, he/she/it becomes a 
fantastic double of the mechanically reproduced body of the filmic actor. 
 
Benjamin dwells upon this troubled relationship between filmic image and 
embodied performance, and uses the words of Italian writer Luigi Pirandello to 
express the sense of loss that defines such a relationship: 
 
‘The film actor’, wrote Pirandello [in his novel Si Gira], ‘feels as if in exile 
– exiled not only from the stage but also from himself.  With a vague sense 
of discomfort he feels inexplicable emptiness: his body loses its 
corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of reality, life, voice, and the 
noises caused by his moving about, in order to be changed into a mute 
image, flickering an instant on the screen, then vanishing into silence… 
The projector will play with his shadow before the public, and he himself 
must be content to play before the camera’.
74 
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This somewhat beautiful description of the “loss of corporeality” that defines 
cinema is echoed in later theoretical work on the relationship between filmic 
technologies and organic presence.  Reminiscent of Benjamin and Pirandello, for 
instance, is Tom Gunning’s discussion of the spectral or incorporeal quality of 
the actor’s on-screen image.  Gunning reminds us that the invention of 
photography “radically transform[ed] traditional beliefs in solidity and unique 
identity” until “the body itself appeared to be abolished, rendered immaterial, 
through the phantasmagoria of both still and motion photography”.
75  For Mary 
Ann Doane, the filmic body is also defined by its spectrality and its absence of 
corporeality: she writes of “the necessary absence of the actor or the object 
which is simply represented on the screen by differences in the intensity of 
light”.
76  Engaging similar imagery is Gore Vidal, who states that “film is 
filtering present light through past images and voices”.
77  Ethnographic 
filmmaker David MacDougall, in turn, refers to bodies on film as “phantoms”, 
writing that “film gives us the bodies of those we have filmed, yet those same 
bodies dissipate or are transformed before our eyes”.
78  The relationship between 
the actor’s original, embodied performance and his/her image on screen is 
explained by MacDougall in terms of a “tearing apart of the signifier from its 
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object”, a separation which “is progressively exacerbated and transformed by 
time, as the film comes further adrift from the present tense of filming”.
79  
MacDougall also recognises a gradual paring away of the actor’s corporeality 
throughout the process of filming: 
 
A person I have filmed is a set of broken images: first, someone actually 
seen, within touch, sound, and smell; a face glimpsed in the darkness of a 
viewfinder; a memory, sometimes elusive, sometimes of haunting clarity; a 
strip of images in an editing machine; a handful of photographs; and finally 
the figure moving on the screen, of cinema itself.
80 
 
As many of these descriptions of the filmic body suggest, the relationship 
between organic presence and its reproduction on screen is a relationship akin to 
memory – a relationship, in other words, that involves a temporal disjunction, an 
ever-widening separation between the image of the actor and the moment-in-time 
that the original performance represents.  We can refer to Benjamin’s angel of 
history here: the body looking back on its (lost) past.  We can also refer to the 
Frankensteinian monster, a mechanical or otherwise postorganic being forever in 
negotiation with its lost origins in nature. 
 
What emerges here is a theoretical mapping of the “origin story” of the screen 
body.  Such a body, we can conclude, needs to be seen not only in terms of its 
fragmented presence but also in terms of its absence.  In many ways, this takes 
us back to where we started: the Edison film.  This film plays upon the spectral 
aspect of filmic presence, with the monster re-presented as an almost ghostly 
figure – especially in the moment of his wavering creation, and again at the 
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moment of his disappearance in the mirror.  Even the image of the monster 
standing before the mirror, confronting his reflection, can be read as a 
performance of the mediation of the actor’s body and the separation of body 
from image that defines the cinematic act of mechanical reproduction.  In this 
sense, it is interesting that Benjamin himself observes that “[t]he feeling of 
strangeness that overcomes the actor before the camera… is basically of the 
same kind as the estrangement felt before one’s own image in the mirror”.
81 
 
If this subtext of absence, incorporeality, and separation is less noticeable in the 
Whale films, which represent the monster as fragmented and/or mechanical but 
as toweringly present, it returns with vigour in some of the reworkings of 
Frankenstein to appear in the digital age.  Indeed, in the digital age this problem 
of organic presence and its disappearance from the cinema screen becomes 
increasingly relevant.  If Benjamin saw the filmic body as ghostly, incorporeal, 
or eternally exiled from its original moment-in-time, what might he have made of 
digital modes of production that overwrite organic presence, or simulate it, or 
construct it “from scratch”?  This will be explored in chapters to come.  My 
focus here has been early cinema, with the exception of the Branagh film (which 
we might read as a regression or, more sympathetically, an homage to the 
adaptations of Whale’s time).  In the following chapter I will shift my attention 
to more recent retellings of Frankenstein and consider how the tale has been 
reworked in response to new concerns, many of which pertain to digitality itself. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RE-IMAG(IN)ING FRANKENSTEIN IN  
CINEMA OF THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: New “creation” scenes: Blade Runner and The Fifth Element 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The Matrix and Jurassic Park: digital “monsters”?   113 
From animation to simulation 
 
In the 1910 film Frankenstein the monster confronts his reflection in a mirror, 
contemplating his own monstrosity as well as the cinematic mediation and 
framing of his body.  Many decades later, in the 1982 film Blade Runner, the 
postmodern “monster” Rachael contemplates a photograph of herself and her 
mother.  As she does so, the cold-hearted hero Deckard explains to her that both 
the photograph and the memories it represents are false.  This scene strips 
Rachael of her history, and thus performs her status as a filmic image: for, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, the filmic image too has a dubious origin story and 
is marked by a tenuous and disrupted connection to an original moment-in-time.  
As a meditation on artificial memory, visual culture, and the framed body, this 
famous scene is also a moment in which desires and concerns pertaining to 
cinema itself coalesce; it thus functions much like the creation scene in earlier 
filmic versions of Frankenstein, and indeed it is a moment in which Rachael, to 
some extent, is “created”.
1   
 
An iconic film of the 1980s, Blade Runner is often theoretically addressed as a 
retelling of Frankenstein.  Taking the place of Victor in this text is the bio-
engineer Tyrell, and his replicants – from the scary/camp Roy Batty to the 
beautiful and mournful Rachael – are postmodern “monsters”.  As Jay Clayton 
has pointed out, this film shares with Shelley’s novel a thematic concern with 
embodiment and power, continual references to vision and “the eye”, and an 
                                                 
1 Partly, at least, because this is the moment she learns she is a replicant.   114 
exploration of the “emotional dynamics between a creator and his creation”.
2  
The key thematic in Blade Runner is not animation, however, but simulation.  
The film is concerned with a quiet and insidious process of replicating human 
presence, and explores the effect of such a process on both the replicants 
themselves (who are “more human than human”) and on those who perceive 
themselves to be human (but can never be sure).  Steeped in such thematics, 
Blade Runner lacks a spectacular scene of animation or a moment of electric 
spectacle.  Cinema’s obsession with its own power to “animate”, it seems, has 
waned since the 1930s, when such a power was in its infancy; in the digital age, 
there are new concerns that inflect upon the filmic retelling of Frankenstein. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to track these new concerns, and to investigate the way 
the Frankensteinian monster and/or the creation scene have been rewritten in 
cinema of the digital age.  Having assessed the relationship between 
Frankenstein and film in my previous chapter, I want to move beyond what 
Nestrick calls the “myth of animation”,
3 that crucial link between Shelley’s tale 
and the medium that repeatedly adapts it.  Zakharieva tells us that it is not just 
the myth of animation but the “composite body”
4 that links cinema and the 
Frankenstein tale; but we can move beyond this, too, particularly as we turn our 
attention from very literal adaptations of the tale (such as Branagh’s film) to 
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looser retellings, especially those that operate within the science fiction genre.  
As Picart observes, this shift in generic location often allows for a stronger 
reworking and subverting of the original tale.
5  In this chapter, I will identify a 
shift in emphasis from monstrosity to artificiality, from animation to mediation, 
and from photomechanical to digital bodies.  My focus will be particular films of 
the 1990s that either reposition the monster to confront concerns pertaining to the 
digital age or rewrite the monster as digital “other”. 
 
I begin, however, with this scene from Blade Runner – a film of the 1980s – 
because it captures the spirit in which these later retellings operate.  I find this 
scene to be definitive of the way Frankenstein has been reworked and retold in 
response to concerns of the digital age.  Without a literal depiction of digital 
technologies, it performs some of the concerns that accompanied the rise of 
digital culture (simulation, mediation, artificiality, deception).  The presence of 
the photograph itself – a frame within a frame, a media text within a media text – 
suggests the importance of vision and mediation as self-reflexive themes in this 
film.  What Rachael recognises when she views the photo, furthermore, is not 
that she is a mechanically constructed monster but that she is a bio-engineered 
replicant: this scene, and the film in its entirety, consequently suggest a shift in 
emphasis from electricity and robotics to genetics and biotechnology (a coding 
rather than a galvanising of the body). 
 
                                                 
5 Caroline Joan Picart, “Introduction: Diffusing Beyond Horror: Frankenstein’s 
Enduring Resurrections”, in The Frankenstein Film Sourcebook, eds. Caroline 
Joan Picart et al (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), xiii.   116 
At the same time, this scene suggests an awareness of the encroach of digitality 
onto the cinematic space.  Garrett Stewart reads the scene as a nostalgic moment 
that appropriates both the photograph and the body it frames as a defence against 
postcinematic technologies.  “The photograph marks a nostalgia for the human 
body per se”, Stewart tells us, a nostalgia symptomatic of a world in which both 
the image itself and the bodies it captures can be “digitally engineered”.
6  For 
Stewart, the photographed body thus functions, in Blade Runner and in many 
other science fiction films, as a “funerary icon” for the disappearance of both 
organic presence and cinema itself in its pure, photographic, pre-digital aspect.
7  
Many analysts of science fiction film are beginning to acknowledge the influence 
of digital technologies, not just on how stories are being told within the genre, 
but also on what sort of stories are being told and how these stories might depict 
technology, the body, and human presence.  Drawing from Stewart, Charles 
Tryon notes that “recent science-fiction film tends to associate the incursion of 
the digital onto film with the attenuation of human presence”;
8 he reiterates 
Stewart’s argument with his suggestion that: 
 
digital effects inevitably encroach on stable definitions of the human, with 
the result that science fiction films have been marked by a double nostalgia 
for stable definitions of the human and for the photographic technologies 
that ground them.
9 
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The influence of digital technology on fantastic and science-fictional images of 
the human becomes of importance when we consider Frankenstein, a tale about 
the dialogue between human presence and technology that is often (re)told in 
fantastic and science-fictional texts revolving around cyborgs, replicants, and 
posthuman bodies.  As I will discuss below, digital effects have a double impact 
on the process of screening and retelling Frankenstein: they offer a fantastic new 
means of bringing the tale to life and of imaging the monster’s body, yet they 
also often become an object of anxiety within such texts. 
 
This chapter will be structured around two concerns: mediation and digitality.  I 
will address two films, in particular, that rework the Frankenstein tale in 
conjunction with these concepts: Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days, a film about 
mediation and memory that offers a fantastic image of the spectator (rather than 
the actor) as a constructed, fragmented, and technologically enhanced 
body/subject; and Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park, a film that deals with the 
creation of “monsters” and also a film that employs groundbreaking digital 
effects, projecting these new technologies onto the bodies of its monsters and 
thus offering an image of the Frankensteinian Creature as digital other.  Between 
my analyses of these texts I will also refer briefly to other films, including The 
Matrix and The Fifth Element, which rework the Frankensteinian creation scene 
(and other motifs from the tale) in response to the concerns of a new era.  In 
combination, these films show us that our cultural understanding of “life” itself – 
the monolithic concept at the heart of the Frankenstein tale – has changed, not 
only since Shelley’s day but since the time of Whale, Lang, and Edison/Dawley.  
Life today is not necessarily organic or electric (or indeed, if we are to refer to   118 
the Edison film, alchemical); it can also be an electronic flicker on a screen; it is 
digital or genetic code; it is information; it is a computer-generated “effect”.  
This shift, and its influence upon the process of retelling Frankenstein, will be 
investigated throughout the chapter. 
 
Mediation and memory 
 
It is not only digitality that is on our minds in the so-called “digital” age.  This is 
a period in which a concern with media and mediation, in general, runs through 
the cultural bloodstream.  Mark Williams argues that the advent of the digital age 
has brought about an increased awareness of our own mediated status, and a 
desire to see this status reflected and explored in popular culture.  He writes: 
 
as the rise of digital culture has become evident, so has popular interest in 
media history, including interest in the media as industries.  Essays and 
feature articles about media history/industry now appear regularly in news 
and cultural magazines (e.g., Time, Newsweek, The New Yorker).  The New 
York Times has greatly expanded its coverage of media and technology, 
and other newspapers have followed suit.  Documentaries and talk-show 
discussions about media technology, media moguls, media conglomerates, 
and media effects have become standard fare on PBS and several new 
cable channels.  Contemporary media dynamics (textual, industrial, 
economic, interpersonal, etc.) and an apparently attendant desire to 
understand how they are and have been determined, now exist at an 
unprecedented level – as staple topics for news and information media 
outlets.
10 
 
                                                 
10 Mark Williams, “Real-time Fairy Tales: Cinema Prefiguring Digital Anxiety”, 
in New Media: Theories and Practices of Digitextuality, eds. Anna Everett and 
John T. Caldwell (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 161.   119 
Williams refers to this as “popular attention to media dynamics”, a cultural 
phenomenon that involves “a desire to understand the media and our mediated 
experiences with greater detail and complexity”.
11 
 
Interestingly, Williams also argues that the advent of the digital age “must entail 
at some level a recognition or underlying sense that we have tended to ignore or 
repress, rather than be merely unaware of, some of the media matters we now 
seek to understand”.
12  If we bear in mind Freud’s suggestion that repression 
leads to the uncanny,
13 we can argue that this exploration of previously repressed 
anxieties leads to the depictions of uncanny media that we find in fantastic, 
horror, and science fiction films of the digital age.  Uncanny depictions of media 
presence can be found in sci-fi/horror hybrids like The Ring (in which a ghostly 
apparition crawls out of the television set and murders its victims) and Signs (in 
which creepy aliens are glimpsed on news footage and reflected in the television 
screen), films that perform cultural anxieties over television, visual media, and 
cinema itself in an age when “digitality” is perceived to be on everyone’s minds.  
These films may not openly engage Shelley’s tale, but they do offer interesting 
new images of the “monster” as a mediated, mechanically reproduced, 
technologically animated figure.  
 
In this period there is also an increasing interest in the techno-body as an 
allegory for the media spectator.  In the 1960s Marshall McLuhan announced 
                                                 
11 Williams, 161. 
12 Ibid., 162, my emphasis. 
13 Freud states that the uncanny “proceeds from something familiar which has 
been repressed”.  See Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. IV (1924-50), 
trans. Joan Riviere (London: Holgarth Press and The Institute for Psycho-
analysis, 1919), 401.   120 
that media technologies extend our bodies, our senses, and our consciousness, 
rendering us postorganic.
14  “The new media and technologies by which we 
amplify and extend ourselves”, he wrote, “constitute huge collective surgery 
carried out on the social body”,
15 a strange image that brings Frankenstein to 
mind.
16  McLuhan’s media cyborg finds a place in science fiction, horror, and 
fantastic cinema of the 1980s and beyond.  Techno-bodies become spectators in 
films like Robocop, in which a memorable scene has the cyborg seated and 
watching a screen.
17  Later films of the 1990s and early 2000s flirt with 
cyberpunk and imagine a plugged-in subject bombarded with data and images: 
                                                 
14 McLuhan writes: “During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in 
space.  Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have 
extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both 
space and time as far as our planet is concerned.  Rapidly, we approach the final 
phase of the extensions of man – the technological simulation of consciousness, 
when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately 
extended to the whole of human society, much as we have already extended our 
senses and our nerves by the various media.” Marshall McLuhan, Understanding 
Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge, 2001), 3-4. 
15 Ibid., 70. 
16 McLuhan’s media cyborg bears some similarity to the cinema spectator as 
imagined by Walter Benjamin.  Benjamin famously writes of the “distracted” 
nature of the film viewer, who is an “absent-minded” critic; but he also imagines 
the spectator in terms of an interface between the organic and the technological.  
As Tim Armstrong observes, Benjamin’s spectator is not only “distracted” but 
“plugged into collective energies” thus “demonstrating the dissonance between 
the mechanical and the human”.  See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. 
Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 242-243; 
and Tim Armstrong, Modernism, Technology and the Body: A Cultural Study 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218-219. 
17 This scene has been analysed by Healy, who writes: “The cyborg is seated.  
We watch the cyborg, the monitoring devices to which it is attached (video 
monitors and continuous charting graphs… Perhaps the most interesting aspect 
of these rememberings and bodily enactments of remembering is that both 
Murphy’s and Robocop’s memories become increasingly cinematic in at least 
one important sense – Murphy cannot exist as a figure of identification because 
the spectator’s relationship to his ‘experiences’ is spectacular – we see but do not 
identify with the body of Murphy in the construction of POV… In the end 
though, we learn to see both the past and the present through the eyes of a 
cyborg.”  Chris Healy, “Total Recall?  Bodies, Cyborgs and Memory”, in 
Screening the Past: VIth Australian History and Film Conference Papers, eds. 
John Benson et al (Melbourne: La Trobe University, 1993), 235.   121 
these include Strange Days and the films of the Matrix trilogy.  These films 
express an interest in mediation, an anxiety about the pervasiveness of visual 
culture; they also position their techno-bodies as spectators or bodies in 
negotiation with visual technology.  As tales about technologically modified 
bodies, as apocalyptic depictions of postorganic presence – like McLuhan’s text 
itself – these films also place themselves in dialogue with the Frankenstein tale. 
 
Closer to home, we can argue that the cultural desire both to understand and to 
represent our own mediation has shaped retellings of Frankenstein.  Blade 
Runner offers the best example of this: as discussed above, it is a film about 
simulation rather than animation, and it contains a scene of spectatorship and 
contemplation rather than a scene of animation.  In the previous chapter it was 
noted that many filmic versions of Frankenstein are self-reflexively concerned 
with vision; Heffernan, for instance, tells us that cinematic adaptations of 
Shelley’s tale are marked by a desire to “see” the monster and also to represent 
him/her/it as a creature who sees.
18  In Blade Runner, the emphasis shifts from 
viewing the monster’s monstrosity to viewing the perfection and beauty of the 
replicants; at the same time, these replicants are both visible and viewing 
creatures.  The scene in which Rachael contemplates “herself” in a photograph, 
for instance, recalls the moment in Shelley’s novel when the monster glimpses 
his own reflection in a forest pool.
19 
 
                                                 
18 James A.W. Heffernan, “Looking at the Monster: Frankenstein and Film”, 
Critical Inquiry 24, 1 (1997), 136. 
19 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions, 1993), 88.   122 
Yet the “monsters” of Blade Runner are confronted not only with their own 
image but with the barrage of images that constitute postmodern media culture.  
Relatedly, the plight of the monster in Blade Runner is relocated from the Gothic 
landscape of eighteenth-century Europe – the mountains and cities where Shelley 
situated her tale – to a cluttered, spectacular, futuristic-but-recognisable media-
scape: a “noir” city, but also a space inhabited by images and simulations, a 
space where the key thematic of “replication” signals not only the 
biotechnological construction of bodies but also the machine of advertising and 
the workings of media culture itself. 
 
Memory, too, is on our minds in the digital age – and Blade Runner is in part a 
film about the mediation of individual and cultural memory.  Chris Healy refers 
to this film, along with Total Recall and Robocop, in his investigation of the way 
“anxieties about an enfeebled historicity have been confronted through the 
metaphors of the body and in particular through the figure of the Hollywood 
cyborg”.
20  Here, the story of the mechanically reproduced body becomes a story 
about historical absences, about contemplating/viewing the past, and about 
technologies that both remember and re-member the body.  A similar 
interweaving of memory themes into the Frankenstein myth was discussed in 
Chapter One with particular reference to Victor Kelleher’s novel Born of the Sea.  
Kelleher’s Madeleine, like the replicants of Blade Runner, is an artificial creature 
struggling with memory problems; afflicted with amnesia, she searches for her 
creator Victor Frankenstein, her lost past as a French aristocrat, and finally for 
                                                 
20 Healy, 233.   123 
Mary Shelley (her “other” creator).  The replicants of Blade Runner are afflicted 
not with amnesia but with the related problem of false and implanted memories 
 
Many of the “techno-body tales” that followed Blade Runner followed suit.  
Alongside the aforementioned Robocop and Total Recall, these stories include 
the films Johnny Mnemonic and Paycheck, science-fictional tales that feature 
characters with technologically extended memories; they also include the novel 
Neuromancer, which was published two years after Blade Runner and which 
deals with similar themes.  In each case, the techno-body – the artificial or 
mechanically extended being – is positioned to confront the memory-crises that 
characterise a hyper-mediated world.  Many of these texts dwell upon what 
Alison Landsberg has termed “the ‘otherness’ of prosthetic memory”:
21 they 
resound with anxieties over the possibility of false, simulated, or artificial 
memory.  The Frankensteinian monster as an emblem of technologically-created 
otherness finds new applicability in these stories about implanted memory and 
the struggle for authenticity. 
 
Of particular interest here is the notion of a memory/body connection.  Films like 
Blade Runner explore and deconstruct the understanding that the body is an 
archive of memory, or a text on which memories are inscribed.  Such an 
understanding has been beautifully articulated by Jeanette Winterson in her novel 
Written on the Body, where she proclaims that “written on the body is a secret 
                                                 
21 Alison Landsberg, “Prosthetic Memory: Total Recall and Blade Runner”, in 
Cyberspace, Cyberbodies, Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment, 
eds. Mike Feathersone and Roger Burrows (London: Sage, 1995), 176.   124 
code only visible in certain lights: the accumulations of a lifetime gather there”.
22  
The idea of bodily memory, however, becomes problematic in the context of 
Frankenstein, a tale about a fragmented being constructed from stolen body 
parts; a creature who is created rather than birthed, brought to life in a 
technologically-induced instant rather than grown and nurtured.  As Shelley 
almost articulates in her novel, one of the monster’s fundamental problems is 
his/its lack of the memories that are usually inscribed into a human body.  
Significantly, the interior part of the novel – that which gives voice to the 
monster himself – begins with the words “[i]t is with considerable difficulty that 
I remember the original era of my being”.
23  The monster is referring here to his 
inability to recall the moments straight after his creation, but this rather opaque 
line can also be read as a reference to his lack of the collection of memories that 
constitutes and defines a subject.  Throughout the novel, Shelley is also at great 
pains to establish the personal histories of her male protagonists, Walton and 
Victor; if this is merely an attempt to stress the importance of family – the 
connection each man has to his sister/father/fiancée – it still renders all the more 
stark the monster’s background or lack thereof.  Across the course of the novel, 
the monster struggles to situate himself within the sort of historical narrative that 
Walton and Victor possess: he negotiates history, literature, nature, although 
forever as an outsider.
24 
 
                                                 
22 Jeanette Winterson, Written on the Body (London: Vintage, 1993), 89. 
23 Shelley, 79. 
24 Literature and history, for instance, he learns while spying on the De Lacey 
family.  During this period of surveillance, he encounters such texts as Volney’s 
Ruins of Empires and Milton’s Paradise Lost.  Shelley, 92-98.   125 
In films like Blade Runner these memory problems are lifted to the surface of the 
tale.  To some extent, the foregrounding of memory as a theme in this 
“adaptation” of Frankenstein is indicative of a need to address the digital age, a 
period in which external devices and technologies of memory – the camera, the 
computer, cyberspace – inflect upon our capacity to remember (and upon our 
understanding of memory itself).  It is worth pointing out here that the 
technologising of memory has long been theoretically recognised as a by-product 
of the process of mechanical reproduction – that very process around which the 
Frankenstein tale revolves.  In his essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Walter 
Benjamin discusses the changes to memory and history brought about by 
reproductive technologies.
25  Drawing on Benjamin’s work, Mark Hansen 
observes that “reproductive technologies [are] functioning as the exteriorized 
(and collective) embodiments of memory”
26 and that “technological 
reproducibility marks the eclipse of interior, associated memory as the privileged 
mode of storing experience”.
27  As a result, memory “finds its home not in the 
depths of psychic interiority but in the brute materiality of physical things”.
28  
Such externalisation of memory is intrinsically related to the development of 
media, photographic, and cinematic technologies.  As Josko Petkovic tells us, 
“the invention of photography and film made it possible to objectify elements of 
our interiority – our thoughts, desires and fantasies – and render these as 
                                                 
25 Drawing from Marcel Proust and his concept of embodied memory 
(exemplified by the Proustian “madeleine”), Benjamin refers to memory as 
“natural” (embodied) or “synthetic” (technological/artificial).  Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1969), 157. 
26 Mark Hansen, Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000), 236. 
27 Ibid., 240. 
28 Ibid., 241.   126 
elements of our visual exteriority”.
29  Scott McQuire calls this the camera’s 
“capacity to objectify vision”, reminding us that in the media age “both personal 
and collective memory [have been] relocated in the virtual landscapes of new 
media technologies”.
30  Such concerns become more acute in the digital age.  
Digital technologies have altered the way we remember: for years we have 
described the capacity of computers to store information in terms of “memory”; 
and today the Internet, in particular, acts as a giant external brain, a pool of 
collective memory disconnected from any individual body.
31  These concepts 
background the depiction of the artificially-created and amnesiac “monster” in 
Blade Runner; they are flirted with in this film and in many of the “techno-body” 
stories that followed. 
 
This theme of manufactured memories – an emerging theme in some of our 
Frankenstein-like tales of the digital age – shifts the emphasis from the 
construction of the body to the construction of less tangible things: historicity, 
temporality, mind, consciousness.  Let us return again to Rachael and her 
photograph.  Assessing this scene in relation to Frankenstein, we can observe 
that Blade Runner is less concerned with the fragmented body than with the 
fragmentation of the subject: Rachael is not a sutured monster, but she is a 
subject split between her embodied self and the external memories that the 
                                                 
29 Josko Petkovic, “The Rhizome and the Image: the Genealogy of the Film 
Letter to Eros” (PhD diss., Murdoch University, 1997), 134. 
30 Scott McQuire, Visions of Modernity: Representation, Memory, Time and 
Space in the Age of the Camera (London: Sage, 1998), 107. 
31 Umberto Eco likens the Internet to Funes El Memorioso, Jorge Luis Borges’ 
character who literally remembers everything.  Umberto Eco, “Signs of the 
Times”, in Conversations About the End of Time, eds. Catherine David et al, 
trans. Ian Maclean and Roger Pearson (London and New York: Penguin, 1999), 
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photograph represents.  The technologising of the body is here matched and 
mirrored by the construction and colonisation of the mind by visual culture. 
 
There is a wonderful scene from the 1997 film Dark City that exemplifies this 
shift in emphasis from constructed body to constructed mind.  Dark City is not, 
strictly speaking, a retelling of Frankenstein, although it resounds with 
Frankensteinian themes: the construction of the self by social circumstance; the 
cruelty of scientific experiment.  The film depicts the creation of an entire social 
world by alien beings, The Strangers, who are intent on studying the human race.  
The Strangers construct not artificial bodies but artificial space – a fake “city” 
for their human subjects to live in – and artificial memories.  Helping them is the 
human character Doctor Schreber, a caricature of the popular image of 
Frankenstein: a mad scientist shuffling through his laboratory, muttering and 
cackling.  In one memorable scene we see Schreber manufacturing his false 
memories, narrating his creative work gleefully: “a touch of unhappy childhood”, 
he says, “a dash of teenage rebellion, and last but not least, a tragic death in the 
family”.  As with Blade Runner, the figure of the fragmented or constructed body 
is replaced in this scene by an interest in the fragmentation of the subject: the 
colonisation and construction of the mind by exterior forces and technologies.  
At the same time, Dark City is a film about films: it transforms the Frankenstein 
tale into a story about the production of space and time, a very cinematic 
theme.
32 
                                                 
32 As Charles Tryon has pointed out, the city in Dark City “is characterized by 
images of industrial production, including the elevated trains, the Automat, and 
the fifties automobiles”.  Tryon argues that “[t]his industrial image corresponds 
to cinema’s status as an art of ‘mechanical reproduction’”, as does the depiction   128 
 
Arguably, then, an emerging cultural interest in media and mediation is shaping 
our Frankenstein stories, resulting in a new generation of visible and viewing 
monsters.  In many ways, the myth of the techno-body has become a space for 
performing and cathartically expelling anxieties about mediation, visual culture, 
and media technology, about the fragmentation of the subject, about the 
colonisation of both mind and body by exterior technologies that remember for 
us and re-member us.  I will take this up in my analysis of the film Strange Days, 
a film that offers an image of the fragmented/constructed “media cyborg” and 
that also beautifully merges the Frankenstein tale – and the Gothic mode to 
which it belongs – with a late twentieth-century concern with spectatorship, 
image culture, and the media apparatus. 
 
Cyborg spectators and fragmented subjects in Strange Days 
 
Released in 1995, Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days unfolds on the streets of Los 
Angeles during the frantic days before the turning of the millennium.  In this 
“future-scape” of 1999 memories and experiences can be recorded, bought, sold, 
and “played back” on a device called a SQUID, essentially a form of virtual 
reality that saturates the viewer with sensory information.  Participating in this 
culture of artificial memory and recorded experience is Lenny Nero, a dealer in 
playback and also an addict to it.  Lenny is immersed in a world of past images, 
mostly clips of his ex-girlfriend, Faith, who rejects his advances in the present 
but the image of whom he can repeatedly recall and view via his SQUID unit.  
                                                                                                                                   
of “classically modernist technologies such as the gears, wheels, levers, and 
assembly lines that serve as the city’s substructure”.  Tryon, 49-50.   129 
As the narrative progresses, Lenny struggles to “unplug” himself from this 
violent and voyeuristic world and from the technology that defines it, leading to 
his rejection of Faith and the beginnings of a healthier romance with his 
companion Mace. 
 
Strange Days has been described by Jules Law as “contemporary permutation of 
the gothic in the emergent subgenre of ‘virtual reality’ narrative”, and thus as a 
text that has much in common with Shelley’s Frankenstein.
33  Both texts, Law 
argues, are characterised by a desire for “transcendence” that marks the Gothic 
mode, and also by what he terms a “double apparatus”:
34 in Shelley’s tale, the 
framing narration and the constant references to other modes of writing (poetry, 
letter writing); in Strange Days, the short clips of “playback” that punctuate the 
narrative.  Strange Days is also a violent film that shares with Shelley’s 
Frankenstein a sense of techno-fear linked to horrific and transgressive 
depictions of the technology/body relationship.  The film’s most disturbing scene 
features the rape and murder of a girl named Iris, who is wired into a SQUID unit 
and is consequently forced to witness her own violation and to experience her 
killer’s sexual gratification as she dies.  This murder is perpetrated not by a 
“monster” but by a mechanically enhanced individual who uses the playback 
apparatus to heighten his pleasure as he rapes and kills; the technology is here 
made monstrous and the killer is technologised in a manner that recalls Shelley’s 
text. 
 
                                                 
33 Jules Law, “Being There: Gothic Violence and Virtuality in Frankenstein, 
Dracula, and Strange Days”, ELH 73, 4 (2006), 976. 
34 Ibid.   130 
To some extent, however, the true Frankensteinian “monster” of this film is the 
dubious and erotic character of Faith.  She features in most of the playback clips: 
we see her skating with Lenny, making love to him, and we even see her raped 
and murdered in a similar manner to Iris (although this clip is later revealed to be 
fake).  Through the technology of playback Faith is repeatedly “brought to life” 
for us to view: memories of her are reanimated, largely to satisfy Lenny’s desire 
for her (absent) body.  She is thus an artificial, constructed, and repeatedly 
viewed body; a mechanically reproduced “work of art”.  Fittingly, she is 
presented to us as both seductive and sleazy, an erotic image repeatedly re-
created for Lenny’s pleasure and also a worn-out shell of a person who appears 
as tired and bored as she is beautiful.  We might view her within the context 
provided by Benjamin’s work and suggest that her authenticity is compromised 
in a way that matches her status as mechanical reproduction – that she is, in other 
words, stripped of her “aura”. 
 
Yet Lenny, too, can be read as a type of Frankensteinian monster.  With his 
addiction to playback and his attachment to his SQUID unit, Lenny turns himself 
into a cyborg; he becomes, literalises, McLuhan’s mechanically extended media 
viewer.  The film also recalls the work of Benjamin on the relationship between 
spectator and actor:
35 when Lenny, forlorn and lovesick, views clips of Faith, his 
identification with the technology of playback takes the place of his lost 
relationship with her as a real person.  We might also describe Lenny as a sewn-
together composite, not of different body parts but of different people’s 
                                                 
35 Benjamin writes that the spectator views a film “without experiencing any 
personal contact with the actor”; consequently, the spectator’s “identification 
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experiences and memories (which are “animated” by the technology of 
playback): he is a fragmented, technologised subject inhabiting a whole, organic 
body.  Strange Days thus reverses the problematic of Shelley’s tale, in which the 
monster is depicted as a unified subject in a fragmented body.  As the film 
progresses, however, Lenny’s fragmentation becomes less noticeable.  When he 
acknowledges his feelings for Mace in the film’s climax and seizes her in a 
passionate kiss (to a suddenly romantic and soaring soundtrack) we might 
suggest that he has become whole.  This ending, which Quinby refers to as 
“apocalyptically romantic”,
36 performs a rapturous escape from the technological 
trappings and unhealthy addictions that have bound Lenny and the world in 
which he lives.   
 
Overall, Strange Days is just as anxious about the hyper-technological media-
world it depicts as Shelley was of the world she constructed in Frankenstein.  
The film’s strident techno-fear and its othering of technology is particularly 
linked to its themes of invasion, penetration, and rape.  This becomes evident 
early in the film when we witness Lenny’s dealing with a customer, new to the 
playback experience, whom he terms a “virgin brain”, and who is subsequently 
penetrated and invaded by Lenny’s technologies.  Meanwhile a killer is raping 
women and recording the experience; his victims are penetrated doubly, by the 
killer and by the SQUID unit he straps to their heads.   
 
                                                 
36 Lee Quinby, Millennial Seduction: A Skeptic Confronts Apocalyptic Culture 
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Central in this othering process is the character of Mace.  As David Crane has 
pointed out, Mace undertakes a certain “guardianship of the real” in this film.
37  
Associated with moral fortitude, strength, and selflessness, she represents the 
body that is not yet technologically penetrated, and thus the path that Lenny must 
ultimately choose if he is to “save” himself.
38  In many ways, Mace is a version 
of Shelley’s “Elizabeth”, who represents a similar path of salvation for Victor.  
The two characters share a status that might be referred to as technological 
virginity.  Elizabeth represents “nature” in its pure form, free from technological 
and scientific entanglements, while Mace’s purity is related to her refusal to wear 
a SQUID unit (like Lenny’s customer, she is a “virgin brain”).  In Frankenstein 
the “penetration” of nature by technology is symbolised by the brutal murder of 
Elizabeth on her wedding night; in Strange Days there is a less bloody but still 
horrific moment to depict such penetration: Mace loses her “virginity” when 
Lenny all but forces her to watch the violent and confronting clip of Iris’ murder. 
 
                                                 
37 David Crane, “In Medias Race: Filmic Representation, Networked 
Communication, and Racial Intermediation”, in Race in Cyberspace, eds. Beth E. 
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38 As both David Crane and Claudia Springer have pointed out, this 
characterisation of Mace is grounded in racial stereotypes: as an African 
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Springer argues that films such as Strange Days, Virtuosity, Johnny Mnemonic 
and Hackers feature African American characters who help, support, or “ground” 
the white main characters, while Crane writes of the same films that African 
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provides a more authentically resistant otherness than hybridity, and that 
authenticity associated with blackness visually enhances the intersection between 
cyberspace and cinematic space”.  See Crane, “In Medias Race”, 91, and Claudia 
Springer, “Psycho-Cybernetics in Films of the 1990’s”, in Alien Zone 2: The 
Spaces of Science Fiction Cinema, ed. Annette Kuhn (London and New York: 
Verso, 1999), 215.   133 
Alongside these motifs of penetration, virginity, and techno-fear, Strange Days – 
like its predecessor Blade Runner – shares with Shelley’s Frankenstein a concern 
with visuality and “the eye”.  Clayton writes that Blade Runner “invokes 
Frankenstein from its opening sequence, in which a disembodied eye stares 
down on an aerial view of Los Angeles at night”, adding that “[i]n Shelley’s 
novel, disembodied eyes terrify Frankenstein repeatedly”.
39  Similarly, Strange 
Days opens with the image of a (seemingly disembodied) eye in close-up, an 
image that creates the unsettling illusion that audiences are themselves being 
viewed by the film.  This particular image recalls the work of psychoanalysts 
such as Christian Metz and the notion that “the [cinema] spectator identifies with 
himself, with himself as a pure act of perception”.
40  In this sense, Strange Days 
also shares much with some of the early filmic versions of Frankenstein: 
particularly the Edison film, with its mirror-play and doubling of spectatorship. 
 
More specifically, Strange Days has been described by Roz Kaveney as “a film 
about the gaze, and about not being able to look away”.
41  In this respect it draws 
attention to the voyeuristic position of the cinema spectator.  Voyeurism, too, is a 
recurring theme in Shelley’s text: the monster, in particular, is positioned as a 
voyeur during his lengthy period of spying on the DeLacey family, and later 
when he watches Victor construct and then destroy (or violate) the body of the 
female Creature.  Interestingly, in filmic adaptations there is often an inversion 
whereby Victor becomes the voyeur and the monster is the object of his/our gaze: 
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in the Edison film, for instance, Victor spies upon the monster’s eerie birth, 
peering through a gap in the closed doors.  In Metropolis, the mechanically 
reproduced Creature is female and she/it dances seductively for an audience.  
This is mirrored many years later in Blade Runner, where the replicant Zhora 
performs a similarly seductive dance on stage while being spied upon by 
Deckard; it is also mirrored in Strange Days, where Lenny sits in a darkened 
audience watching Faith perform with her band.  This leads us back to the 
understanding that today’s Frankensteinian monsters are often incorporated into 
(gendered) narratives of cinematic surveillance.  In Strange Days, Lenny’s 
relationship with Faith’s mechanically reproduced body – and the gendering of 
visual technology throughout the film – resonates with both psychoanalytic 
readings of cinema and the trappings of the Gothic genre itself, in which, as Law 
reminds us, the body is “caught up in the violent, gendered field of the gaze”.
42 
 
As science-fictional tales set in futuristic worlds, devoid of monsters and lacking 
a scene of true animation, Blade Runner and Strange Days are examples of films 
that, in Frank Smooth’s words, “extend the [Frankenstein] myth outward a 
considerable distance”.
43  Nevertheless, because they appropriate and rework the 
figure of the techno-body – a very old figure whose history in myth and literature 
predates Shelley – they resonate with the Frankenstein tale.  They can be further 
linked to Frankenstein because they explore the problems relating to the act of 
mechanical reproduction, although they afford the problem of memory greater 
scrutiny than Shelley’s novel did.  Like the early Frankenstein films, 
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furthermore, these later retellings contain an image of the filmic machine: both 
texts are obsessed with visuality and spectatorship, and Strange Days in 
particular depicts a complex and fantastic apparatus that stands in for cinema 
itself.
44  Both texts also respond to and ruminate on the problems associated with 
living in a world dominated and defined by visual media.  They are films about 
simulation, subjectivity, the gaze and the frame; they explore the human/machine 
interface and offer a fantastic image of the media spectator as “monster”; and 
they dramatise the construction, colonisation, and penetration of body and mind 
by media technologies. 
 
Yet if Blade Runner and Strange Days retell Frankenstein, they do so with an 
awareness of important shifts in the cultural understandings about what it means 
to be embodied and what it means to be alive.  Blade Runner reminds us that, at 
the end of the twentieth century, developments in genetic engineering and 
biotechnology paralleled those in media culture; Strange Days depicts the 
emergence of cyberculture and its impact on our understandings of the 
relationship between body and mind, body and technology, self and other.  Both 
films also demonstrate an awareness of the encroach of digital effects onto the 
cinematic space.  This, as previously discussed, informs the famous photograph 
scene in Blade Runner, with its decidedly elegiac tone and its positioning of both 
the organic body and photographic modes of representation as (lost) objects of 
desire.  In Strange Days, the playback apparatus both stands in for cinema and 
suggests its demise: as Law points out, playback acts as a “rival medium”, 
allowing the film to participate in “a defence of the cinematic apparatus against 
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the incursions of a rival technology”.
45  In the remainder of this chapter I will 
discuss these developments in biotechnology, cyberculture, and digital 
filmmaking, developments which in combination have contributed greatly to the 
evolution of the Frankenstein myth. 
 
Coded bodies and the changing concept of “life” 
 
In 1997 the Frankenstein tale was updated for a new era of filmmaking.  Taking 
a different path from the more introspective Blade Runner, director Luc Besson 
returned to a spectacularisation of the creation scene in his space opera The Fifth 
Element.  In this film Leeloo, an alien being and the potential saviour of 
humankind, is created before our eyes: fibre by fibre she appears, her artificial 
origins exposed for all to see; from bones, to muscles, to a strikingly beautiful 
young woman with pale skin and flaming orange hair.  A group of male scientists 
approach the tube in which she lies, a futuristic version of the mythical Sleeping 
Beauty.  “Perfect”, they murmur breathlessly.  Their expressions of combined 
awe and appreciation may well mirror the expressions of the film’s inscribed 
spectator, its ideal audience: the geeky sci-fi fan, the young adolescent male who 
is blown away by both the scene’s stunning use of special effects and the nearly 
naked body of the “perfect” woman before them. 
 
An artificial being who is constructed before our eyes in a clear homage to 
Frankenstein, Leeloo is nevertheless defined by her beauty, not her monstrosity; 
the actress who brings her character “to life” is former model Milla Jovovich 
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(once the face of L’Oréal advertising campaigns).  Accordingly, this spectacular 
moment of techno-genesis dwells less upon cinema’s fragmentation of the body 
than upon the construction of beauty in the media age, and upon the related 
reduction of the (female) body to an image for viewing.  This digitally-enabled 
creation scene also functions as a strange foreshadowing of the creation of digital 
actors such as Aki Ross, who was to appear some years later in Final Fantasy: 
The Spirits Within, and whose creators did much to stress her beauty and 
“perfection”.  At the same time, the scene raises Frankensteinian questions.  It is 
a very mechanical scene that involves a process of de-naturing – Leeloo is 
“built” instantly and at the “hands” of quick, efficient machines – and it strips the 
body of its organic basis, removing any suggestion of an origin in nature.
46  
What, we are invited to ask, does it “mean to be embodied, when the body 
cannot claim the status of nature?”
47  What happens when a body is instantly and 
artificially created rather than born?  Although these questions are not taken up 
by the largely superficial narrative that follows, it does not seem to matter: the 
creation scene, with its imaging of a posthuman, postorganic, postcinematic 
body, is the film’s most powerful moment. 
 
If this scene in The Fifth Element questions the human body’s link to “nature”, it 
does so with reference to crucial developments in biotechnology that marked the 
1990s as a period.  In 1997, when the film was released, the Human Genome 
Project – which sought to sequence every human gene and thus provide a “map” 
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of the entire organism – was well underway and near completion, bringing with 
it a new understanding of the body.  Writing in the mid-1990s, Evelyn Fox 
Keller captures the essence of this new understanding: 
 
Today’s biological organism bears little resemblance to the traditionally 
maternal guarantor of vital integrity, the source of nurture and sustenance; 
it is no longer even the passive material substrata of classical genetics.  The 
body of modern biology, like the DNA molecule – and also like the 
modern corporate or political body – has become just another part of an 
informational network, now machine, now message, always ready for 
exchange, each for the other.
48   
 
Such loss of “vital integrity” is also, of course, fantastically depicted in Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, a text that foreshadows the biotechnological developments that 
occurred more than a century after its publication.  That this loss of “vital 
integrity” should, for Keller, be best seen in the eclipse of the body’s “maternal” 
function – another theme that Shelley dwells upon – is significant given that 
many of the “monsters” who are created on our screens today are, like Leeloo, 
female. 
 
It is also interesting to note Keller’s allusions to the technologies of media and 
communication in this description of the genetically coded body: as she describes 
it, the mapping of the genome and the surrounding biotechnological 
developments turned the body into a “medium” for DNA “messages”.  A 
comparison can be drawn here with an earlier period in which developments in 
the way information was communicated gave rise to a view of the female body, 
in particular, as a “medium”: in the nineteenth century, the invention of new 
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media technologies such as telegraphy inflected upon the Spiritualist movement 
(with its mostly female “mediums”) to produce, as Jeffrey Sconce observes, a 
“theory of woman as technology”.
49  For Sconce, this demonstrated “that media 
‘liveness’ was from the very beginning a concept understood through a 
compelling complex of arterial metaphors linking body and consciousness with 
technology and information”.
50  We witness a similar intertwining of concepts in 
the 1990s when an emerging image of the body as a medium for textual flickers 
of DNA “life” can be partly attributed to the dominance of media culture and the 
familiarity of media objects such as the television, the computer, and the cinema 
screen. 
 
What we glimpse in The Fifth Element and its reworking of the Frankensteinian 
creation scene is thus a shift in the cultural conception of “life” itself.  As 
Waldby tells us in her analysis of Shelley’s novel, “[l]ife today is information, 
molecular or neuronal data, and it circulates freely between bodies and 
computational systems”.
51  The Human Genome Project exemplifies this shift 
towards life-as-information (rather than “energy”).  Elsewhere, Waldby tells us 
that this project presented itself as a new way “to map and know the human”
52 
that implied:  
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a disconcerting threat to any idea of the human as a stable, knowable 
‘species’, an organic integrity whose limits can be positively specified.  If 
human bodies can be rendered as compendia of data, information archives 
which can be stored, retrieved, networked, copied, transferred and 
rewritten, they become permeable to other orders of information, and liable 
to all the forms of circulation, dispersal, accumulation and transmission 
which characterise informational economies.  Any fantasy of organic 
integrity is lost in the face of the interface, the potential for data bodies to 
be integrated into data circuits, cybernetic or genetic.
53 
 
Waldby is here comparing the Human Genome Project with the Visible Human 
Project, a research project of the mid-1990s that involved the photographing and 
digitising of (dead) human bodies.  Both these projects powerfully evoke the 
Frankenstein tale, but this is not all they share: both also resulted in the digital 
archiving of the body-as-information (the databases that contain the completed 
sequence of the human genome are available on the Internet, as are the images of 
the cross-sectioned cadavers from the Visible Human Project). 
 
This digression into cyberspace is significant, because the biotechnological 
advances that marked the 1990s were inextricably linked to parallel 
developments in cybernetics.  As Keller reminds us, these two areas of study 
borrowed and swapped their concepts and terminologies, until words like 
“system” and “organism” came to be used as descriptors for both living and non-
living entities (humans and computers).
54  Furthermore, if the mapping of the 
genome and related developments in biotechnology changed our understandings 
of body and life then so did these concurrent developments in cybernetics.  Keller 
argues that at the end of the twentieth century: 
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electricity has given way to electronics and matter and energy to 
information.  In the late 20th century, it is the computer that dominates our 
imagination, and it has liberated us from that odd locution ‘man has a 
body’.
55 
 
We can consider cinema’s reworking of Frankenstein, particularly in the science 
fiction cinema of the 1990s, in light of these new understandings.  From the 
galvanised bodies of the 1920s and 1930s – and from the related emphasis on 
electric spectacle and the “spark of life” – we move, in the 1990s, to the notion 
of “jacking in”, the fantasy of leaving our material bodies behind to construct a 
new identity in cyberspace.
56  Claudia Springer writes of a similar shift in 
emphasis when she considers the rise and fall of the “hard-bodied cyborg” as a 
mythic figure.  In cinema of the 1990s, she argues, this familiar figure becomes 
less visible: “[l]eaving the hard-bodied cyborg behind, Hollywood turned to 
cyberspace and the expansion of the mind”,
57 she writes, also noting that the 
“new cultural fantasy”
58 of cyber-immersion came to eclipse the popular image 
of the muscular/mechanical hybrid body seen in films of the 1980s such as The 
Terminator.  Drawing on Springer and upon this well-theorised shift from 
“energy to information”, we can trace the development of the cinematic monster 
from the galvanised bodies of the 1920s and 1930s through the cyborg years of 
Hollywood science fiction and into the 1990s and beyond, where popular culture 
becomes obsessed with the body-as-information and with the ability to 
reconstruct human presence in the ethereal realm of cyberspace. 
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Jodi O’Brien describes the act of rewriting the body in cyberspace with an 
emphasis on Frankensteinian themes of embodiment and re-embodiment, 
construction and reconstruction, writing and techno-production: she tells us that 
“(re)embodying the self in [the] disembodied realm [of cyberspace] is an 
exercise in textual production”.
59  Cyberpunk, the literary genre that responds to 
these technological and cultural developments, often plays upon these 
Frankensteinian concerns of techno-creation and bodily (re)construction.  As 
Bell, Loader, Pleace and Schuler write in their definition of the genre, cyberpunk 
deals with:  
 
the nature and essence of humanity in a future in which the use of VR and 
the ability to extensively change and modify one’s own body allowed 
individuals to constantly re-invent themselves and to avoid dealing with the 
‘real’ world if they did not want to.
60 
 
This brings us to films like The Matrix, which perform such negotiations 
between cyber-fantasy-scapes and the so-called real world.
61  As a story about 
the posthuman future, and a text that imag(in)es the body as both a plugged-in 
hybrid and a reconstructed cyber-self, The Matrix can be read as a retelling of 
Frankenstein for the digital age.  This immensely popular film of 1999 
exemplifies the shift from electricity to information that marks its period, a shift 
that is suggested in the film’s opening image – streams of glowing green 
computer code pouring down the screen (an image that was also extensively used 
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in the promotion of the film and its sequels).  Alongside the fantasy of “jacking 
in” and the reconstruction of the self in cyberspace, the film also addresses 
genetic manipulation and the production of the self by media fantasies (including 
popular film itself) that pacify, control, and create.  These concerns are 
enthusiastically taken up by the film’s two sequels. 
 
Let us consider two scenes from the Matrix trilogy that operate as “creation” 
scenes, of a sort.  In the first film, both techno-creation and procreation are 
hinted at in the sequence that depicts hero Neo’s exit from cyberspace and his 
rebirth into the “real world”.  In this scene we see Neo’s body swallowed by 
code, covered in a silvery substance as his cyber-self “dies”; he then appears 
within a womblike space, breaks through a sac of amniotic fluid and is flushed 
into the real world, hairless and naked as an infant.  He finds himself, however, 
in the “farm” where human bodies are genetically manufactured by the machines 
who enslave them.  An uneasy Frankensteinian tension between production and 
reproduction is evoked here.  A scene from The Matrix: Reloaded gives us a 
complementary image of cyber-production and reanimation.  Towards the end of 
this film the heroine Trinity dies, but is resurrected by Neo: as Roz Kaveney 
describes the scene, Neo “rewrites her code so that her heart beats again”.
62  Here 
is a telling reference to both computer/genetic code – and thus to new 
understandings of “life” – and to the constant rewriting that virtual bodies can 
undergo, allowing them to be continually reanimated.  We might seize upon this 
scene as a Frankensteinian moment reworked for the digital age, a translation of 
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Frankensteinian themes, images, and narrative instances into the language of 
cyberculture. 
 
Ultimately, however, both The Fifth Element and the Matrix trilogy respond to 
this digital/genetic coding of the body with conservatism, falling back upon the 
same division between natural and unnatural production that defines Shelley’s 
text.  Susan Hayward points out that the world imagined by Besson in The Fifth 
Element is associated with and ultimately saved by the “reproduction of life”,
63 
which reaches its fullest depiction in the loving (and love-making) bodies of 
Leeloo and the hero Corban Dallas.  The film thus moves from mechanical 
reproduction to organic reproduction: Leeloo saves the world not through her 
superpowers or the fantastic abilities inscribed into her artificial body, but as a 
romantic heroine who can make love and potentially reproduce.  That the final 
love scene takes place in the same tube in which she was “built”, and is viewed 
by the same set of gaping scientists, only reinforces this transition. 
 
Similarly, The Matrix may be a film about data, digitality, and code, but it 
responds to such a coded future with anxiety and nostalgia.  Neo is horrified, for 
instance, to learn from his mentor Morpheus that humans in this post-apocalyptic 
world “are no longer born – they are grown”, genetically manufactured by the 
machines themselves.  This line from Morpheus is significant because it 
articulates a nostalgia for natural bodies and natural birth in a period dominated 
by techno-production.  Such nostalgia is visually expressed in the film’s version 
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of the Frankensteinian creation scene, which is imbued with a nostalgia for birth 
itself: a desire not just to return to the womb but to escape the trappings of a 
hyper-technological existence and re-experience a moment of organic wholeness.  
We might compare The Matrix to Branagh’s Frankenstein, discussed in the 
previous chapter: for in Branagh’s more literal adaptation of Shelley’s novel, the 
creation scene is similarly rewritten as a sort of high-tech birth.  Both films, we 
might argue, exhibit a nostalgia for organicism that is symptomatic of their 
context – a period when self, body, and subject are all perceived to be 
constructed, reduced to information, or inextricably entangled with technological 
and artificial systems. 
 
Jurassic Park: digital monsters 
 
This chapter has addressed many concerns that have inflected upon the retelling 
of Frankenstein in the digital age: simulation, mediation, the fragmentation of the 
subject and the removal of our organic power to remember, the coding of the 
body during an age of biotechnological advances, the emergence of cyberculture, 
the shift from “energy” to “information”.  I will conclude the chapter with 
reference to a film that engages many of these concerns, and that also provides us 
with a more literal adaptation of Frankenstein than any of the texts discussed 
above: Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park.  Spielberg’s film occupies an important 
position in this unfolding history of Frankenstein in cinema, not only because it 
responds so well to the cultural understandings of its period but also because it 
employs cutting-edge digital effects and projects these effects onto the bodies of   146 
its “monsters”.  Consequently, the film not only adapts Frankenstein but injects 
the Frankenstein myth with new meaning and purpose. 
 
Jurassic Park was released in 1993, one year before Branagh’s adaptation of 
Frankenstein.  The films share similar themes – both depict monster-making and 
comment on the dangers of scientific ambition – but they are, of course, very 
different in iconography, setting, and narrative structure.  Branagh’s film is a 
period piece as well as an acknowledged adaptation of Shelley’s novel; Jurassic 
Park is based on a novel by Michael Crichton and tells the story of reanimated 
dinosaurs running amok on a remote island.  This shift in location is telling.  As 
previously mentioned, Branagh’s film is often critiqued for its absurd 
restructuring of Shelley’s narrative: but in many ways, this film should be taken 
to task for its desire to be faithful to the novel in the first place.  As a looser 
retelling of Frankenstein, Jurassic Park more successfully asks us to consider 
what problems of “life”, “technology”, and “embodiment” are most on our minds 
in the digital age. 
 
The film follows the endeavours of entrepreneur John Hammond: a jolly, 
misguided version of Victor Frankenstein who, like his predecessor, makes a 
scientific discovery which he chooses to exploit for his own gain rather than 
share with humanity as a whole, and which specifically involves the creation of 
monsters.  These “monsters” are long-extinct dinosaurs, genetically engineered 
by Hammond and his scientific team.  Unlike Victor, Hammond does not 
abandon his creatures – indeed, he delights in adopting a motherly role towards 
them, and demands to be present each time a new dinosaur is born – but he is   147 
portrayed as an irresponsible creator.  Tellingly one of the other characters 
accuses him of a “lack of humility before Nature”; by attempting to usurp the 
reproductive and creative powers of the natural world, he thus shares Victor’s 
biggest sin.  Designed for entertainment and controlled by the monstrous 
machine of capitalism itself, Hammond’s monsters are also heraldic of a media 
age that turns everything into spectacle and then tries to package, brand, and 
offer it for consumption. 
 
Jurassic Park also inherits the Frankensteinian tension between “natural” and 
“unnatural” production.  Against the backdrop of genetic engineering, 
reanimation, and monsters running amok, a struggle over the future of human 
reproduction and the human family is played out in the interactions between the 
characters: maternal Ellie, reluctant father-figure Alan, and seemingly parentless 
children Lex and Tim.  Alan begins the film with a pronounced dislike for 
children: “babies smell”, he tells Ellie, his disappointed partner.  However, the 
film’s resolution sees him overcome this dislike and leaves us with the 
suggestion that Alan and Ellie will eventually start their own family.  Alongside 
a return to the primordial world of the Jurassic era, therefore, the film performs a 
return from the dead world of science, fossils, and bio-engineered infants to the 
“natural” world of the family.  This opposition between production and 
reproduction infuses the character of Hammond: he strives to create a primal 
scene, yet as a male scientist he can only do so by technologising the very act of   148 
creation; thus John O’Neill refers to his “park” as an “off-shore techno-Eden”
64.  
Ultimately, Hammond’s desires to “play mother” result in bloody catastrophe. 
 
Yet if Hammond is a sort of Victor Frankenstein, a maker of monsters, then so 
too is Spielberg, who creates his own dinosaur “theme park” with this film.  
Indeed, Jurassic Park is also Spielberg’s “techno-Eden” – a space within which 
monsters can be created, digitally birthed, lovingly constructed.  With this film, 
Spielberg and his animators revolutionised the use of computer-generated 
imagery in cinema: the dinosaurs were some of the first digital creations that 
audiences had ever seen in a live-action film.  A startling image in Jurassic Park 
suggests the origin stories of these digital/bio-engineered monsters: when a 
dinosaur, stalking human prey in the film’s climax, walks in front of a projector 
and genetic code is momentarily “screened” on its body, we are reminded that 
this body is coded, built, postorganic – and also digital.  For the first half of 
Jurassic Park, at least, we are invited to look upon these digital creations with 
wonder and awe; such wonder and awe is deflected onto the characters, who 
gape at the dinosaurs.  In this sense, the dinosaurs operate like Roberts’ 
spaceship, which in science fiction cinema “focus[es] our fascination with the 
medium itself” and with the special effects that define it.
65 
 
Yet Spielberg’s digital creations are not just fascinating technological objects but 
terrifying monsters: they are figured as other to the cinematic, rampaging onto its 
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“natural” terrain.  The simple Frankensteinian divide between “natural” and 
“unnatural” modes of production is complicated here by the possibility that 
cinema itself can be privileged as a “more natural” mode of production in the 
face of encroaching digital effects.  Seemingly aware of these tensions, Spielberg 
allows the image of his computer-generated dinosaurs to be neutralised in the 
film by more traditionally “cinematic” shots of nature itself: the final image of 
birds flying over the ocean, for instance, soothes the audience with a gentle and 
truly cinematic form of spectacle, quietening any anxiety that the otherness of the 
CGI might evoke. 
 
This projection of post- or non-cinematic technologies onto the body of a 
villainous, duplicitous, or monstrous other is nothing new.  When stop-motion 
and other “non-cinematic” techniques were employed in early live-action films, 
they were frequently used to depict the body of a monster or fantastic other.  
Indeed, as Jeremy Dyson points out, a version of Frankenstein was in production 
in the 1920s in which the monster was to be presented using stop-motion 
animation, thus “allowing the monster to perform super-human feats”.
66   The 
project was later scrapped, leaving Dyson to speculate that such a film would 
have changed the future of Frankenstein in cinema, perhaps eclipsing or 
replacing the Whale films that would become so famous in the 1930s.
67  For a 
more tangible example, non-cinematic otherness is wonderfully displayed in the 
1963 film Jason and the Argonauts, in which pioneering stop-motion animation 
is used to depict the bodies of “monsters” (creepy sword-wielding skeletons).  
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Thirty years later, Spielberg famously rejects stop-motion techniques and turns to 
computer-generated imagery to animate the bodies of his monsters, the dinosaurs 
of Jurassic Park.  Spielberg’s film demonstrates that digital effects have offered 
a new means of imag(in)ing the Frankenstein tale, of bringing its monster(s) to 
life, indeed, of turning the monstrous body into a spectacle.  At the same time, 
the film shows us that in the digital age the Frankensteinian monster becomes a 
body onto which the otherness of digital technologies can be projected. 
 
We find versions of such digital otherness in other texts contemporary with 
Jurassic Park.  In The Matrix, for instance – a film that Joshua Clover describes 
as a “digital entertainment about being digital”
68 – we have the character of 
Agent Smith, a computer “program” who appears in human form.  Both the 
digital effects used to produce the film and the character’s digital (and non-
human) status allow Smith to surpass the normal rules of embodiment: he shape-
shifts, morphs, and multiplies.  Smith represents – indeed, embodies – the digital 
otherness within this text, a live-action film that relies heavily upon 
postcinematic powers of representation.  Smith resembles the shape-shifting T-
1000 in James Cameron’s Terminator 2: Judgement Day, a liquid-metal body 
depicted using the digital technique known as the “morph”.
69  With its ability to 
shape-shift, to borrow the image of other humans and to disguise itself as objects, 
the T-1000 embodies cultural anxieties over the “deceptive” nature of the digital 
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image – its ability to mimic, alter, and replace the “real” – while offering a 
monstrous body onto which the film’s digital otherness can be displaced.  These 
films remind us that representing new modes of on-screen embodiment often 
involves inventing them.  Special effects have largely developed in response to 
stories that depict strange, unusual, and often technological bodies; and these 
bodies can in turn be used to contain, perform, and give form to the anxieties that 
special effects might evoke.  This has great relevance for Frankenstein: a story 
about embodiment, technology, monstrosity, and the techno-body as other, and 
also a story that, increasingly, relies upon special effects to bring it to life. 
 
To close the chapter, then, what might we conclude after an examination of these 
various filmic retellings of (or “extensions” on) the Frankenstein myth?  In 
particular, how might we link them to the earlier (and often more literal) 
adaptations of Frankenstein, those films that embedded a fantastic image of the 
filmic “machine” in their on-screen rendition of Shelley’s tale?  I propose that 
the films I have considered here do offer us an image of cinema, but quite a 
different one.  They are, for instance, less concerned with Nestrick’s “myth of 
animation” than with cinema as part of broader systems of simulation and 
mediation.  They also depict a filmic machine that is beset by a dangerous new 
hybridity: for the simple tension between filmic apparatus and organic body has 
more recently become a threefold tension between cinema, organicism, and 
digitality.  At the same time as we have been mapping the genome and leaping 
into cyberspace, we have invented new ways to represent ourselves – and our 
“monsters” – using digital technologies.  Like the concurrent developments in 
biotechnology and cybernetics, these new technologies of representation can   152 
reduce the body to code, turning organic presence into information; they offer 
new understandings of embodiment, challenging and disrupting our 
preconceptions about what it means to be human, what it means to be alive, what 
it means to watch a film and what it means to act in one.  I will take this up in 
my next chapter, which will examine the (re)construction of organic presence via 
new technologies of digital animation.  153 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“HUMANS ARE HISTORY”:  
THE POSTHUMAN BODIES OF DIGITAL ANIMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Origin stories: Aki Ross and her voice actor, Ming-Na 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Aki negotiates the “natural” world 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Nature and technology – “Floating Films” at the 2008 Perth 
International Arts Festival   154 
Posthuman/postcinematic 
 
In this chapter, I will shift my focus from digitally-enabled live-action film to 
digital animation.  My intention here is to bring the figure of the Frankensteinian 
Creature face to face with a new type of cinematic “monster”: the digitally 
animated, photorealistic “actor”.  I will accomplish this with particular reference 
to the 2001 film Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within, a fantastic text (with tropes 
borrowed from both the science fiction and the horror genres) that, with its 
digital recreation of human presence, opens an interesting dialogue with the 
Frankenstein myth.  While other chapters of this thesis have contained analyses 
of films that adapt or retell Frankenstein, this chapter will be somewhat different: 
for although Final Fantasy reworks some elements of Shelley’s tale, its narrative 
is the most loosely bound to Frankenstein of all the stories I consider in this 
project.  We find, however, that the figure of the Frankensteinian monster 
surfaces in descriptions of, and cultural responses to, the technologies used to 
create this film. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I will use the concept of the “posthuman” to theorise 
the link between Frankenstein and the new modes of digital animation that films 
like Final Fantasy employ.  We can begin with the assertion that much of 
Frankenstein’s current cultural importance lies in its assessment of a posthuman 
condition.  Shelley’s novel can be situated within a long line of myths, fables, 
and stories that respond to concerns and challenges about what constitutes 
“human-ity” by rewriting the very concept of human being.  We can also identify 
the Frankensteinian monster as a “boundary-creature” whose power lies in its   155 
challenge to established cultural divisions between what constitutes human being 
and what does not.  As Elaine Graham argues: 
 
One of the ways in particular in which the boundaries between humans and 
almost-humans have been asserted is through the discourse of 
‘monstrosity’.  Monsters serve both to mark the fault-lines but also, 
subversively, to signal the fragility of such boundaries.
1 
 
We might recognise the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as a period 
in which these boundaries seem particularly fragile; hence, perhaps, the renewed 
importance of the Frankensteinian monster as a mythic figure.   
 
Earlier in this thesis, I brought the Frankenstein myth into dialogue with the 
work of Donna Haraway and the fantastic/theoretical figure of the cyborg.  
Similarly, we can consider the tale’s resonance with the work of writers who 
map a posthuman condition.  Halberstam and Livingston were among the first to 
theorise such a condition,
2 followed closely by Hayles, whose book How We 
Became Posthuman charts (and challenges) a future-present in which human 
presence is disrupted by its own interface with digital and artificial systems.  
Writing at the turn of the millennium and working mostly within the field of 
cybernetics, Hayles is concerned with the rise of a “posthuman view” that 
“configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent 
machines”.
3  This posthuman condition, she tells us, is at least partly defined by 
                                                 
1 Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 12. 
2 See Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingstone (eds), Posthuman Bodies 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
3 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 3.   156 
an overwriting of embodied presence: in the digital age, “the erasure of 
embodiment is performed so that ‘intelligence’ becomes a property of the formal 
manipulation of symbols rather than enacted in the human lifeworld”.
4  In the 
face of such disembodiment, Hayles stresses the need to resist the overwriting of 
the body and bodily experiences.  Her work therefore has much in common with 
that of Haraway, who deploys her cyborg as a sort of resistance against the 
“erasure of embodiment” that might otherwise define a high-tech, postmodern 
world.
5  That both theorists should concern themselves with hybridity and with 
maintaining the body as an object around which stories can be told brings their 
writing in line with that of Shelley. 
 
When Shelley wrote of her monster, furthermore, a post- or super-human 
creature whose cobbled-together and reanimated body poses a challenge to any 
understanding of organic, whole, human presence, she was arguably exploring 
the sort of “posthuman view” that Hayles unpacks – as it would have applied to a 
pre-digital, industrial, early-nineteenth-century world.  Frankenstein’s monster is 
created with the desire that he should make humankind, with its weaknesses and 
susceptibility to death and disease, obsolete; at the same time, with its theme of 
techno-genesis, the novel depicts a world in which “reference to a natural 
                                                 
4 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, xi. 
5 As Melissa Colleen Stevenson observes, the two theorists “share a common 
goal: each focuses on what Hayles calls here ‘the splice’ and what Haraway 
refers to as ‘weaving’, the fruitful connections made between bodies and 
identities across categorizations previously thought to be mutually exclusive”.  
Melissa Colleen Stevenson, “Trying to Plug In: Posthuman Cyborgs and the 
Search for Connection”, Science Fiction Studies 34, 1 (2007), 88.   157 
humanity is always anachronistic”, as Waldby tells us.
6  This speculative 
depiction of a posthuman body/world is what Shelley’s novel shares not only 
with the work of theorists like Hayles and Haraway but also with fantastic and 
science-fictional texts of the digital age: for films such as Blade Runner, The 
Matrix, I, Robot, and AI: Artificial Intelligence – alongside novels of the 
cyberpunk genre – all indulge in a depiction of what Mark Williams calls a 
“literally posthuman future, in which humans are history amid a world of 
advanced informational dynamics”.
7 
 
But posthuman bodies are also appearing on our screens – and often in the same 
films.  In the digital age, new modes of animation allow human presence to be 
manipulated, restructured, simulated, and overwritten.  This brings an interesting 
new emphasis to the “erasure of embodiment” that Hayles interrogates.  Indeed, 
we can use her work – which is grounded in a discussion of cybernetics, not 
cinema – to theorise this posthuman/postcinematic convergence.  In her essay 
“The Condition of Virtuality” Hayles again discusses the human/computer 
relationship and explores (without necessarily endorsing) the view that “human 
beings are essentially informational patterns rather than bodily presences.  If a 
technology can replicate the pattern, it has captured all that really matters in a 
human being”.
8  Today, many films employing computer-generated imagery ask 
technology to “replicate the pattern” of human presence on screen; the question 
                                                 
6 Catherine Waldby, “The Instruments of Life: Frankenstein and Cyberculture”, 
in Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, eds. Darren Tofts et al 
(Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2002), 29. 
7 Mark Williams, “Real-time Fairy Tales: Cinema Prefiguring Digital Anxiety”, 
in New Media: Theories and Practices of Digitextuality, eds. Anna Everett and 
John T. Caldwell (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 160, my emphasis. 
8 N. Katherine Hayles, “The Condition of Virtuality”, in The Digital Dialectic: 
New Essays on New Media, ed. Peter Lunenfeld (London: MIT Press, 1999), 72.   158 
remains as to whether such replication captures “all that really matters in a(n on-
screen) human being”. 
 
Such posthuman filmmaking is discussed by Joshua Clover, who warns us about 
the impending arrival of the “actorless movie”.
9  Clover uses this term in his 
analysis of The Matrix, a film that depicts the digital threat to human presence 
while also making use of the potentially overwriting power of digital effects.  
“To be human in the Matrix”, Clover writes, “is to be mesmerised by digital 
fabrication”.
10  Indeed, Trinity’s time-defying leap in the film’s opening 
sequence truly does exemplify the digital future – if only by imag(in)ing a body 
that is subsumed and frozen by special effects.  According to Clover, these 
special effects “render the humans peculiarly insubstantial.  The movie is not 
about them.  From the perspective of pleasure, the movie is about digital 
effects”.
11  Of particular concern here is principal actor Keanu Reeves, who is 
“digitally smoothed” and “destined not to distract from the digital mise en scène 
but to integrate with it”.
12   
 
Interestingly, this digital overwriting of human presence is also the subject of 
cyberpunk literature, the sub-genre of science fiction from which The Matrix 
draws considerable influence.  As Howard Hendrix observes, cyberpunk – 
particularly that written by William Gibson – emphasises “the etherealisation of 
human beings, their transformation to pure information downloaded to machine 
                                                 
9 Joshua Clover, The Matrix (London: BFI Publishing, 2004), 19. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 21.   159 
systems as they leave their bodies behind them”.
13  There is a wonderful image in 
The Matrix that visually performs such a transformation: during the scene of 
Neo’s rebirth, his body is swallowed by a quicksilver-like substance, and in a 
spectacular manifestation of the relationship between organic body and digital 
effects Neo/Keanu fights for visibility as computer code seemingly overwrites 
him.  Unlike the novels of the cyberpunk genre, however, The Matrix and its 
sequels respond with some anxiety to the (doubly) digital future they depict.  
Charles Tryon writes of the trilogy as “cyberphobic”,
14 and argues that The 
Matrix is informed by certain “millennial worries framing representations of 
digital technologies” which “often informed debates about definitions of the 
human in the age of digital reproduction”.
15  The posthuman and the 
postcinematic might intersect in films like The Matrix, then, but both are 
frequently depicted in apocalyptic terms. 
 
Other films of recent years have invited their audiences to view posthuman/ 
postcinematic bodies.  In the same year as The Matrix revolutionised the use of 
digital effects in live-action cinema, George Lucas released The Phantom 
Menace, the first of his Star Wars prequels and a film that made excessive use of 
special effects.  Fans of the Star Wars franchise reacted against this film, and 
were vocal and acerbic in their criticism of the CGI alien Jar Jar Binks, one of 
                                                 
13 Howard V. Hendrix, “The Body Apocalyptic: Theology and Technology in 
Films and Fictions of the MIME Era”, in Projections: Science Fiction in 
Literature and Film, ed. Lou Anders (Austin: MonkeyBrain Books, 2004), 234. 
14 Charles Tryon, “Virtual Cities and Stolen Memories: Temporality and the 
Digital in Dark City”, Film Criticism 28, 2 (2004), 48. 
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the first digitally animated characters to share the screen with human actors.
16  
Critics offered a broader deconstruction of the film and its posthuman elements.  
Many reviewers argued that Lucas’ reliance on special effects and digital 
techniques stripped the film of its human qualities (emotion, expression, 
humour).  Desson Howe of the Washington Post, for instance, wrote that “Lucas 
is so busy trying to digitally blow everyone’s mind that he forgets about his 
characters.  The sacrifice of humanity for special effects creates an unfortunate 
disturbance in the Force”.  He further complained that “the actors are caught like 
cosmic deer in the headlights” and that the film gives seasoned actors like Liam 
Neeson “little opportunity to do more than interact with computer beings”.
17  
Similarly, Todd McCarthy wrote in Variety that Neeson had “only moderate 
charisma” and that the film “is neither captivating nor transporting, for it lacks 
any emotional pull”; McCarthy further dismissed the film as “easily consumable 
eye candy” that “contains no nutrients for the heart or mind”.
18  Like Clover’s 
announcement that The Matrix foreshadows an “actorless future”, these 
reviewers hone in on the interaction between mechanical and organic presence as 
a defining feature of the film.  Arguably more so than The Matrix, however, 
Lucas’ tendency to isolate the bodies of his actors in front of the “green screen”, 
and consequently to remove the “organic” interaction between them, resulted in 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of fans’ reactions to Jar Jar Binks see Nathan Hunt, “The 
Importance of Trivia: Ownership, Exclusion and Authority in Science Fiction 
Fandom”, in Defining Cult Movies: The Cultural Politics of Oppositional Taste, 
eds. Mark Jancovich et al (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2003), 185-201. 
17 Howe, Desson, “‘Star Wars’: Special Affected”, The Washington Post, May 
21, 1999.  Accessed online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/style 
/movies/reviews/phantommenacehowe.htm (May 15, 2007). 
18 McCarthy, Todd, “Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace” (review), 
Variety, May 10, 1999.  Accessed online at 
http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117499730.html?categoryid=31&cs=1 (May 
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the creation of a posthuman, postorganic, postcinematic space that audiences and 
critics reacted to with distrust and discomfort. 
 
This removal of organic presence from the screen becomes more pronounced in 
some of the new modes of animation that have emerged over the past ten years: 
motion-capture or performance-capture technologies, in particular, will be 
discussed below, but we might also consider the technique known as 
“rotoscoping”
19 whereby live-action film footage is digitally “animated over” to 
produce a dreamy, sketchy, half-real image-scape.  This technique was used in 
the science fiction film A Scanner Darkly, based on the novel by Philip K. Dick; 
the protagonists of this film are addicted to a new type of drug, and their 
hallucinatory experience of the world suits the new style of animation, as does 
the thematic suggestion that identity and embodiment are illusory concepts in a 
world where new visual technologies allow for the concealment, replication, and 
mis-representation of human presence.  Ultimately, rotoscoping involves the 
writing-over of original (rooted in the body) performances; like other new modes 
of animation, it creates new and interesting variations on the problem of filmic 
presence and its link to an organic origin. 
 
What these films share with Frankenstein is less a particular narrative or thematic 
pattern – although each are science fiction texts that inherit from their generic 
predecessors an inclination to question, if only fleetingly, what it means to be 
human in an increasingly posthuman world – than an engagement with a 
                                                 
19 Rotoscoping is, of course, a very old technique that was used in animation as 
early as 1915.  When labelling it a “new” mode of animation, I am referring 
specifically to the digital rotoscoping pioneered in the mid-1990s and first used 
by Richard Linklater in his films Waking Life and A Scanner Darkly.   162 
technology that de-organicises the body.  Those who write about film often tell 
us that “technology” is a character in any film: Nick Lacey, for instance, states 
that “[u]nlike most art forms, film requires sophisticated technology both to be 
made and to be shown”;
20 similarly, Rachel Moore argues that:  
 
The material elements of cinema – slow, fast motion, jump cuts, angles of 
all directions and frames in all sizes, coloured filters, and the very aging of 
the film itself – all serve to give technology a key part in a movie, any 
movie.
21 
 
In these digitised ventures, however, technology is arguably the main character, 
and its relationship with human presence is often the main “story”.  Frequently, 
we watch such films because we want to see the cutting-edge technologies at 
work: we become fascinated with these “actorless” movies because they confront 
us with new images of the human.  Whether the films themselves are marginal or 
mainstream, challenging or conservative, the technologies upset our 
understandings of what it means to be embodied, present, alive, real.  At the 
same time, our response to such texts often hovers between fascination and fear.  
We marvel at the technologies while wishing we could identify more closely 
with the characters, or that they would appear more real; frequently, we leave the 
experience feeling unsettled.  Cultural and critical responses to such texts are 
polarised: the technologies are often described in terms of both the sublime (we 
have never seen anything like this before) and the catastrophic (they suck the life 
out of the movies that utilise them).  The film under scrutiny in this chapter – 
                                                 
20 Nick Lacey, An Introduction to Film (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 
295. 
21 Rachel Moore, “Love Machines”, in Technologies of Magic: A Cultural Study 
of Ghosts, Machines and the Uncanny, eds. John Potts and Edward Scheer 
(Sydney: Power Publications, 2006), 23.   163 
Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within – evoked these mixed feelings in me when I 
first watched it in 2001: like many others, I was fascinated by the use of digital 
technology to reconstruct human presence, but I was simultaneously 
disappointed by the coldness of the film and its posthuman actors.  I will 
elaborate on this below. 
 
My investigation of Final Fantasy will pay particular attention to the film’s 
digital protagonist, Aki Ross.  As a new type of cinematic “machine”, Aki has 
been read by critics and theorists alike in fantastic terms.  In countless reviews of 
the film she is described as robotic or as a walking cadaver;
22 these tropes, stolen 
from the fantasy genre, are also played with in academic analyses of the film.
23  
In many ways, Aki is a Frankensteinian monster for the age of digital 
filmmaking: she becomes an object of cultural anxiety because she represents a 
future that is disturbingly posthuman and postcinematic.  Turning from Aki’s 
body to the narrative that contains it, I will investigate the film’s themes of 
ghostliness and its depiction of a “luminous” (if digitally reconstructed) natural 
world.  I will conclude the chapter with the assertion that the struggle between 
“nature” and “technology”, depicted in Shelley’s Frankenstein and a crucial part 
of the tale in all its manifestations today, becomes an effective template for 
                                                 
22 Lisa Bode cites numerous such reviews of the film.  See Lisa Merle Bode, 
“From Shadow Citizens to Teflon Stars: Cultural Responses to the Digital 
Actor”, (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2005), 27, 38, 65. 
23 Livia Monnet, for instance, refers to Aki as both a “ghostly” body (111) and a 
medium, in the Spiritualist sense of the word (110); she argues that the film’s 
digital technologies “vampirize” the human actors (99) and also writes that 
“Final Fantasy’s virtual actors perform as undead digital vampires or zombies” 
(99).  See Livia Monnet, “A-Life and the Uncanny in Final Fantasy: The Spirits 
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understanding the new modes of digital representation that are reshaping film 
and media in the twenty-first century. 
 
“The desire to create a being like oneself”: the new monsters of digital 
animation 
 
In her article “Silicon Stars: the New Hollywood” – an early response to the 
digital “actor” phenomenon written in 1995 – Paula Parisi links a computer-
generated image of screen goddess Marilyn Monroe to the female monster in 
Bride of Frankenstein.  Parisi writes, “[w]atching Marilyn recalls the chilly 
seduction of the first artificial flirt, captured so precisely in the classic climax to 
James Whale’s 1935 Bride of Frankenstein”.
24  For Lisa Bode, this account: 
 
evokes something mythic, beautiful and terrifying, a being that hovers 
unsettlingly between states: neither dead nor alive, neither subject nor 
object, neither human nor machine… In this erstwhile emblem of cinema’s 
future, [Parisi] finds an image from cinema’s past – yet evidently not the 
image intended by its creator.  Rather than seeing Marilyn Monroe’s 
breathy 50s sexuality, situated precariously between natural innocence and 
knowing artifice, Parisi finds Elsa Lanchester’s fright-wigged, wild-eyed 
portrayal of a thing, cobbled together in the charnel house and electrically 
animated.
25 
 
The words of both these writers, one commenting upon the other, demonstrate 
the extent to which the Frankenstein myth and, particularly, images of 
Frankensteinian animation – once so evocative of cinema itself and the spectacle 
of filmic “life” – have been re-engaged in discussions of the digital replication of 
human presence. 
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Parisi and Bode are discussing the unique phenomenon of artificial or computer-
generated beauty: an appropriate pretext for a discussion of Final Fantasy and its 
“perfect” heroine Aki Ross.  Yet their accounts also draw upon the status of the 
Frankensteinian monster as a resurrected body.  Just as Shelley’s novel evoked, 
in the early 1800s, weighty problems of what it means to be “alive”, digital 
animation is often received in terms of its ability to alter our understandings of 
“life” and “death”.  This is not surprising given that new digital technologies are 
often employed in a resurrective capacity.  If we can digitally generate an image 
of anyone, unbound by the laws of nature or physical presence, why not bring to 
life someone who is both famous and dead, if only to see them speak and act and 
move again?  This perverse logic is, at times, accompanied by seeming necessity.  
When an actor dies during the production of a live-action film, he or she can now 
be “replaced” by a CG-simulacrum and filming can continue.  The figure of the 
Frankensteinian monster – as other, and as resurrected or reanimated body (the 
ghostly and ghastly creature who unsettles the boundary between life and death) 
becomes a suitable allegory for such digital presence. 
 
As Nathan Hunt tells us, there are “complex issues of authenticity that surround 
the use of CGI to alter or replace the role of actors in films”.
26  He uses the 
example of the 1994 film The Crow, noting that “there was some concern over 
the ‘macabre’ use of CGI to complete [the film] after its star Brandon Lee died 
during filming”.
27  Two words strike chords of recognition here: authenticity (a 
crucial sub-theme in the Frankenstein tale) and macabre (suggestive of 
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monstrosity as well as the supposedly uncanny or transgressive nature of such 
resurrective technologies).  Appropriating his example of The Crow, we might 
question why audiences objected to the digital resurrection of Brandon Lee but 
not to the film’s cinematic representation of him after death.  CGI might give the 
illusion of suspending mortality but, as a wealth of theorists have pointed out, 
cinema too can generate “spectral images of the dead”;
28 how then did audiences 
discern between “real” cinematic representations of Lee after his death and 
“faked” digital representations of him that were somehow transgressive, beyond 
imposing on the latter a cultural fear of digitality?   
 
Digital animation can indeed be viewed in Frankensteinian terms – as a new 
means of monster-making for a culture addicted to screen images – and not just 
because we can use such animation to resurrect the dead.  Frankenstein, after all, 
is a story about the act of reshaping and attempting to control human presence.  
Shelley’s novel takes its place in a long line of stories and myths dealing with the 
creation of an artificial being: we can trace this trajectory from the ancient Greek 
myths of Prometheus and Pygmalion (and their respective retellings by the 
Roman poet Ovid) to Shelley’s Frankenstein and onwards to newer science-
fictional tales of cyborgs, replicants, robots, and automata.  As J.P. Telotte 
observes, these tales are fuelled by desires relating to the “subjection” of the 
body: particularly the desire to “rein in or reconfigure the unruly self” and to see 
                                                 
28 Anthony Enns, “Mediality and Mourning in Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris and His 
Master’s Voice”, Science Fiction Studies 29, 1 (2002), 34.  Enns is drawing on 
the work of media theorist Friedrich Kittler, who explores the media’s ability to 
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the body “rendered as a thing to be explored, mastered, and reshaped”.
29  Such 
desires, Telotte continues, particularly informed the filmic versions of 
Frankenstein that appeared in the 1930s, which “depict the problematic nature of 
the modern self, confronted with a science that wants to explore, control, and 
even reshape the body – to render it as artifice”.
30  These Frankenstein films 
dwell upon the figure of the scientist/creator and: 
 
this figure’s single-minded concern… with demonstrating his mastery over 
the body: by carving it up and reconfiguring it, by adding or eliminating 
parts of it, or, as is most prominently the case in Frankenstein, by 
fashioning it into a mocking double of the human.
31 
 
This in turn is demonstrative of “the desire to render the body a manipulable and 
subject thing, ultimately little more than a raw material upon which the scientific 
spirit might exercise its will to artifice”.
32  We might ask ourselves if these are 
the same desires that inform recent endeavours in digital animation.  In many of 
these endeavours there is seemingly a very Frankensteinian wish to render the 
body as “a thing to be explored, mastered, and reshaped”; here too are desires to 
demonstrate “mastery over the body” by “carving it up and reconfiguring it, by 
adding or eliminating parts of it” and ultimately “by fashioning it into a mocking 
double of the human”. 
 
Such desires are particularly evidenced by the recent need to create digital 
“stars” – computer-generated bodies that take the place of “real actors” and that 
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(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 74. 
30 Ibid., 75. 
31 Ibid. 
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are made to appear as human as possible.  “For years now”, Karen Moltenbrey 
tells us in a recent edition of Computer Graphics World, “digital artists have 
been trying to solve one of the most difficult challenges in computer graphics 
today: the creation and animation of realistic digital humans”.
33  Moltenbrey 
refers to such endeavours as a “quest”,
34 highlighting the Frankensteinian 
overtones to what has become a passionate scientific venture.  She also reminds 
us that this “quest to create a photoreal digital human… opens doors for stars to 
create and license detailed replicas of their likeness without making a physical 
appearance”.
35  Such a project, then, is steeped in themes of replication, cloning, 
and the simulation of human presence: indeed, photorealistic digital bodies strive 
for life in a manner that was preemptively performed by the replicants of Blade 
Runner and by Shelley’s monster itself, making it significant that science fiction 
and fantastic texts are often the first to “benefit” (and I use the term 
questionably) from these technologies.  
 
This quest for digital photorealism also satisfies that particular “desire for 
resemblance, the desire to create a being like oneself” that Barbara Johnson 
identifies as the “central transgression in Mary Shelley’s novel” and also one of 
the most powerful links between Mary and Victor as writers/creators.
36  We 
might recall the Edison film here and the proclamation that Victor desires to 
create “the most perfect human being that the world has known”; this film’s use 
of mirrors further reminds us that Victor seeks to “perfectly” re-create his own 
image, a transgression that results in the creation of a monster (or a monstrous 
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image of the self).  Like the endeavours of Victor, our quest for digital 
photorealism has not unfolded according to plan.  If there were certain utopian 
overtones to the initial declaration that we could digitally recreate a 
photorealistic human, thus forever changing the fundamentals of filmic 
production, the cultural reception of these animated “stars” has been uneasy and 
fraught with problems.   
 
We can approach the cultural reception of computer-generated actors using the 
somewhat unusual framework provided by roboticist Masahiro Mori.
37  Writing 
in the 1970s, Mori explores the emotional reaction of humans to robots: as a 
robot becomes more human in appearance and in movement, he proposes, the 
human response towards it generally becomes more positive, until “a point is 
reached at which the response suddenly becomes strongly repulsive”.
38  When 
the robot’s appearance and movement becomes indistinguishable from that of 
humans, the response becomes more positive again.  The graphic representation 
of this changing response creates what Mori calls the “uncanny valley”.  
Tangentially, we might argue that the body of the Frankensteinian monster 
occupies a similar space or position: his/her/its uncanny monstrosity is due to a 
tension between likeness and difference; he/she/it is “repulsive” not because 
he/she/it is inhuman but because he/she/it is not human enough.  As Roberts 
reminds us, Shelley’s Frankenstein is a text that revolves around an “‘uncanny’ 
technological creation” that “unsettles our assumptions about the identity of the 
                                                 
37 See Masahiro Mori, “Bukimi No Tani [The Uncanny Valley]”, Energy 7, 4 
(1970), 33-35. 
38 John Potts and Edward Scheer (eds), Technologies of Magic: A Cultural Study 
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human”.
39  For Mori, the body of the robot “unsettles” us in the same way; so 
too, we can argue, do the bodies of certain digitally animated characters who are 
made to appear real but whose movement, appearance, and expression is not real 
enough. 
 
Mori’s theory is no doubt informed by the extensive body of psychological work 
on “the uncanny”, a cycle of texts that begins with E.T.A. Hoffman and his 1816 
story “The Sandman”.  Hoffman’s tale – previously identified in this project as a 
text closely bound to Shelley’s Frankenstein – depicts a man falling in love with 
an automaton.  The psychologist Ernst Jentsch used Hoffman’s story and the 
automaton Olympia as demonstrations of the state he called “the uncanny”, 
described as “doubts whether an apparently animate being is really alive; or 
conversely, whether a lifeless object might not in fact be animate”;
40 both 
Hoffman’s story and its analysis by Jentsch in turn formed the basis for Freud’s 
1919 essay “The Uncanny”.  This trio of texts – Hoffman, Jentsch, and Freud – is 
often incorporated into academic discussions of photorealism in digital 
animation.
41  The creepy ambiguity of a state that hovers between life and death, 
between familiarity and strangeness – a state that Donna Haraway also hints at 
when she asserts that our machines have become “disturbingly lively”
42 – is most 
applicable to photorealistic digital films and the otherwise indescribable eeriness 
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(New York: Routledge, 1991), 152.   171 
evoked by their characters, who often appear on-screen much like living dolls or 
automata. 
 
Mori’s work is particularly applicable to films that employ motion-capture or 
performance-capture models.  In such films, the movements and expressions of 
real human actors are captured on camera and used to inform the animation 
process: here, the “liveliness” of real bodies is transferred into a computer-
generated space.  Motion-capture often accompanies attempts at photorealism; 
yet like Mori’s robots, motion-capture photorealistic characters are too real and 
not real enough, and consequently they evoke the uncanny.  Other animated 
characters, including the fantastic inhabitants of the Disney/Pixar universe and 
the wide-eyed, colourful-haired folk of Japanese anime, have not attracted this 
kind of repulsion, precisely because they do not strike the same chord of eerie 
resemblance.  In contrast Final Fantasy, the film I will examine below, lands 
itself firmly in Mori’s valley with its creepy, half-real, motion-capture humans.  
It is worth noting that the films that followed Final Fantasy in the quest for 
photorealism did not seem to alienate audiences and critics to the same extent.  
Most notable to date have been the Robert Zemeckis productions The Polar 
Express (2004), which elicited mixed reactions while still deemed by some 
viewers to be “creepy”,
43 and Beowulf (2007), which incited far more positive 
responses and was considered by many critics to have “solved” the problem of 
motion-capture “creepiness”.  With each film the technologies and their ability to 
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simulate human presence improved, allowing the film in question to clamber 
further out of the “valley” into which Final Fantasy had fallen.
44 
 
When discussing the anxieties evoked by the quest for photorealism (and their 
link to the Frankenstein tale) we can also return to Walter Benjamin and to the 
problems associated with filmmaking-as-mechanical-reproduction.  As Nestrick 
tells us, the Frankensteinian monster is “our prime image of mechanical 
reproduction”;
45 yet if cinema was once the ultimate expression of such 
reproduction, it is now being surpassed by these new projects in animation that 
seek to mechanically reproduce human presence in a far more astounding 
manner.  The figure of Frankenstein’s monster is here charged with new 
applicability.  We find, furthermore, that Benjamin’s notion of a loss of “aura” 
takes on new meaning in the world of motion-capture and performance-capture 
animation.  For Benjamin, the mediating presence of the camera impacts upon 
cinema’s processes of representation to the extent that “the aura that envelops the 
actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he portrays”.
46  In films that 
employ the motion-capture technique, the original movements of an “actor’s” 
body are filmed, then digitally transformed into a screen image; the on-screen 
bodies that result from such a process are doubly mediated and have doubly lost 
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their aura.  This loss of aura may be responsible for the tremulous cultural 
reception that such technologies elicit.  Benjamin also writes of the distance 
between audience and actor, telling us that the difference between cinema and 
theatre is primarily that the film audience will identify with the camera, not the 
actor.
47  In motion-capture animation, however, the audience is one step further 
away from contact with the “actor”, who is presented to us as a body mediated 
by both the screen and the animation process.  This, too, may contribute to 
cultural readings of such films as cold and unengaging. 
 
Final Fantasy provides us with an example of just such a film.  Directed by 
Japanese game designer Hironobu Sakaguchi, it is notable for being the first 
feature film to use motion-capture technologies together with CGI to create a 
photorealistic style of digital animation.  The film thus undertakes the sort of 
Frankensteinian quest for “likeness” discussed above.  There is a coldness about 
the film, however, and a certain lifelessness about the characters, that led to its 
box-office demise.  Moltenbrey notes that “[w]hile the CG characters were 
amazing for the time, they were not quite real enough to satisfy theatregoers… 
As a result, the movie failed miserably at the box office, with losses estimated at 
more than $120 million”.
48  Hunt also links the movie’s failure to its 
unsuccessful depiction of human presence, and likens Final Fantasy to The 
Phantom Menace and the public outrage and rejection that was levelled at the 
computer-generated character Jar Jar Binks.
49  Let us turn our attention to Final 
Fantasy, then, and to Aki Ross, the problematic body at the heart of the film. 
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The mechanical body re-imagined: reading Aki Ross 
 
Given that both academic analyses and industry reviews of Final Fantasy usually 
dwell upon the appearance of the characters and the perceived success or failure 
of the technologies used to create them, those who have never seen the film 
might be surprised by the complexity and pensiveness of its storyline.
50  The 
story events unfold in the year 2056: humans are at war with alien creatures 
known as “phantoms”, strange insubstantial beings who pull the life out of 
anyone they touch.  Aki is the heroine, a young scientist working to understand 
the phantoms.  She and her marine corps companions, who seem plucked from 
the familiar narrative spaces of earlier science fiction films like Aliens, undertake 
a journey to stop the ultra-aggressive military from destroying both the phantoms 
and the Earth itself (which has already been reduced to a post-apocalyptic 
wasteland in the human/phantom war).  This journey leads the characters beyond 
the barrier cities into which the human population has withdrawn, out into the 
wasteland and, eventually, to “Gaia”, the soul of the Earth itself.  In a conclusion 
that draws from anime, from deep ecology, from Shintoism, and from a host of 
science fiction and fantasy texts, Aki uses a combination of “spirits” – energies 
taken from various living creatures – to neutralise the phantom threat and 
peacefully save the Earth. 
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However, if “technology” is a key character in digital animation – as was 
suggested above – it is not surprising that audiences, reviewers, and academics 
alike have neglected this storyline and tuned their response to the film into Aki-
as-technological-body, reading her as the product of a complex technological 
procedure rather than as the heroine of an imaginative if long-winded fantasy 
film.  In many ways, Aki is a more important “text” than the film in which she 
appears.  Certainly, her status as digital actress – the first of a new generation of 
computer-generated screen “stars” – eclipses the role she plays in a narrative that 
many viewers deemed forgettable or confusing.  Consequently, my analysis of 
Final Fantasy will address Aki’s mechanical body before turning towards two of 
the film’s important themes: ghostliness and the nature/technology tension. 
 
Like all the characters in this film, Aki is a digital creation.  Thomas Lamarre 
cites the makers of Final Fantasy as initially stating that “[n]o reference models 
were used or digitizing of real humans done to create these characters; they were 
all built from scratch within the computer”.
51  As Lamarre points out, however, 
Aki and the other characters were not created “from scratch” by a computer; 
instead this process was aided by the capturing of human movements located in 
the “real” world.  As I watch Final Fantasy for perhaps the twentieth time, I am 
wondering about the person whose movements provided Aki with “life”.  Ming-
Na is credited as the actress who “plays” Aki, yet she provides only the voice 
and some of the facial expressions; the body who acts out Aki’s movements – the 
body to whom the motion-capture markers are attached – is ultimately uncredited 
and unacknowledged. 
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Why, I also wonder, did the makers of the film mislead their fans about Aki’s 
motion-capture status?  This ambivalence is itself indicative of the importance of 
origins, and of the relationship between animated body and “real” body, to this 
film.  As Lamarre tells us, Final Fantasy:  
 
presents a challenge to the logic of origins in several ways.  In addition to 
bypassing the need for real places as shooting locations, the film 
destabilises relations to a place of production.  It is a movie produced 
everywhere and nowhere, bits of information transmitted electronically 
between computers in various locations in Japan and the United States.
52 
 
This, we might add, gives the film a lack of grounding in a physical scene of 
production, contributing to its uneasy relationship with a “real”, organic 
landscape.  Lamarre also notes that Aki herself is particularly beset with 
problems of originality; with her raceless features, she: 
 
need not be designated as Japanese or American, and more importantly, 
she harbors an alien close to her heart, literally.  She is a creature of 
multiple origins.  And we might say the same for the digital actors in 
general… their physical appearance has indeterminate, multiple origins.
53 
 
Aki, then, is a new type of filmic body who shares with the figure of the 
Frankensteinian monster a tenuous and dubious origin story, a fragile link to the 
organic world. 
 
These origin stories will be returned to later in the chapter.  First, however, let us 
consider some of the other elements that Aki shares with the mythic figure of the 
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Frankensteinian monster.  We can begin with her artificial and mechanical status.  
Aki is an experiment in techno-production, constructed by humans who seek to 
represent and duplicate themselves.  She is also, to use Haraway’s term, a 
“lively” machine; to be more precise, she inhabits a hybrid zone, representing 
both sides of the problem articulated by Haraway – she is both a machine that is 
“disturbingly lively” and a representation of human presence that is 
“frighteningly inert”.
54  Like the monstrous-yet-beautiful “Bride” in Whale’s 
film Bride of Frankenstein – who embodied the female “star” as meticulously 
“built” by the Hollywood studios of the cinematic Golden Age – Aki is a 
constructed beauty, a manufactured star, although her digital presence bestows 
new meaning on the very notion of “stardom” itself. 
 
There is no creation scene for Aki in Final Fantasy – at least, not within the 
confines of the narrative.  The film is rather conservative about what it shows of 
her body, especially when compared to anime like Ghost in the Shell (the subject 
of my next chapter) in which the body is repeatedly exposed and apocalyptically 
deconstructed.  Yet although the narrative does not give her a creation scene as 
such, the publicity surrounding the film betrays an obsession with Aki’s 
mechanical body and with the technologies used to create her.  My DVD copy of 
Final Fantasy comes with a promotional documentary that details the “making” 
of the film (and which consequently gives us an echo of Mary Shelley’s 
announcement, in her 1831 introduction, that she will “furnish” us with an 
account of the making of her “hideous progeny”).
55  This documentary dwells 
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particularly on Aki, showing us the computer models used to create her and thus 
taking us “inside” her body.  The documentary also literally takes Aki apart, 
fragmenting her body into various parts to be discussed by the animators 
responsible for them (including a detailed and slightly fetishistic discussion of 
her hair by the young man whose job it was to construct and perfect each strand). 
 
Again, we might recall the words of Benjamin here.  Discussing cinematic 
presence he tells us that the filmic actor’s “creation” is “by no means all of a 
piece” but is “composed of many separate performances”, because “there are 
elementary necessities of equipment that split the actor’s work into a series of 
mountable episodes”.
56  As an animated character, Aki is even further 
fragmented: like the Frankensteinian monster she is assembled bit by bit, her 
facial expressions, her voice, her movements, and even her individual body parts 
originating from different sources.  We might also recall the words of 
Frankenstein himself, who – in Whale’s version of the tale – proclaims of his 
Creature: “That body is not dead.  It has never lived.  I created it.  I made it with 
my own hands with the bodies I took from graves, from the gallows, from 
anywhere”.  He insists that he is not bringing a dead body back to life; instead, 
he has created a new body from fragments and animated it into being.  We can 
describe Aki’s creation in a similar way: she too is created from fragments, built 
by various actors, voice artists, and animators, and then she too is brought to life; 
she too, in other words, was never a whole body prior to being animated. 
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If we think of Aki’s construction in these rather violent terms, we might find it 
strange that the narrative is so peaceful and presents her in such a non-violent 
manner.  Physically, there is nothing particularly monstrous about Aki; with her 
smooth freckled skin, her shiny hair and her slim figure, she is a digital angel, 
made to appear “perfect”; she is not overtly seductive but instead somewhat 
wholesome, a digitally animated girl-next-door.  Although the technologies that 
create her render her a cyborg, of sorts, she is depicted within the confines of the 
narrative as human, with some variances: she is locked in a symbiotic 
relationship with an alien “phantom”, and wears a mechanical breastplate that 
keeps her alive.  She also remains whole, unscathed, and unruffled throughout 
the film; indeed, she is so unproblematic a body/character that she almost 
becomes invisible.  Monnet suggests as much when she writes of Aki as a 
vanishing character who is “erased or abducted” and ultimately robbed of both 
her agency and her physical presence.
57  There are some violent elements to the 
plot of Final Fantasy: the film borrows from the generic repositories of horror 
cinema (and from horror/sci-fi hybrids such as Alien) by allowing its characters 
to be picked off by the phantoms one by one, so that Aki, the sole survivor of her 
team, becomes a version of Carol Clover’s “Final Girl” (the pure and virginal 
survivor of many horror film narratives).
58  Even so, little bodily violence 
appears on-screen: the phantoms kill their victims by pulling out their souls, and 
this somewhat beautiful imaging of the ensouled body merely strives to 
emphasise wholeness and human status.  The film thus refuses to physically 
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deconstruct the bodies of its characters, bodies that are rendered so problematic 
by the technologies used to create them. 
 
Ultimately, we can link Aki to the live-action characters discussed in the 
previous chapter – Neo in The Matrix and Leeloo in The Fifth Element – 
characters whose construction we witness but who are nevertheless depicted as 
seamless, perfect, and beautiful rather than fragmented, monstrous, and 
problematic.  Similarly, we can read into the film a version of the nostalgia 
discussed in Chapter Two: the nostalgia for organic presence and 
(unproblematic) corporeality generated by cinema’s fragmentation and 
reproduction of the body.  Such nostalgia contributes to the production of Aki as 
a normalised and non-confronting body (with perfect features and shiny hair).  
This continuation of a nostalgia unique to the filmic “machine” might lead us to 
suggest that the problems that spring from cinema’s mechanical reproduction of 
the body – including both the fragmentation and the attenuation of organic 
presence – are not solved in the digital age; instead, they are complicated by new 
technologies that overwrite, reconstruct, or replicate the organic body. 
 
Ghostliness and the nature/technology tension in Final Fantasy 
 
As this analysis of Aki might suggest, Final Fantasy is thematically less 
concerned with monsters, cyborgs, and mechanical bodies than with ghostliness 
and spirituality – even if the animation process behind the film does suggest a 
Frankensteinian narrative of construction, replication, and fragmentation.  At its 
core, the film investigates what happens after death; as the DVD commentary   181 
informs us, writer/director Sakaguchi was deeply interested in this subject, and 
even named his protagonist Aki after his dead mother.  Such interests permeate 
the narrative.  The “phantoms” are revealed to be the ghosts of long-dead alien 
creatures, and when these phantoms steal a human life we see a glowing spirit 
pulled from the lifeless body.  The visualisation of both these phantoms and the 
human ghosts is perhaps the film’s most beautiful aspect – ironically, the half-
real human characters seem no more alive than when they are colourful, 
transparent ghosts pulled from their dead human form.  Here, the film intersects 
with Shelley’s tale.  As we know, Shelley wrote Frankenstein in response to the 
challenge of writing a “ghost story”; if her monster seems not at all like an 
incorporeal ghost, we might remind ourselves that Victor is driven by a quest to 
suspend mortality – to “renew life where death had apparently devoted the body 
to corruption”.
59   
 
In the media age, this notion of ghostliness and the related concepts of 
reanimation and resurrection take on new meaning.  As Alessia Ricciardi 
reminds us, “photography, cinema, and television confront us with human 
referents whose mortality has been technologically suspended or annulled 
through the visual production of the perpetual simulacra of life”.
60  This creates a 
new variation on the Frankenstein myth: if film and media are technologies that 
can both animate and suspend death, they are similar to the “instruments of 
life”
61 that Victor employs in his act of techno-genesis.  Such notions have been 
played upon in a host of recent media texts that do not seek to retell 
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Frankenstein, but that nevertheless offer a new reading of the monster as 
resurrected and simulated presence; these include Solaris (2002),
62 The Ring 
(2002),
63 and various episodes of the television series Doctor Who
64 and 
Torchwood,
65 all of which engage a cultural fascination with the media’s 
capacity to “reanimate” the dead.  As I write this chapter, Christopher Nolan’s 
film The Dark Knight is opening in cinemas, generating much hype over Heath 
Ledger’s posthumous performance as The Joker: the film offers a very eerie and 
uncanny resurrection of Ledger’s image at a time when his death is still being 
mourned, and the fantastic nature of the text – as well as the macabre nature of 
Ledger’s role – contributes greatly to this sense of eeriness.  Such a fascination 
with filmic ghostliness can also be read into Final Fantasy, and is often 
mentioned in academic critiques of the text.  In her analysis of the film, for 
instance, Monnet takes us back to early cinema, which was “regarded by its 
spectators (particularly by middle-class bourgeois viewers) as a 
medium/technology for transcending death – an ersatz of life or lifelike illusion 
that seemed capable of keeping death at bay”.
66  The sort of digital technologies 
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employed in Final Fantasy bring new urgency and new meaning to this filmic 
ability to suspend death: the development of computer-generated imagery, in 
particular, has allowed filmmakers to continue to “work” with actors who have 
died during the shooting process.  The aforementioned digital resurrection of 
Brandon Lee in The Crow offers an early example of such computer-generated 
ghost-making and the cultural anxiety it evoked. 
 
The theme of “ghostliness” becomes a useful link between the two texts in 
question here.  Shelley’s Frankenstein was a ghost story for the industrial age: a 
period in which traditional images of spirits and phantoms were less important 
(in the mind of one eighteen-year-old writer, at least) than a monstrous, 
posthuman, sewn-together-and-reanimated body.  Similarly, we might read Final 
Fantasy as a ghost story for the digital age: a period in which spirits, phantoms, 
and resurrected bodies have strange equivalents in the digitally animated bodies 
that populate our screen texts.  Ultimately, then, it is not merely Aki’s 
mechanical and fragmented nature that allows her to be read in conjunction with 
the Frankensteinian monster.  She is also a ghostly body, a reanimated body, a 
body that is only half alive; with her strange half-presence she becomes the focal 
point for the film’s concern with spectrality, even though she is depicted by the 
narrative as “human”.  While she is not a literal resurrection of a dead actor, 
furthermore, she embodies cultural anxieties over the digital recreation of human 
presence and its potential link to the macabre.   
 
There is another strong thematic link between these two texts: both explore, 
romanticise, and are infused with the tension between “nature” and   184 
“technology”.  In Frankenstein Victor’s scientific, masculine act of techno-
production – an act that displaces the natural process of reproduction – takes 
place against the backdrop of Shelley’s stunning descriptions of the mountains, 
lakes, forests, and natural landscapes she so obviously adored as a writer.  In 
Final Fantasy, Aki’s more peaceful scientific quest leads her into a natural world 
that Sakaguchi and his animators clearly take great pride and pleasure in bringing 
to life.  Perhaps compensating for its lifeless, semi-present human actors, Final 
Fantasy images and imagines a natural world that is animated in many senses of 
the word: not only presented to us in lively and colourful “animation”, but 
inhabited by spirits (the phantoms, who are not grey and gruesome as their name 
suggests but big, beautiful, and brightly coloured) and itself ensouled (given a 
spirit or “Gaia”).
67 
 
This luminous natural world, however, is also a world threatened by invasive and 
penetrative technologies.  These are symbolised by the phantoms, creatures who 
invade both the human body and the barrier cities into which the human 
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resemble the Shinto deities known as kami, best described as the spirits of natural 
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and London: Greenwood, 1994), xxiii.)  With these Shinto overtones, Final 
Fantasy shares much with films by anime master Hayao Miyazaki – which, as 
Wright and Clode tell us, resonate with Shinto themes (Lucy Wright and Jerry 
Clode, “The Animated Worlds of Hayao Miyazaki: Filmic Representations of 
Shinto”, Metro 143 (2005), 46-51).  In particular, Final Fantasy recalls 
Miyazaki’s Nausicaä of the Valley of the Winds, a film about a feisty heroine 
who mediates between aliens and humans in an effort to protect the natural 
world.   185 
population has retreated.  More powerfully, such penetration of the natural world 
is symbolised by the “Zeus cannon”, a weapon capable of literally penetrating 
the Earth from space.  This becomes a literalisation of the concerns explored by 
Shelley.  Frankenstein is often read as a critique of the techno-scientific (and 
gender-informed) desire to penetrate nature and reveal its (“Her”) secrets.  Early 
in the text, Victor tells us that he will “pioneer a new way, explore unknown 
powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation”; he is inspired 
by the words of Professor Waldman, who lectures on the scientific desire to 
“penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show how she works in her hiding-
places”.
68  This desire to penetrate nature becomes a more brutal and aggressive 
act in Final Fantasy.  In her dreams, Aki witnesses the apocalyptic scorching and 
destruction of the phantom planet, an ultimate violation of the natural world by a 
high-tech and aggressive race of creatures; she saves the Earth from a similar 
fate, protecting it from the violence imposed by an over-zealous, technologically-
enabled, penetrative, “masculine”, military. 
 
These deep-set tensions between nature and technology converge in Aki, a 
digital character with a troublesome link to her own origins in nature.  Indeed, 
we frequently see digital Aki traversing and negotiating a “natural” landscape 
(albeit one that is digitally animated): she wanders the post-apocalyptic 
wasteland, clambers over mountains, and in her dreams she travels the 
sometimes harsh, sometimes beautiful landscapes of the alien world.  These 
negotiations echo the negotiations between Frankensteinian monster and natural 
world: in Shelley’s novel the monster, an artificial creature, is also frequently 
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encountered in dramatic natural settings.  Both relationships between body and 
landscape are defined by a sense of exile.  In Shelley’s novel the beautiful natural 
landscapes continually remind us of the monster’s artificial status; in Final 
Fantasy Aki may appear to be “embraced” by the (fake) natural landscape she 
traverses, but this sweeping natural beauty makes her digital body seem all the 
more artificial and uncanny.  As a digital body Aki, like the Frankensteinian 
monster, is in exile from the organic world.  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, the term “exile” is used by Italian writer Luigi 
Pirandallo to describe the status of the filmic actor.  These words, which inspired 
Walter Benjamin, are worth repeating here in a slightly different context.  In the 
novel Si Gira, Pirandello writes that the filmic actor:  
 
feels as if in exile – exiled not only from the stage but also from himself.  
With a vague sense of discomfort he feels inexplicable emptiness: his body 
loses its corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of reality, life, voice, and 
the noises caused by his moving about, in order to be changed into a mute 
image, flickering an instant on the screen, then vanishing into silence… 
The projector will play with his shadow before the public, and he himself 
must be content to play before the camera.
69 
 
Much of what Pirandello is saying here has great relevance for Aki Ross.  She 
too experiences a loss of corporeality, a certain “evaporation” of presence; she 
too is deprived of reality, life, and voice, and this very lifelessness has caused 
audiences to generally reject her or find her unpleasant to watch.  Even a 
discussion of “her” as actor, performance, body – as anything other than “image” 
or “text” – causes problems, for who exactly is “she”?  Overall, the sense of exile 
that Pirandello writes of – what MacDougall sees in semiotic terms as the 
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“tearing apart of the signifier from its object”
70 – becomes a perfect description 
of Aki’s status as on-screen image, an image that is exiled or torn apart from 
original movements, expressions, and organic presence. 
 
In this sense, the two themes discussed here – ghostliness and the 
nature/technology tension – are intrinsically related.  In her analysis of 
Frankenstein and its various filmic retellings, Zakharieva points out that “[t]he 
sentimental current underpinning the Romantic movement finds full force in the 
conflict between the mechanical and the natural”, the tension at the heart of 
Shelley’s novel; she also argues that Romanticism’s “glorification of the natural 
is in its essence a fear for the lost soul of man”.
71  It is therefore significant that 
Final Fantasy’s obsession with the “ensouled” body – expressive of an anxiety 
over the very absence of the “spirits within” referred to in the title, an absence 
that marks the motion-capture body – accompanies the film’s quest to bring the 
organic landscape to the screen using digital techniques.  Whether there is a 
return in Final Fantasy to the Romantic idealism of Shelley’s novel is debatable; 
what we can argue, however, is that this problem of organic presence haunts the 
film and underpins the interaction between nature and technology that is 
dramatised in the narrative. 
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Animation as an “organic machine” 
 
I began this chapter with reference to digital bodies and the posthuman.  Running 
through the chapter, however, has been a concern with organicism (and 
postorganicism) in animation.  Our efforts to digitally reconstruct human 
presence, and the uncanny bodies they produce, might recall the operations of 
Victor Frankenstein; but there are deeper tensions at work in animation that 
evoke the Frankenstein tale – namely, the irresolvable tension between organic 
and mechanical worlds.  Such tensions have always been part of animation; they 
are exacerbated in, but not unique to, the digital age. 
 
Recently, I found these tensions spectacularly demonstrated by an unusual 
cinematic event.  In February 2008 the Perth International Arts Festival opened 
with an event known as “floating films”: a huge screen was “floated” over the 
Swan River, presenting a film to spectators watching from the banks.  The event 
was designed to celebrate Perth’s “river culture” and to combine the Perth 
community’s love of picnics, swimming, and the outdoors with the sense of 
highbrow “artiness” that the festival entailed.  This event particularly caught my 
attention, however, because the film to be screened (or “floated”) was My 
Neighbour Totoro, an animated film by Japanese master of anime Hayao 
Miyazaki.  This is a gentle film about the relationship between two young girls 
and the spirits that inhabit the natural world around them: like many of 
Miyazaki’s creations it brings to life a “lost” world in which, in Susan Napier’s 
words, “nature is not yet dominated by humanity and exists as a powerful force   189 
in itself, strong in its identity as the nonhuman Other”.
72  By dramatising the 
interaction between nature and humankind (or nature and technology) Miyazaki 
tells the story of the medium within which he works; for in animation “nature” is 
also othered, held at a distance by the technologies that depict it.  These tensions 
were amplified and further spectacularised when the film was screened not only 
in conjunction with a natural setting but as part of an artistic event that 
incorporated nature into the performance. 
 
Arguably, the attempt with these “floating films” was to create a cinematic 
experience that resembled a sort of “organic machine”.  Immersed in the writing 
of this thesis when I came across this event, I was instantly reminded of the 
Frankenstein narrative – of the monster’s body, not as a violent and dark 
reconstruction of human presence, not as a hideous body marked by scars, but as 
a body that exists at the point of tension between nature and technology.  As I 
read about the event, I was also reminded of David Chute’s use of the term 
“organic machine” to describe the films of Miyazaki, a filmmaker who shuns 
digital animation but whose films depict a luminous and often sacred natural 
world.  Chute observes that the films of Miyazaki – which alongside My 
Neighbour Totoro include Princess Mononoke and Nausicaä of the Valley of the 
Winds and, more recently, Spirited Away and Howl’s Moving Castle – are 
defined by a tension between the natural and the technological: they feature both 
machinery and nature in imaginative manifestations, yet they are also redolent of 
the notion that “the natural world may or may not be one enormous organic 
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machine”.
73  For Chute, the term “organic machine” also describes the care and 
precision taken to create Miyazaki’s imaginary worlds, and with the production 
process behind them.  Operating within the machine that is animation itself, 
Chute suggests, are the “organic” qualities to Miyazaki’s work: because the 
famous animator shuns computer-generated imagery and “personally draws up to 
70 percent of the individual frames in his movies” his films are stripped of the 
“high gloss of CGI” and contain “images that appear hand-crafted (a look as 
distinctively Japanese as the ‘organic’ surface textures of an ancient teacup”.
74  
Chute also uses the term “organic” to describe the way Miyazaki “manages to 
seduce us into believing that these places actually, or at least ‘virtually’ exist – 
that they could be turned and tipped and looked at from any angle, and 
contemplated as a whole”.
75 
 
By distinguishing between hand-crafted and more mechanical or mass-produced 
modes of production, Chute calls the Frankenstein narrative to mind: for 
Shelley’s novel, as we have already seen, is defined by a struggle not only 
between nature and technology but between natural and unnatural modes of 
production.  This divide, as I have suggested elsewhere, can be appropriated to 
depict the struggle between cinema (in its “more natural” photographic form) and 
new digital technologies.  When discussing animation, it should be noted that a 
similar tension informs the representation and cultural reception of new, digital 
modes of animation, which take on an “unnatural” status in the face of traditional 
hand-drawn methods.  This division informs Chute’s argument that Miyazaki’s 
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work is “organic”; perhaps also informing his argument is the understanding that 
Miyazaki personally draws many of his images and thus is organically involved.  
Hand-drawn animation is an embodied act, as opposed to the production of 
images by a computer; in this way, the shift from traditional hand-drawn 
methods to computer-generated imagery echoes the shift from writing to film, 
and the technologising of the Frankenstein text as it was taken from its original 
author (and from an original, embodied act of writing) into the mechanical and 
mass-produced world of film. 
 
This very “Shelleyian” division between natural and unnatural production is 
articulated in the recent Pixar film Ratatouille.  In a play upon the film’s subject 
matter – it is set in a kitchen, the main character a chef – a label appears in the 
end credits attesting to the film’s “ingredients”.  “100% Pure Animation”, we are 
told: “No Motion Capture!”  This is strangely relevant in an age where questions 
of organic purity dominate the world of food production as well as that of film 
production.  Yet if Chute writes of handcrafted animation as “organic”, what 
might we say of the films produced by Pixar: vastly commercialised, relying 
heavily on computer graphics, yet defined by image-scapes that are beautiful, 
fluid, and magical?  The Pixar films often revolve around mechanical or artificial 
subjects, foregrounding the mechanical or artificial nature of the production 
processes behind them.  We see this in Toy Story and Cars, and in their most 
recent film, Wall-E, a science fiction film that depicts a doubly posthuman 
world: both a fictional world populated by robots, and an on-screen world 
defined by a lack of human presence (for the character of Wall-E himself 
communicates using robot noises and body language rather than a human voice).    192 
Other Pixar projects, however, have ventured into the natural world: arguably 
their most successful venture was animating the ocean in Finding Nemo, the 
undersea world of which almost seems to ebb and flow “organically”. 
 
Final Fantasy, too, can be described as a digital animation determined to make 
present the organic world.  Indeed, director Sakaguchi seems almost to go in 
search of a form of “organic-digital” imagery: he uses cutting-edge digital 
techniques to bring to life stunning landscapes and a vibrant “natural” world.  
More recently, this venture has been undertaken by James Cameron and the 
creative team behind the film Avatar.
76  Cameron’s film blends live-action, 
motion-capture, and other digital effects technologies (and is consequently a 
highly fragmented text attempting to appear seamless).  Currently being hailed as 
a technological masterpiece, Avatar also brings to life an “organic” world and 
communicates an ecological “message” similar to that of Final Fantasy. 
 
In brief, the film depicts a future in which humans are mining on the moon 
Pandora, thus threatening the indigenous population (the Na’vi), who revere 
nature and live in harmony with the natural world around them.  The humans use 
genetically engineered Na’vi bodies controlled by human minds to aid their 
research and their negotiations with the pagan tribe.  These alter-identities, or 
manufactured “others”, are known as “avators”.  Although writer/director 
Cameron seems to have adopted the name “avatar” in its Hindu sense – meaning 
incarnations of the gods on Earth – the term also has cyberpunk connotations: it 
is the name given to one’s constructed identity online or in a digitally imagined 
                                                 
76 At the time of completing this thesis, Avatar has only just been released: for 
this reason, my comments on this important text will be superficial.   193 
space.  Interestingly, the film reverberates with the cyberpunk dream of escaping 
the limitations of the body and rewriting an idealistic existence in the digital 
world: crippled protagonist Jake “jacks in” to the dreamy world of Pandora, 
eventually rewriting himself as a Na’vi.  This difference between “real world” 
and (digital) dream/fantasy is underscored by the decision to have humans appear 
in live-action while the Na’vi are animated using motion-capture.   
 
While exploring these complex negotiations between organic and digital bodies, 
the film also deals with cultural anxieties over our lost link with the organic 
world.  As with Final Fantasy, Avatar’s narrative explores the techno-human 
threat to the natural world and the dangers that human ambition poses to nature 
itself.  At the same time, Avatar – like Final Fantasy – uses digital technologies 
to recreate a convincing and glorious nature-scape.  That the film is intended to 
be viewed in 3D brings new meaning to the idea of “organic” digital imagery: 
like the image-scapes that Chute describes, the world of Avatar, too, can 
seemingly be “turned and tipped and looked at from any angle, and contemplated 
as a whole”.
77 
 
As “nature” becomes a tempting subject for ambitious animators, more and more 
films are taking this path.  Films like Final Fantasy, Finding Nemo, Avatar, and 
the various master-works of Hayao Miyazaki show us that the organic world can 
now be animated and/or digitally reconstructed for us to view.  As analysts of 
film, how should we approach such ventures?  Can we describe them as 
Frankensteinian “reconstructions” or “penetrations” of nature, or should we 
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consider them interesting demonstrations of the fusion between organic and 
mechanical worlds?  Overall, the relationship between the organic and the 
mechanical – whether we describe it as a struggle or a harmonious interface – 
has become a crucial issue for animation in the twenty-first century.  This, 
alongside the digital construction of (post)human presence, is where today’s 
animated texts resonate with Frankenstein. 
 
Of course, there are many animated texts that more openly and violently retell 
Frankenstein.  The nature/technology tension that drives Final Fantasy, Avatar, 
and the films of Miyazaki is, in other Japanese animation, reconfigured as the 
relationship between organic and mechanical bodies: a relationship that is 
frequently aggressive, apocalyptic, and spectacularly destructive.  This leads me 
to my final chapter, where I will discuss the relationship between Frankenstein 
and anime in greater detail, dwelling particularly on the cyberpunk film Ghost in 
the Shell.  More so than any of the texts discussed thus far, Ghost in the Shell 
revels in a posthuman/postcinematic future.  In my analysis of this film I will 
consequently return to many of the ideas discussed in this chapter, including both 
the overwriting power of digital animation and the problems of techno-
production, ghostliness, and (absent) organicism that Final Fantasy evokes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE MONSTROUS/MECHANICAL BODY: 
FRANKENSTEIN AND ANIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Kusanagi’s creation scene in Ghost in the Shell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Vanishing acts – Kusanagi negotiates the cityscape   196 
Strange bodies: transformation, otherness, and the animated “monster” 
 
Throughout this thesis I have tracked cinema’s reworking of the Frankenstein 
tale, moving towards postcinematic modes of filmmaking and the problem of 
digitally (re)constructing organic presence.  This chapter will conclude the 
project by discussing how Frankenstein is appropriated and retold – often with 
startling power – in the unique cultural space provided by Japanese animation.  
Many anime engage the Frankenstein myth by depicting the body in both 
monstrous and mechanical terms, often dwelling upon this body’s creation at the 
hands of malevolent scientific or political institutions.  Below, I will consider 
how this monstrous/mechanical body is positioned to confront historical and 
social problems specific to Japanese culture, thus initiating a unique and 
culturally inflected reworking of Frankenstein; I will also examine how such 
retellings incorporate a fantastic image of media culture in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, and are frequently underscored by concerns specific to the 
medium of animation itself.  My main text for consideration will be the 1995 
anime Ghost in the Shell: a now fifteen-year-old text that I feel can still be 
described as the most powerful, subversive, and spectacular retelling of 
Frankenstein in the digital age.  
 
Before delving into these analyses, a brief discussion of animation and the 
animated body is needed.  We can begin with the very Frankensteinian theme of 
“life” itself.  Richard Weihe tells us that animation is the art of “breathing life or   197 
movement into dead matter”;
1 for Weihe, animation involves “creating the 
illusion of a ‘soul’ by means of a technique somewhere between photography 
and film that exploits a specific mode of perception” – it is, in other words, “[t]he 
art of enabling the spectator to envision the dead as alive”.
2  Consequently, we 
can think of animation as a Frankensteinian act.  Indeed, Shelley’s narrative of 
monster-making and techno-creation has much in common with the narrative of 
animation itself as a technology by which on-screen bodies are built and given 
life.  The very problems associated with “breathing life into dead matter” and 
“creating the illusion of a soul” are inscribed into Final Fantasy, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter: a film subtitled “The Spirits Within”, the 
narrative of which asserts the presence of a soul, but also a film in which the 
illusion of a “soul” in the animated characters wasn’t quite enough – a film 
whose characters were critiqued and rejected for their cold, lifeless, soulless 
demeanour. 
 
These problems of life, soul, and techno-production – which have their roots in 
the Frankenstein tale – are also negotiated in Ghost in the Shell.  Throughout this 
film the protagonist, a cyborg known as Major Motoko Kusanagi, self-
reflexively questions the existence of her soul (or “ghost”).  The film also offers 
a spectacular creation scene that depicts Kusanagi’s body as a mechanical shell 
ready to be “animated”; it thus pinpoints the precise moment at which “life” will 
be “breathed” into her “lifeless” form.  This scene is inter-cut with images of 
computer code that slyly suggest how such animation will take place: the scene is 
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suggestive of a digital creation, which is significant given that Ghost in the Shell 
was a film that revolutionised digital filmmaking with its unique blend of CGI 
and cel animation. 
 
If the problem of “life” is paramount to the act of animation, then animation 
exacerbates some of the problems associated with live-action cinema.  Weihe 
suggests as much when he writes that “animation film seems paradigmatic of 
film as such the premise of which is the spectator’s willing acceptance of the 
moving image as a representation of ‘life’”.
3  Such problems are engaged in the 
very first cinematic adaptation of Frankenstein: the 1910 Edison film.  Let us 
consider “Edison’s” monster once again: he/it is transformative, disconcerting, 
fantastic, embodying all the flickering uncertainty of early cinema and 
performing the new medium’s marvellous yet uncanny
4 use of technology to 
shape and alter the body.  Animated bodies, especially those that appear in 
science-fictional and fantastic anime, often have these qualities too.  These are 
strange bodies, imbued with the unnatural aspects of the medium that contains 
them. 
 
However, when analysing animated film it is also important to distinguish the 
medium – and the bodies it contains – from live-action cinema.  Anime expert 
Susan Napier writes of the “otherness” of animation: “perhaps from its very 
inception”, she tells us, animation “has existed as an alternative form of 
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representation, a representation that privileges very different properties and 
conventions from that of live action”.
5  Such otherness particularly involves the 
capabilities and qualities of the animated body, which for Napier has a fantastic 
aspect that live-action cinema cannot replicate: “what animation can do to the 
human body is one of the most interesting and provocative aspects of the 
medium”, she writes.
6  Drawing from Napier, we can consider the animated body 
in terms of its technologically-enabled otherness; and this, too, is a 
Frankensteinian quality.  In this sense, animation (and specifically anime, a sub-
group of screen texts that plays upon such otherness with dark enthusiasm and 
wonderful self-awareness) provides a perfect space for new reworkings of the 
Frankenstein tale. 
 
Paul Wells also argues that the animated body is defined by its strange, 
wonderful, and non-cinematic qualities, which range from “malleability” to 
various “impossible abilities”.
7  He argues, for instance, that in animation “[t]he 
body is a mechanism – it may be represented as if it was a machine”; he also tells 
us that the animated body is “fragmentary – it can be broken into parts, 
reassembled and conjoined with other objects and materials”.
8  Both these 
(Frankensteinian) qualities are literalised in anime such as Ghost in the Shell, 
where Kusanagi is a mechanical body whose fragmentation is violently depicted 
on-screen.  Wells further suggests that these fantastic qualities disrupt traditional 
rules of embodiment, character, and identity, creating narrative patterns that 
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differ markedly from those found in classical Hollywood cinema; in this sense, 
the animated body also initiates “new modes of storytelling”.
9  This becomes 
crucial in the context of a discussion of anime, as the analyses below will 
demonstrate.  In Ghost in the Shell, for instance, Kusanagi’s destruction at the 
end of the film is accompanied by a narrative that becomes (depending on one’s 
perspective) confusing, abstract, or unsettling; her mechanical and fragmented 
body seems to drive the story, which does not so much end as splinter. 
 
For both Wells and Napier, moreover, the defining feature of animation is 
metamorphosis.  Napier tells us that “the animated body is perhaps best 
understood in relation to the process of metamorphosis”, and that “[p]art of the 
pleasure of watching animation is being invited into [a] destabilized and fluid 
world”.
10  Referring to the transformative quality of animated bodies, she argues 
that live-action cinema simply cannot represent the body in the same way:  
 
Since movement is at the heart of animation, animation can and does 
emphasize transformation in a way that simply no other artistic genre is 
capable of doing.  Even contemporary live-action films with their superb 
special effects have a jerky uneasy quality when compared with the 
amazing fluidity of the animated image.
11 
 
Similarly, Wells argues that metamorphosis is “unique to the animated form” and 
in many ways “the constituent core of animation itself”.
12  Continuing, Wells 
suggests that metamorphosis defines animation in the same way that 
fragmentation defines live-action cinema: “[t]he ability to metamorphose 
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images”, he writes, “means that it is possible to create a fluid linkage of images 
through the process of animation itself rather than through editing”.
13  This 
becomes of particular interest if we recall Zakharieva’s “composite body”
14 and 
her suggestion that fragmentation or “montage” is what links Frankensteinian 
monster and filmic text.
15  In animation, we might argue, the monster can be re-
presented as a morphing body (rather than a “composite” body) in a manner that 
reflects back on the medium itself (and its inherent difference from live-action 
film). 
 
Metamorphosis is a device used with great frequency in anime, often in 
conjunction with representations of the monstrous/mechanical body (which is 
frequently seen to transform in a grotesque, horrific, or otherwise disturbing 
manner).  These moments of metamorphosis are moments that stop the narrative; 
moments when the body becomes a special effect; moments of spectacular self-
reflexivity when the capabilities of the medium are made fantastically visible.  
Thus, they function in a similar manner to the Frankensteinian creation scene.  
Indeed, many anime that appropriate the figure of the monstrous/mechanical 
body replace the creation scene with a moment of metamorphic destruction.  I 
will pursue this argument below with particular reference to Akira, an anime of 
the apocalyptic sub-genre that resonates with Frankenstein on many levels.  
Ghost in the Shell, too, is concerned with bodily transformation and 
deconstruction; although this film does contain a creation scene, this scene is 
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complemented by an end sequence in which the heroine’s body is violently taken 
apart and in which she ultimately transforms into something else. 
 
We can also address the Frankensteinian creation scene, both as it was written by 
Shelley and as it has been depicted in cinema, as a type of metamorphosis.  At 
the core of this scene, after all, is a shift: the monster’s body transforms from 
lifeless to living, from object to organism, in a manner that challenges our 
preconceived notions of life, body, and human being.  This is also a moment 
when the body becomes fantastic.  In her discussion of the fantasy genre, Lucie 
Armitt argues that metamorphosis “is a device which lies at the centre of all 
fantasy texts, not simply in terms of the symbolism used, but also in the 
transformative impulses it employs”.
16  In a manner that relates to Frankenstein 
as a fantastic and horrific tale about embodiment, Armitt remarks:  
 
alongside those narratives which cite the metamorphic body as the central 
source of pleasure, empowerment, terror or horror, the fantastic in general 
takes us into a realm where the static and the finite shift, be it ever so 
slightly, to metamorphose the formerly familiar into a defamiliarized 
state.
17 
 
This is precisely what happens in Shelley’s creation scene (which is also the 
moment when Shelley’s Gothic tale “morphs” into a science fiction story).  
These aspects of the creation scene are imaged in the Edison film, where the 
monster’s creation is depicted as an alchemical transformation; they are, 
however, neglected in later live-action films, which foreground the mechanical, 
galvanised, or artificial aspects of the monster’s body rather than his/her/its 
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transformative nature.  I propose that the device of metamorphosis, “constituent” 
of animation as Wells tells us, is used in many anime to express a 
Frankensteinian moment: a point at which the body as monstrous object becomes 
living and/or the living body becomes monstrous. 
 
This initial theorising gives us a picture of the animated body: a body that is both 
fantastic and technologised, that is other, that transforms, fragments, and 
metaphorically gestures to the medium that contains it.  As I have discussed 
throughout this thesis, we might describe the body of the Frankensteinian 
monster in the same terms.  In the analyses below, I want to consider Ghost in 
the Shell’s Kusanagi as both an animated body and a rewriting of the figure of 
the monster.  I will examine the film’s reworking of the creation scene, its 
redefinition of the cyborg, and its particularly poignant depiction of the 
vanishing of organic presence in a digital world.  First, however, I will 
investigate how anime – as a technology, a cultural phenomenon, and a mode of 
storytelling – negotiates with the Frankenstein tale.  I will accomplish this firstly 
with an analysis of a definitive example of anime, the 1988 film Akira, and 
secondly with a theoretical investigation of the places and spaces where anime 
and the Frankenstein myth overlap. 
 
Apocalyptic bodies and embodied apocalypses in Akira 
 
Katsuhiro Otomo’s anime Akira is a film about the end of the world: it brings to 
the screen a sense of apocalyptic glee (and/or horror) associated with the 
annihilation of “New Tokyo” and the destructive rampages of telekinetic   204 
teenager Tetsuo.  Based on Otomo’s manga, the film tells the story of a world 
where legal and parental structures have broken down, and where teenagers run 
amok as abandoned “monsters”.  With its extended battle sequence and 
astounding graphic realization of the trope of “metamorphosis”, Akira is also a 
film that exemplifies both the special qualities of the animated body and the 
violence that has come to be associated with science-fictional anime. 
 
Moreover, Akira draws on the tradition established by manga and anime such as 
Astro Boy and Tetsujin 28-go, the stories of which revolve around robotic 
characters created by scientists (and which in turn draw on Shelley’s 
Frankenstein as an influence).  The characters
18 in Otomo’s film, however, are 
not robots but teenagers with godlike psychic powers that have been unleashed 
during scientific experiments; like Shelley’s Creature, they become “monsters” 
on a rampage, the result of scientific inquiry gone wrong.  Like Shelley’s 
monster, furthermore, central character Tetsuo is ambivalently situated between 
good and evil.  His monstrosity and his rage against the human race are 
“constructed” by the world around him – an oppressive world in which he is 
treated as an outcast.  In this sense he, like the Frankensteinian monster, is not 
completely responsible for the violence and destruction he unleashes. 
   
However, the film is most interesting not for its narrative-based allusions to 
Shelley’s novel but for its imaging of a monstrous body.  In the film’s climax, 
the apocalyptic destruction caused by Tetsuo’s rage is performed back onto his 
own body, which hideously mutates.  This mutation sequence begins when his 
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arm is severed by a laser blast; soon afterwards he “grows” a mechanical 
replacement limb.  His body then turns into a monstrous mass that he cannot 
control; and in a strange variation on Shelley’s narrative – in which Victor’s 
monster murders his bride Elizabeth – Tetsuo unwillingly crushes his girlfriend 
Kaori to death with his own monstrous bulk.  At the end of his painful mutations 
Tetsuo disappears in the explosion that consumes New Tokyo, with only his 
voice remaining to chant “I am Tetsuo” over the series of abstract images with 
which the film ends.  Like Shelley’s monster, then, Tetsuo is – or becomes – a 
boundary-creature: his mutating figure challenges the logic of embodiment and 
human-ity by crossing the boundaries between human and inhuman, human and 
animal, organic and mechanical, “body” and “thing”, reality and fantasy, 
monstrous and beautiful, violent and innocent, grotesque and divine.  To this 
extent, he is also a version of Haraway’s border-crossing cyborg. 
 
Taking up the figure of the monstrous/mechanical body and writing it into this 
apocalyptic narrative (and/or image sequence), Akira offers a unique reworking 
of Frankenstein.  In this film, first and foremost, the (monstrous) body becomes a 
site of apocalyptic violence.  We rarely find references to Frankenstein in 
Hollywood films of the apocalyptic sub-genre; indeed, we find that in such films 
the body is usually removed from the apocalyptic moment.  As a mere example 
we can consider the 1998 film Deep Impact, which contains an extended end 
sequence involving “deep” and “impactful” special effects from which the entire 
large cast of characters is excluded, and in which the only “body” to be   206 
deconstructed is that of the Statue of Liberty (which is decapitated).
19  In Akira, 
conversely, the body participates in the apocalyptic moment.  The trope of 
metamorphosis is used to facilitate this apocalyptic de(con)struction, allowing 
outsider Tetsuo (perhaps unwillingly) to rewrite his own body, reshaping it for a 
world that does not accept him.  At the same time, the film – with its spectacular, 
symbolic, and rather abstract ending – exemplifies Wells’ suggestion that the 
strangeness of the animated body inflects upon the narrative, and that 
metamorphosis in particular is a device that can “resist logical developments and 
determine unpredictable linearities (both temporal and spatial) that constitute 
different kinds of narrative construction”.
20 
 
In applying the figure of the monstrous body to an apocalyptic narrative, Akira 
also reworks the Frankenstein tale to incorporate and confront elements of 
Japanese history.  Napier has suggested that the apocalyptic mode of anime is 
“deeply ingrained within the contemporary Japanese national identity” because 
Japan is “shadowed by memories of the atomic bomb”.
21  Even science-fictional 
anime like Akira, which do not set themselves in a necessarily realistic world, are 
therefore engaged in an oscillation between a violent, postmodern denial of 
history and a spectacular re-imag(in)ing of iconic and painful past events.  
Accordingly, we can locate the film’s apocalyptic imagery within a historical 
narrative that refers back to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the white, 
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domed explosions that consume the film’s fictional “Tokyo” are reminiscent of 
mushroom clouds, and the image of the charred crater that Tokyo becomes calls 
to mind the Japanese term yaki-nohara, or “burned plain”, used to describe the 
ruined cities after August 1945.
22  Even Tetsuo’s spectacular bodily 
transformations – which can be read as a form of wounding, associated as they 
are with pain and with images of sinew, flesh and blood – have historical 
resonances.  In the context of Japanese history, the relationship between 
apocalypse and body is a troubled one, especially given that the atomic blasts 
marked a generation of bodies through mutation.  Tetsuo’s transformations may 
thus appear as historical inscriptions, whether as national “scars” or as powerful 
reminders of individual suffering and physical or psychological trauma. 
 
Akira also rewrites the Frankensteinian narrative with an emphasis on 
transcendence, making the poetic suggestion that we might leave behind our 
(monstrous) bodies and enter a higher order of being where bodily inscriptions 
and scars do not matter.  As Freda Freiberg observes, the climactic mutation 
sequence ends with Tetsuo “appear[ing] to become one with the cosmos, to be 
liberated from the torments of the flesh and the world into a kind of divine 
spiritual essence”.
23  Given the clear influence of cyberpunk fiction on the film, 
we can further suggest that Tetsuo’s disappearance performs what Springer 
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refers to as the “new cultural fantasy”
24 of cyber-immersion, a forgetting and 
transcending of the body that mirrors the apocalyptic moment’s forgetting and 
transcending of time itself.  This cyber-fantasy has a millennial as well as a near-
religious tinge: as Quinby has noted, dreams of transcending the body have “a 
two-thousand year history, updated March 1997 when the Heaven’s Gate 
members poisoned and suffocated their ‘containers’”.
25  Whether through cyber-
immersion or the ascension into heaven, such transcendence – part of the 
iconography of millennial culture, which clearly informs Akira, a text of the late 
1980s – offers an interesting solution to the problem of the monstrous body: an 
escape route opened by the cultural fantasies of the late twentieth century but 
unavailable to Shelley’s monster, the product of a more restrictive era in which 
individuals were born into a body (with its set of cultural inscriptions) and 
imprisoned there for life. 
 
Finally, Akira represents an unusual rewriting of the Frankenstein tale because it 
takes the teenage body as its subject.  The film interweaves a traditional coming-
of-age narrative with darker stories about rage, self-loathing, violence, and the 
technologising of adolescence; it projects “monstrosity” onto the body of an 
adolescent boy and thus deviates from previous retellings of Frankenstein with 
their images of male or female but always adult “Creatures”.  This might further 
explain the addition of the theme of transcendence to this retelling: for the 
fantasy of transcendence can suggest a desire to escape the flesh experienced by 
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and associated with the (male) adolescent.  Indeed, the end sequence of Akira is 
infused with what Anne Balsamo calls “masculinist dreams of body 
transcendence” that “signal a desire to return to the ‘neutrality’ of the body”,
26 a 
desire that uncomfortable, frustrated Tetsuo achieves when he becomes a “divine 
essence” (or divine image). 
 
Influenced by Akira, several other anime have featured the monstrous and/or 
mechanical body in adolescent form: the television series Guyver and Neon 
Genesis: Evangelion, for instance, depict teenage characters who merge with 
monstrous/mechanical beings.  Like Akira these texts deal with the unnatural 
qualities of a body, and a society, that has been removed from its organic origins; 
they also provide fantastic depictions of the relationship between machine and 
organism.  Neon Genesis: Evangelion, in particular, is replete with images of 
teenage hero Shinji inside the enormous metal body of his “Eva”; so too is its 
filmic extension, The End of Evangelion,
27 which spirals into apocalyptic 
spectacle and systematically deconstructs (or makes monstrous) the bodies of 
each of its characters (who mutate, disintegrate, or are violently killed).  In 
allowing its protagonists to interface with a monstrous technology, Evangelion 
realizes Haraway’s claim that “machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body”.
28  Alongside these 
spectacular images of monstrous machines, however, Evangelion also reminds us 
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that, in Haraway’s words, “modern machines are quintessentially microelectronic 
devices: they are everywhere and they are invisible”.
29  With its emphasis on 
isolation and technological barriers, the text comments on the degree to which 
technology mediates personal relationships; hence many of the characters 
communicate not face to face but across radios, phones and intercoms.  
Communication, or its interruption, is indeed at the heart of the Evangelion 
narrative: dialogue is perpetually cut off, characters continually misunderstand 
one another, relationships are destroyed due to the awkwardness and angst of 
adolescence.
30  The “monstrosity” depicted in Evangelion is therefore also 
interior, a psychological and social condition as well as a physical one. 
 
Interestingly, Evangelion screened at a time when Japan was haunted by the so-
called “shut-in” syndrome, or hikikomori, a social phenomenon whereby “young 
people in their late teens or twenties shut themselves in their room and refuse to 
come out”,
31 often immersing themselves in computer games, videos, television, 
comics, and other media texts.  These “shut-in” teenagers are often anime fans, 
as are the otaku, defined by Tetsuo Sakurai as: 
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young people who [are] so engrossed in animation, comics or video games 
that they [turn] their back on any pretence that relationships with others 
[are] important… a young generation completely divorced from the social 
and moral world of their elders.
32 
 
With its reference to teenage isolation and interrupted communication between 
the generations, Evangelion seems to engage these (mediated) social problems, 
using them to fuel a narrative that is far more worldly, human, and grounded than 
it initially appears.  The isolated and unmotivated Shinji becomes in this respect 
an exaggeration of the “shut-in” teenager, the passive Japanese youth in his 
media cocoon.  Like some of the American films discussed in previous chapters, 
then, Evangelion takes the figure of the mechanical body and positions it to 
negotiate concerns of the media age – including the cultural “machine” of anime 
itself. 
 
If these texts contain Frankenstein monsters, of a sort – bodies that are both 
mechanical and monstrous, that are scientifically restructured or technologically 
extended, that operate at the point of tension between machine and organism – 
they notably lack distinct moments of creation.  Instead, they are marked by 
scenes and sequences of apocalyptic violence and spectacular de(con)struction.  
We might refer to these moments as reverse creation scenes: moments when the 
body is not brought to life but taken apart.  In live-action versions of 
Frankenstein, we often find that the creation scene brings the narrative to a point 
of arrest: in the James Whale films Frankenstein and Bride of Frankenstein, for 
instance, the spectacular scenes of creation halt the story, inviting us to focus 
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upon the body-as-image and drawing our attention to the technology – the 
machine – of cinema itself.  The destruction scenes that feature in anime like 
Akira and Evangelion function in a similar manner.  What these scenes of 
cinematic creation and animated destruction share is a grounding in special 
effects, which are themselves, as Scott Bukatman reminds us, “especially 
effective at bringing the narrative to a temporary and spectacular halt”.
33  This 
will be discussed further in the following section, where I will assess the 
relationship between Frankenstein and anime. 
 
Visible monsters and dividual selves: Frankenstein and anime in dialogue 
 
When compared to some of the Hollywood texts analysed in this project, the 
anime discussed above seem more willing to dwell upon the monstrosity of the 
bodies they depict – more determined to turn the monstrous body into a 
spectacle.  Unlike Hollywood films that adapt the Frankenstein tale or engage its 
themes, these anime capture a certain sentiment present in Shelley’s novel: a 
combination of horror and fascination evoked by the sight of the monster’s body.  
In Shelley’s 1831 introduction she describes the vision that so horrified and yet 
obviously fascinated her: 
 
I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out… looking on him with 
yellow, watery, but speculative eyes… I opened mine in terror… [but] I 
could not so easily get rid of my hideous phantom; still it haunted me.
34 
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Shelley writes her response to the image of the monster into the text: for Victor 
too articulates both a disgust at the sight of the monster and a desire to view him, 
or an inability to tear his eyes away (evident in the amount of detail he provides 
about the monster’s appearance): 
 
His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful.  
Beautiful!  – Great God!  His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of 
muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; 
his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more 
horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour 
as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion 
and straight black lips.
35 
 
This act of viewing the monster, and the accompanying sentiments of disgust and 
fascination, are never quite captured by Hollywood adaptations of the tale, even 
those that spectacularise the scene of creation (like the Whale films) or make 
constant references to vision and “the eye” (like the later science fiction films 
Blade Runner and Strange Days).  Films like Akira, however, invite their 
audiences to look upon the body-made-monstrous.  Tetsuo’s body is turned into a 
spectacle, but it also evokes a combination of horror, disgust, fascination, and 
wonder; a sort of sublime terror that can be traced back to Shelley’s text. 
 
The need to view the monstrous/mechanical body as expressed in filmic versions 
of Frankenstein has already been discussed in this thesis with reference to 
Heffernan and his claim that cinematic adaptations of the tale are informed by 
the visual language of film.
36  This focus on the visual, Heffernan claims, allows 
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filmic versions of Frankenstein to reveal “what the novel hides or suppresses”.
37  
Arguably, this becomes more pronounced in anime, the “visual language” of 
which is addressed by many theorists.  Helen McCarthy, for instance, tells us that 
anime are part of an established “imagistic” trend in Japanese storytelling, 
drawing influence from medieval scroll paintings and woodblock prints.
38  In a 
similar vein, Susan Napier writes that “Japan is a country that is traditionally 
more pictocentric than the cultures of the West, as is exemplified in its use of 
characters or ideograms, and anime… fit easily into a contemporary culture of 
the visual”.
39  We can remind ourselves here that most anime are based on 
manga, the comic books or graphic novels that Donald Richie refers to as “image 
propelled entertainment” which the reader “scans” rather than properly reads.
40  
Within a space so dominated by the image, the monstrous/mechanical body is 
easily turned into a spectacle, while some of the elements that remain “hidden” 
in both Shelley’s novel and its Hollywood adaptations are brought to the screen – 
including the apocalyptic, horrific, and simultaneously beautiful qualities of a 
body that escapes the confines of human being, as does Tetsuo’s in Akira. 
 
The desire to turn the monstrous/mechanical body into a spectacle particularly 
defines the mecha mode of anime to which Evangelion belongs: a sub-genre that 
plays upon the interface between giant mechanical vehicles and the human 
subjects who control them.  Mecha anime tend to problematise the divisions 
between human and machine, organic and mechanical – as does the figure of 
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Frankensteinian monster, to some extent, even as he/it was first imagined by 
Shelley.  The emphasis in mecha anime, however, is on fusion rather than the 
sort of self/other, nature/technology opposition around which the Frankenstein 
tale is structured.  Napier tells us that “the world of hard science fiction anime 
known as mecha revolves around a quest to contain the body, this time quite 
literally in the form of some kind of technological fusion”;
41 continuing, she 
observes that:  
 
the fusion of human pilot inside armored machine leads to bizarre 
combinations of mechanical/organic violence in which huge machines 
combat each other in fantastic displays of mechanical agility while at the 
same time hinting at the organic bodies inside them with graphic glimpses 
of dismembered limbs flying around and blood seeping through 
mechanical armor.
42 
 
The monstrous/mechanical body in this case is both violently organicised and 
violently de-natured – and thus it is fundamentally different from the monsters, 
cyborgs, robots, replicants, and simulacra that populate Hollywood retellings of 
Frankenstein. 
 
Representations of the body in most science fiction texts – including 
Frankenstein in all its manifestations – articulate cultural understandings about 
selfhood, subjectivity, and human identity.  It is not surprising, then, that the 
representations of the monstrous and/or technologised body in these Japanese 
texts differ from parallel representations offered by Hollywood.  As Margaret 
Lock reminds us, Japanese understandings of self and body differ from those in 
Western culture.  “The idea of an autonomous, individualized self”, Lock states, 
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“essentially synonymous with the ‘person’ in the West, does not sit well in 
Japan, where ‘person’ is above all reproduced in the public domain, beyond the 
bounds of the body”.
43  It is perhaps in response to such an understanding that 
anime like Akira depict an escape from the monstrous body, interweaving 
themes of deconstruction, transcendence, and disembodiment with the 
Frankenstein myth.  Other theorists have investigated this uniquely “Japanese” 
sense of self in a manner that has relevance here.  Winston Davis points out that:  
 
a Japanese human being (ningen) is never an individual in the Western 
sense of the word; he or she is always defined in terms of a set of 
relationships with others (hito no aida)… Unlike the Western self, which is 
predicated on clearly defined ontological boundaries, the Japanese self 
expands and contracts to fit shared relationships or situations.
44 
 
Similarly, Takie Sugiyama Lebra has outlined a “socially contextualized, 
indeterminate, multiple” Japanese self that exists “in striking contrast to the 
Western idiom of self as consistent, continuous, unique, intrinsic, or clearly 
bounded”.
45  Lebra goes on to explore how elements of possession, surrogacy 
and “self-other reflexivity” in Japanese culture have lead to a conception of the 
self as “‘dividual’, instead of ‘individual’”.
46  We can argue that this, too, inflects 
upon the retelling of Frankenstein in anime.  As I have already argued in this 
thesis, Shelley imagined her monster as a unified subject in a fragmented body; 
he/it was also written into an established division between self and other which 
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Shelley negotiates throughout her tale.  Japanese understandings of selfhood are 
not necessarily regulated by such divisions.  Accordingly, the 
monstrous/mechanical body in anime often appears as both self and other, as 
subject and object, singular and multiple, absent, present, transformative, and in-
between. 
 
Alongside their articulation of cultural codes of embodiment and subjectivity, 
adaptations of Frankenstein usually respond to a sense of techno-fear distinct to a 
particular time and place: to localised cultural anxieties about technological 
progress and the mechanical tampering with organic presence.  What sort of 
techno-fear, then, defines the cultural space in which these anime are produced?  
Murphie and Potts argue that Japanese culture actually lacks a pronounced sense 
of techno-fear.  “Japanese culture is perhaps less prone than the West to techno-
fear, as is reflected in the tradition of friendly robots and androids in animation”, 
they write, adding that “Japanese SF often portrays the bond between humans 
and machines with less pessimism and fear than is found in Western SF”.
47  This 
lack of techno-fear might be responsible for the unflinching depictions of the 
monstrous/mechanical body that we find in anime like Akira and Evangelion.  
The bodies that appear in the anime under scrutiny here, however, have 
apocalyptic and quite horrific qualities: they are far from the friendly robots of 
Astro Boy (the text to which Murphie and Potts are particularly referring).  To 
state that Japan lacks “techno-fear” is to deny the darker sides of these anime, 
which are frequently “pessimistic” – often apocalyptically so – about the 
human/machine interface they depict. 
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Lock tells us that there is an element of techno-fear at work in Japanese culture, 
and that this is related to a conception of the West-as-other and to a perceived 
loss of both authentic Japanese culture and a connection with the natural 
landscape.  The “technologising” of Japan took place after the Meiji Restoration 
of the mid-1800s, when the nation opened itself up to Western influences; in 
hindsight, such technologising has been perceived by many to have taken the 
nation away from its traditional culture and also from its grounding in nature, the 
landscape, and a primarily rural way of life.  Lock argues that cultural responses 
to contemporary issues like organ donation – a subject which itself evokes the 
Frankenstein tale – are built upon these older tensions.  She writes: 
 
the current debate about body technologies in Japan – the feasibility of 
tinkering with the margins between culture and nature, and the very 
creation of those margins – takes place in light of received wisdom about 
the Other, the West.  At the same time, nostalgia about the loss of an 
‘authentic’ Japanese past contributes prominently to the debate.
48 
 
This culturally distinct othering of technology shapes the retelling of 
Frankenstein in anime, bringing a dark quality to the tale that frequently emerges 
in apocalyptic sub-tones.  These are not necessarily anxious films; they do not 
reverberate with the overt technophobia that drives a film like The Terminator, 
for instance, or later The Matrix.  Yet neither are they celebratory about the 
hyper-technological, postorganic futures they depict.  Technology in these texts 
is othered, but such otherness is embraced rather than held at a distance, and this 
allows for a more confronting depiction of the postorganic body than we tend to 
find in Hollywood. 
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Interestingly, Lock’s description of Japan as a national body that is technologised 
but “nostalgic” about the “loss of an ‘authentic’… past” contains the suggestion 
of a national origin story.  The origins that are negotiated here involve both a 
sense of tradition and a link to nature, which combine to create the “authentic 
past” of which Lock writes.  Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney discusses the importance of 
these traditional/natural origins to the Japanese perception of selfhood, writing 
that in Japan:  
 
agriculture symbolizes the past.  As in many cultures, the pristine past 
embodying a distinct and sacred Japanese identity, uninfluenced by foreign 
influences and modernity, represented by the city, is symbolized in the 
reconstituted agriculture and the rural.  The valorization of the primordial 
self of the Japanese symbolized in agriculture saw heightened expressions 
by intellectuals during the late Edo period... and through the Meiji period... 
and continues today when the Japanese search for nature in the 
countryside, now nostalgically referred to as furusato (old homestead; 
literally, one’s home region).
49 
 
Nature, in other words, “serves as a temporal metaphor of self representing a past 
that is pure, simple, imbued with pristine beauty, and uncontaminated by foreign 
influences”.
50  This brings a new inflection to the nature/technology tension that 
is articulated in Frankenstein, and to the problem of organic origins that 
constitutes the core of the tale.  It is primarily the absence of nature that defines 
science-fictional anime, most of which take place in post-apocalyptic worlds or 
futuristic, high-tech cities; nevertheless, the hybrid organic-mechanical bodies 
that populate such anime can be read as fantastic expressions of a national body 
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that is penetrated by technology and for whom a traditional way of life rooted in 
the natural landscape has become a period of remembered innocence that can 
never be returned to.  Indeed, the body of the Frankensteinian monster in its most 
mythic form – a mechanical body in negotiation with its lost origins in nature – 
offers an interesting allegory for the technologising of Japan and the associated 
sense of vanishing tradition and lost organicism. 
 
Ultimately, then, if anime like Akira and Evangelion negotiate the Frankenstein 
tale they also substantially rework it, interweaving it with a set of understandings 
about embodiment, selfhood, technology, nature, and power that are unique to 
Japanese culture.  Such understandings also inform Ghost in the Shell, a film that 
was heavily influenced by Akira and that similarly challenges the established 
understandings of embodiment, selfhood, and technology that are likely to be 
harboured by a Western audience.  Ghost in the Shell also performs the 
mechanical body’s loss of organicism in a way that suggests, if fleetingly, Japan-
as-nation’s loss of tradition, culture, and organic past.  The film is thus 
exemplary of the strange relationship between Frankenstein and anime; it also 
shows us how the Frankenstein tale can be stunningly reworked to address the 
digital age. 
 
Vanishing acts: the disappearing cyborg in Ghost in the Shell 
 
Ghost in the Shell is a film directed by Mamoru Oshii and is based upon the 
manga by Masamune Shirow.  With its very title, the film (like the manga) 
engages the problem of mind/body dualism, drawing influence from the work of   221 
a succession of theorists.  These include René Descartes, who wrote of the body 
as a “machine” but considered the mind to be, in contrast, immaterial; Gilbert 
Ryle, who attacks Cartesian dualism and its flawed “dogma of the ghost in the 
machine”;
51 and Arthur Koestler, whose book The Ghost in the Machine 
critiques Ryle’s work while still rejecting the mind/body dualism.
52  Ghost in the 
Shell takes its name from Koestler’s book, which in turn borrows a phrase from 
Ryle.  The film inserts itself into this ongoing theoretical discussion and 
demonstrates that our understandings of mind and body have evolved into the 
digital age, where cyberspace technologies and other digital media bring new 
complications to the debate.  Jodi O’Brien has observed that “online interactions 
provide an excellent site for observing the dislocation of mind and body”,
53 and 
thus bring about new possibilities in both Cartesian dualism and in the existence 
of “ghosts” that might now occupy very different “machines”.  This is something 
that writers of cyberpunk literature have recognised for decades, and it is a 
notion that is enthusiastically seized upon and developed in Ghost in the Shell. 
 
It is important to recognise that the problem of mind/body dualism and the 
contested notion of a “ghost in the machine” takes us back to Frankenstein.  
Shelley’s text, and the various retellings that followed, must necessarily – 
because they revolve around the figure of a constructed body – grapple with the 
question, what is “mind”?  Can there be a natural mind or indeed a “human 
nature” if the body itself does not originate in the natural world?  Dror and 
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Thomas point out that “the underlying view in [Shelley’s] story is that the mind 
is a scientific object.  That is, if you ‘put it together’ correctly, you can create a 
sentient being with a mind”.
54  Thus Frankenstein’s monster “has a mind by 
material design”.
55  They compare Shelley’s book to Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio, 
in which Pinocchio “has to acquire a mind through the fairy godmother’s 
gracious miracle”;
56 of the two contrasting texts, it is Pinocchio, they claim, that 
“reflects Gilbert Ryle’s dogma of the ghost in the machine”.
57  Ghost in the 
Shell, interestingly, borrows from both these fictional tales: we are given clear 
insight into the constructed nature of the mental and physical attributes of 
protagonist Kusanagi; yet at the same time, the film intermittently insists that her 
“ghost” – her soul or psyche – is an immaterial, spiritual self that can control but 
also be separated from her material, constructed body.  Kusanagi thus differs 
from the Frankensteinian monster, whose mental existence is constructed along 
with his body.  Relatedly, as I will observe below, Kusanagi is able to escape the 
confines of her (monstrous) body, and thus her narrative path is quite different 
from that of Shelley’s Creature. 
 
Ghost in the Shell is set in a cyberpunk-ish future, a high-tech urban world where 
cyber-crime prevails and in which technological enhancements to the body and 
mind are common.  The film depicts the internal and external battles faced by 
Kusanagi, a cyborg who works for a counter-terrorist organisation known as 
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Section 9.  Kusanagi and her colleagues become entangled in a fight against the 
Puppet Master, a sentient computer program capable of hacking into and 
controlling human brains.  At the same time Kusanagi reflects on her own 
existence as a subject inhabiting a postorganic body, negotiating a world that is 
increasingly artificial and de-natured; she searches for individualism and 
authenticity, qualities that she ascribes to her “ghost”.  Eventually, these interior 
and exterior concerns collapse: the film ends with an extended physical battle 
between Kusanagi and the Puppet Master, that soon becomes a mental 
negotiation as Kusanagi must decide whether to merge with her enemy and 
become a conjoined cyber-entity. 
 
The film prefaces these events with a startling sequence that takes us back to the 
Frankensteinian creation scene while simultaneously endowing that scene with 
new meaning.  Ghost in the Shell opens with a meeting between “city” and 
“body”: we enter the film to find Kusanagi standing on top of a high building 
overlooking the city below.  We then see her dive from the building, her body 
gracefully falling backwards through the air and into the empty cityscape.  
Moments later there is a second fall sequence, this time in close-up.  Once again 
Kusanagi falls backwards, and this time her body is erased: she flickers and 
becomes invisible, gradually dissolving into the backdrop of the city.  We soon 
learn that Kusanagi is a cyborg capable of superhuman feats (including the 
“therm-optic camouflage” that aids her disappearance).  For a moment, however, 
it seems as though she loses her body as she falls, or that she is overwritten by 
the city itself. 
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These images of vulnerability and power, visibility and disappearance, offer a 
fitting introduction to Kusanagi.  As these opening moments suggest, she is a 
vanishing character whose absent-presence is designed to both “wow” and 
confuse us.  She is also a character whose body is continually removed and then 
re-presented for us to view.  Immediately after the fall scene we are invited to 
view her body once again: this time we witness her construction.  Every fibre is 
laid bare in this construction sequence, and any potential mystery about her 
posthuman status is removed.
58  The film’s climax mirrors its beginning by 
enforcing Kusanagi’s artificiality: in the dramatic end sequence her body is torn 
apart, once again revealing every fibre.  She survives this violent “death”, and is 
reborn into a new manufactured body with an altered personality.  The film ends 
with Kusanagi awakening in this new body after having mentally merged with a 
cyberspace construct, and declaring to her companion Batou that “here before 
you is neither the program called the Puppet Master nor the woman that was 
called the Major”. 
 
Those familiar with Hollywood science fiction might be surprised when they 
view Ghost in the Shell – not only by the inherent darkness of the film, but also 
by the multitude of images distinctive to this text that nevertheless seem familiar 
because they would later be “borrowed” by Hollywood blockbusters.  The image 
of streaming computer code that we see at the start of the film, a gesture to both 
its cyberpunk influences and the digital technologies involved in its production, 
was famously used in The Matrix four years later, and somewhat fittingly given 
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that The Matrix revolutionised the use of digital effects in live-action cinema just 
as Ghost in the Shell was applauded by Hollywood for its revolutionary style of 
digital animation.  Ghost in the Shell’s distinctive creation-and-fall sequence was 
also imitated by Luc Besson’s The Fifth Element, in which the heroine is 
similarly created before our eyes, fibre by fibre, before diving from a high 
building into the dazzling cityscape below.  We might also note that the film’s 
references to ghostliness and the problem of a “soul” were inherited by Final 
Fantasy: a significant connection, given that both films contain digitally 
constructed heroines whose fundamental problem is the illusion of “life” she 
presents (her absent or troublesome “soul”). 
 
If Ghost in the Shell influenced these later films – all of which rely heavily on 
new modes of digital production, as does Oshii’s anime – it can be distinguished 
from them because it does not fall back on a “safe” image of the human body or 
nostalgically attempt to recall organic presence to the screen.  As previously 
suggested, The Fifth Element, The Matrix, and Final Fantasy all move towards a 
privileging of what Susan Hayward calls “the reproduction of life”:
59 they end 
with a suggestion of romance, love, fertility, or continuity.
60  Consequently, they 
perpetuate the division between natural and unnatural production that was so 
important to Shelley and that so informed the writing of Frankenstein.  
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Conversely, Ghost in the Shell ends with destruction – and notably, with the 
de(con)struction of the female body as a potential site of natural reproduction.  It 
also ends with the body no longer as its centrepiece, a notion that contributes to 
the unbalanced, incoherent and disconcerting atmosphere felt at the conclusion.  
The image of Kusanagi’s falling and dissolving body anticipates this conclusion, 
suggesting both the loss of her character and the loss of the body as a stable site 
of identity. 
 
As I will continue to suggest in this analysis and in the remainder of this project, 
these fall scenes – particular to Ghost in the Shell and The Fifth Element, but 
played upon in the Matrix trilogy as well, with its constant imaging of the body 
suspended in space and flying or falling through the cityscape – bring something 
new to the Frankensteinian moment of creation.  By constructing the body on-
screen moments before/after spectacularly suspending it in space, both Ghost in 
the Shell and The Fifth Element play with the artificial body’s visibility; reading 
these films as Frankensteinian texts, we can recall Heffernan’s suggestion that 
Frankenstein films are obsessed with “seeing” the “monster”.
61  The invisibility 
of Kusanagi, however, is arguably a more important addition to the evolving 
Frankenstein myth.  Ultimately, Ghost in the Shell is a more challenging film 
than The Fifth Element, and its rewriting of the Frankenstein tale is arguably 
more powerful: one that speaks eloquently of the absences and vulnerabilities 
that characterise embodiment in the digital age. 
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Continuing this comparison with Hollywood retellings of Frankenstein, we might 
observe that Ghost in the Shell also differs from a film such as Blade Runner, 
which it otherwise visually and thematically resembles.  The replicants of Blade 
Runner can be described as postorganic “monsters” who approach organic status: 
not only do they obsess about organic origins in the form of mothers, but they 
also retain at least a semblance of organic wholeness best seen at the moment of 
death: Roy, completely still, a figure sitting quietly in the rain; and Pris and 
Zhora, shot in the back, bleeding, but whole.  This wholeness – and indeed the 
security of death itself, with its promise of a narrative and thus a history – is 
transcended in Ghost in the Shell.  Kusanagi’s narrative moves not from birth to 
death but from construction to deconstruction, and thus is not a narrative at all, at 
least, not one involving the organic body (the postorganic body can be repeatedly 
deconstructed and then re-constructed, as Ghost in the Shell suggests, and thus it 
follows not a linear narrative but a form of feedback loop associated with 
computers, machines, and artificial beings).   
 
With its created, coded, deconstructed, and transcended bodies, Ghost in the 
Shell offers a reworking of Frankenstein that resonates with contemporary 
understandings about digital media and cyberspace.  As early as the opening 
sequence, when Kusanagi is constructed but also falls into the cityscape and 
disappears, the film reveals its grounding not only in the Frankenstein myth but 
in cyberpunk fiction: for this disappearance suggests her disembodiment in 
cyberspace; it is a manifestation or a metaphoric expression of the act of “jacking 
in”.  Later, Kusanagi fulfills this visual promise when she escapes her 
mechanical body and becomes a cyberspace construct.  This second   228 
“reconstruction” of Kusanagi mirrors the creation scene and offers the suggestion 
that, in the digital age, the Frankensteinian act of techno-creation can also be a 
disembodied act (occurring in the realms of cyberspace).  The film thus 
demonstrates the extent to which the Frankenstein tale can be interwoven with 
tropes and themes from other story cycles, including those of the cyberpunk 
genre. 
 
There are also references to the genetic coding of the body in this thematically 
complex film.  The creation scene, which depicts the body as a mechanical entity 
but which also involves images of “code”, responds to the mapping of the human 
genome and the resultant coding and de-naturing of the body.  The Puppet 
Master orates on this subject in the film’s climax, telling us that “life… relies 
upon genes to be its memory system”.  By implication, the human body is a 
computer and genetic code is digital code.  This reference to DNA as a “memory 
system” also articulates the film’s sub-themes of (mechanical) remembrance.  
Like other films discussed in this project, Ghost in the Shell introduces the theme 
of artificial memory into its retelling of Frankenstein; unlike Blade Runner or 
Strange Days, however, Oshii’s film does not play upon what Alison Landsberg 
calls “the ‘otherness’ of prosthetic memory”.
62  This is demonstrated early in the 
film, when Kusanagi and her companions encounter a man who has been “ghost 
hacked” – his cyborg brain invaded, his memories erased and replaced with 
implants that allow the Puppet Master to control him.  “Your original memory 
will never be restored”, the devastated man is told somewhat heartlessly, “and 
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there might be residual simulation”.  The lack of a resolution re-emphasising the 
primacy of organic memories is striking, and contributes to the overall inflection 
that this film brings to the Frankenstein myth: an inflection perhaps best 
described as a post-cyberpunk disenchantment with organicism. 
 
Ghost in the Shell also brings something new to the Frankenstein myth because it 
uses the figure of the constructed and mechanical body to disrupt traditional 
notions of gender.  This, arguably, is a singular achievement unmatched by any 
of Hollywood’s Frankenstein or techno-body films.  Claudia Springer has 
discussed Hollywood’s gendering of the mechanical body with reference to the 
American cyborg films of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which “enthusiastically 
explore boundary breakdowns between humans and computers, [while] gender 
boundaries are treated less flexibly.  Cyberbodies, in fact, tend to appear 
masculine or feminine to an exaggerated degree”; she concludes by noting that 
“cyborg imagery has not so far realized the ungendered ideal theorized by Donna 
Haraway”.
63  Even as the prominence of the “hard-bodied” cyborg has waned, 
Hollywood has continued to gender its science-fictional characters, even those 
whose artificial and constructed nature seemingly allows them to transcend any 
biological difference between the sexes.  Hollywood’s female monsters, in 
particular – we might refer to Leeloo from The Fifth Element as an exemplary 
character here – are often held up as guarantors of organic reproduction, as 
romantic heroines, and/or as desirable (“perfect”) bodies to be gazed upon.  The 
cyborg imagery of Ghost in the Shell, however, does approach the “ungendered 
ideal” of which Springer writes.  Although we see repeated shots of Kusanagi’s 
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naked body, she remains oddly desexualised, shown to be muscular and 
somewhat androgynous in appearance.  The opening sequence offers up her body 
for viewing and then renders it invisible, letting us know that throughout the film 
Kusanagi will defy the gendered gaze just as she defies her own “womanhood”: 
she will continually disappear and be deconstructed before our eyes.  The film 
also plays with notions of gender by allowing Kusanagi to merge with a 
supposedly male character, the Puppet Master, to form a genderless or doubly-
gendered being.  This becomes Kusanagi’s escape when her body is torn apart; in 
this scene of deconstruction, the body of the female cyborg is rendered 
monstrous, fragmented, and horrific, and this in turn is used to violently unpack 
traditional understandings of feminine beauty. 
 
As a retelling of Frankenstein that operates in conjunction with both cyberpunk 
fiction and cultural writings on gender, technology, and embodiment, Ghost in 
the Shell is a surprisingly sad film.  Kusanagi’s final “escape” from her artificial 
body is not as gleeful or celebratory as we might expect from a text that adopts 
the cyberpunk ethos of transcendence while simultaneously de-gendering the 
mechanical body; there is a sense of loss here that is anticipated at key moments 
throughout the narrative, when we are invited to reflect upon both Kusanagi’s 
artificiality and the possibility of her disappearance.  In these moments, 
significantly, we hear traditional Japanese music with a distinctively mournful 
tone.
64  The effect of hearing such traditional music over shots of a futuristic, 
hyper-technological cityscape is markedly elegiac: the suggestion is almost that 
the past lies outside the on-screen image, is present but not quite reachable.  Iain 
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Chambers has commented on the relationship between music and memory, 
stating that “music, as a language of repetition, continually proposes this play 
between recalling and resisting the past”.
65  The music in Ghost in the Shell 
operates in precisely this manner; and the “past” that is “recalled and resisted” 
here is both an organic past (an organic or natural world that has become nothing 
more than a memory) and a national past (for the music is suggestive of a sense 
of Japanese tradition that is otherwise absent from a setting devoid of any 
national inscriptions).  As suggested above, the organic past and the national past 
coincide in the notion of a Japanese tradition rooted in the landscape.  Such 
national/organic origin stories are powerfully performed in Ghost in the Shell.  
As a mechanical being, furthermore, Kusanagi is separated from such origins, 
her body positioned in exile from a past that is constantly sung-into-being around 
her.  This theme of exile gives the film another important link to Frankenstein, 
and particularly to Shelley’s text: for the Frankensteinian monster, too, is an 
exile from both the organic world around him and the social world he negotiates. 
 
Mechanical/“motherless” reproduction: reading Kusanagi as digital 
monster 
 
Let us return to Ghost in the Shell’s version of the Frankensteinian creation 
scene.  Mary Ann Doane has written of a certain “terror” evoked by “the 
motherless reproduction associated with technology”.
66  Doane tells us that the 
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anxiety over such “replacing” of the mother’s body fuels the narratives of 
science fiction films such as Blade Runner; we can add that it also fuels 
Shelley’s novel, which has been interpreted as a cautionary tale about what 
happens when men try to give birth.  “Motherless” reproduction is also 
represented in Ghost in the Shell’s rendition of the creation scene, although 
perhaps it is depicted as not-so-terrifying: the scene of Kusanagi’s “birth” is 
calm, haunting, and free from anxiety.  In her reading of the film Napier 
comments upon both the references to Frankenstein in this scene and the related 
lack of violence or terror: “although both the technological and organic imagery 
is redolent of science fiction tropes of monster-making”, she writes, “the 
sequence itself is lyrical, quiet, and rhythmically paced”.
67  Yet if this scene 
plays upon motherless reproduction, we might comment that animation itself is a 
form of such reproduction: a means of reproducing the body-as-image, of 
manufacturing bodies rather than birthing them.  The “tropes of monster-
making” that are engaged in Kusanagi’s creation scene thus have a dual function: 
they refer back to Frankenstein as an originary text (a source of inspiration for all 
cyborg stories) and outwards to the technologies of animation itself. 
 
As layers of variation on the same story, each contributing to an evolving 
cultural myth about techno-production, Frankenstein, Blade Runner, and Ghost 
in the Shell form an interesting trio of texts.  In particular, they resound with the 
problem of origins.  What, indeed, “does it mean to be embodied when the body 
cannot claim the status of nature?”, they ask.
68  This question is articulated quite 
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openly in Ghost in the Shell, with Kusanagi frequently analysing her mechanical 
status and posing philosophical questions about body, self, soul, and identity; at 
one point, for instance, she asks her friend Batou “how much of your original 
body do you have left?”  As an animated film, however, Ghost in the Shell offers 
a far more interesting origin story than Blade Runner or even Shelley’s 
Frankenstein: one that questions, where did these on-screen bodies come from?  
How were they produced?  Were they modelled on human bodies that are now 
absent?  Each statement that Kusanagi makes about her manufactured body thus 
has the potential to lead viewers back to the understanding that the animated 
body cannot “claim the status of nature” any more than Frankenstein’s monster 
could.   
 
Like many of the films already discussed in this thesis, Ghost in the Shell can 
consequently be read as a self-reflexive text that spectacularises and explores its 
own technologies of production.  This is particularly evident when we examine 
the film’s thematic concern with memory, history, and durée.  As noted above, 
Ghost in the Shell questions what it means to “remember” when both body and 
mind are artificially constructed.  The film tackles these themes openly and 
philosophically; as a consequence, it gives us insight into the durée of the 
postorganic body.  For instance, Kusanagi’s bold statement that “my thoughts 
and memories are unique only to me” is undermined by repeated suggestions that 
there are other cyborgs identical to her, and that neither her body nor her mind is 
at all unique.  It is also threatened by the loss of her character at the film’s end, 
suggestive of a fractured durée; this is only heightened by the discontinuity 
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between Ghost in the Shell and its sequel, Innocence, which features “Kusanagi” 
in a different body and indeed as a different character.  This continual swapping 
of characters, bodies, narratives and memories is conducive to animation with its 
built rather than “lived” bodies; it is also facilitated by the lack of an actor’s 
body, and the related lack of a single durée to drive the film. 
 
Elsewhere in this project I have discussed the “origin story” of the filmic body, 
using the figure of the Frankensteinian monster as a metaphor for the on-screen 
body’s troubled link to an organic past.  I have also observed that, in digital 
animation, the historical link between actor’s body and on-screen image is 
notably missing.  Writing of the difference between computer-generated imagery 
and live-action film, Michael Allen states that: 
 
whereas the photographic record automatically assumes a referent, an 
original object whose image has been captured by light passing through a 
camera lens and altering the chemical make-up of a strip of celluloid, a 
digital image need have no such referent.
69 
 
The temporal disruption created by such imaging of bodies-without-referents is 
pinpointed by Esther Leslie, who observes that digital technology in general: 
 
promotes the fascination with images and, specifically, an enchantment 
with representation without referent.  Without referent, it is as if the link to 
history and memory is severed in favour of a permanently overwriting 
present without recall.
70 
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This is the ultimate absence behind Kusanagi-as-animated-body: she lacks an 
original presence, and exists as image without referent.  This, too, brings strange 
new meaning to the film’s under-themes of construction, broken memory, and 
forgotten identity. 
 
Such absence is performed in the film’s iconic fall scene.  Indeed, if the creation 
scene and the ensuing narrative position Kusanagi as a Frankensteinian monster 
and reference her creation as an animated body, the fall scene performs her status 
as an animated image, a “representation without referent”.  In her essay on 
embodiment and digital culture, Vivian Sobchack discusses the “increased 
transparency of one’s lived-flesh enabled by new technologies as well as the 
ubiquitous visibility of new technologies”.
71  We can read Ghost in the Shell and 
its fall scene in the context of this comment.  When Kusanagi falls and begins to 
disappear, the fantastic new technologies that enable the scene – both the 
imagined feat of thermoptic camouflage and the revolutionary technologies of 
digital animation that created Kusanagi – become “visible” through her 
“transparent” body.  In this moment Kusanagi also recalls Clover’s description of 
the transparent or “insubstantial” nature of the actor in effects-driven films like 
The Matrix.
72  She, however, is far less “substantial” than The Matrix’s Neo, who 
performs himself into profound visibility with his cyber-acrobatics; in my 
opinion, Clover’s reading of The Matrix as a film that foreshadows “the future of 
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the actorless movie”
73 is far more applicable to Ghost in the Shell, in which the 
invisibility of Kusanagi’s falling body reminds us of the lack of (an actor’s) 
organic presence to inform the film. 
 
Here we can return once again to Walter Benjamin, who tells us that, in cinema, 
the “audience’s identification with the actor is really an identification with the 
camera”.
74  This is exacerbated in animation, where the audience identifies not 
with an actor mediated by the camera but with the technologies of animation and 
the “virtual” actors/bodies they create.  As both a cyborg and an animated body, 
furthermore, Kusanagi is the ultimate mechanically reproduced “work of art”.  
Her search for a soul or “ghost” might be construed as a search for “aura”, for the 
“authenticity” that a reproduced work of art lacks.  Authenticity is precisely what 
Kusanagi seems to desire when she makes the hollow assertion that “my 
thoughts and memories are unique only to me”.  This parallels Benjamin’s 
suggestion that the original work of art is defined by its historicity and its 
existence within a narrative of tradition.  If “the technique of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition”,
75 then Kusanagi – 
like the Frankensteinian monster – is an exile: she has no link to a historical 
narrative, no past-ness, no family, no racial or cultural inscriptions, no place in 
any “fabric” of tradition.
76  As a digitally animated body, she is further detached 
from the organic world as a “domain” of tradition/memory.  Unlike Aki of Final 
Fantasy, who can be dubiously connected via the motion-capture process to 
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organic movements in the “real” world, Kusanagi is literally created “from 
scratch”.  She is a digital monster without an origin story. 
 
It is interesting that Kusanagi’s animators do not attempt to simulate such 
organic origins in their portrayal – and exposure – of her mechanical body.  
Instead, the film meditates upon the loss of such organicism, and visually 
deconstructs Kusanagi in response to this loss.  There are fleeting moments when 
her mechanical body seems to negotiate its lost origins in nature.  In one notable 
scene Kusanagi goes diving in the harbour, immersing herself in water as though 
in an attempt to surround herself in the nature from which she is excluded.  
Napier writes of this scene that “Kusanagi seems to be attempting to discover a 
core self, one that is accessible through the technological apparatus of her diving 
gear but is encased within the organic womb of the sea”.
77  Significantly, 
Kusanagi’s experience of this natural world is mediated by technology; the 
scene, like many in the film, expresses loss and absence rather than fulfilment 
and presence, a mere negotiation with an ultimately inaccessible organic world. 
 
With both its narrative and its technologies driving towards an apocalyptic end of 
embodiment, the film – which leaves us with the sense of an amnesiac 
abandoning of the (memory of the) organic body – is somewhat postmodern, if 
also hauntingly sad.  Kusanagi is Frankenstein’s monster turned into a digital 
simulacrum: as a cyborg and ultimately a cyberspace construct, but also as an 
animated image, she demonstrates the extent to which, as Andreas Huyssen puts 
it, “in the scheme of simulation… the body as referent becomes so much 
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refuse”.
78  Yet she is also a poignant character, inhabiting a tale that resounds 
with a sense of mourning.  Such mourning is conveyed by the haunting and 
elegiac musical theme, which, significantly, often coincides with moments of 
bodily loss.  The music is prominent, for instance, in an extended scene where 
Kusanagi floats down the river on a boat, gazing at mannequins in shop windows 
who eerily seem to resemble her, her on-screen presence eventually replaced by 
shots of the city and its anonymous inhabitants.  This scene, a more subtle 
version of her earlier disappearing act, can be read as a prolonged funereal 
sequence, lamenting the disappearance of the organic.   Such a sense of 
mourning also works its way into the film’s dialogue.  Kusanagi’s line, “how 
much of your original body do you have left?”, is a perfect example of this: it is 
delivered wistfully and plaintively, with regret rather than anxiety.  The 
mechanical body is thus framed with sadness in this film, a sadness that also 
incorporates the loss of the body from the postorganic spaces of digital 
animation. 
 
In summary, then, we can describe Kusanagi as a Frankensteinian monster for 
the digital age.  As an artificial being who constantly questions the existence of 
her soul, she has much in common with her Gothic precursor, who asks similar 
questions.  Both are beset by the problem of organic origins; both, too, are given 
a creation scene that not only attests to the absence of such origins but that also 
speaks of their status as fictional, textual, literary/filmic characters.  Barbara 
Johnson tells us that Shelley’s Frankenstein can be read as “the story of the 
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experience of writing Frankenstein”;
79 similarly, Ghost in the Shell can be read 
as the story of what it means to be an animated body – what it means to build 
one, and what it means to exist as one.  At the same time, both Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and Ghost in the Shell are dark texts whose representation of 
embodiment is theoretically resonant; both imagine (and in the latter case, 
spectacularly image) a postorganic future, and do so in a manner that 
incorporates the cultural, political, and scientific discourse of their times.  
However, Kusanagi differs from Shelley’s monster in one fundamental aspect: 
she is granted the ability to escape the confines of her body.  Like Akira, Ghost 
in the Shell rewrites the story of the monstrous/mechanical body to emphasise 
transcendence; but it does so with reference to its own technologies of digital 
animation and the forgetting or overwriting of organic presence they entail. 
 
This chapter has examined the rewriting of Frankenstein in anime.  Ghost in the 
Shell is merely one example of a Japanese animation that not only incorporates 
the figure of the artificial body but makes elaborate contributions to the evolving 
myth of the cyborg.  My extensive focus on Ghost in the Shell here is due to the 
text’s closeness to Frankenstein and its articulation of Frankensteinian concerns 
– not to mention, of course, its wonderful re-imaging of the Frankensteinian 
creation scene.  Nevertheless, there are numerous other anime that – because of 
their depictions of techno-organic protagonists and exploration of an apocalyptic 
end-of-embodiment – can be read in conjunction with Shelley’s novel.  This 
thesis does not have the space to discuss other notable anime films and series 
including Guyver, Serial Experiments Lain, Appleseed, or Patlabor, and we can 
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only speculate what the future of anime will bring and what new variations on 
the Frankenstein myth might rise from this cultural phenomenon.  As I write this 
chapter, a live-action version of Akira is in production; meanwhile, cutting-edge 
new anime are emerging year by year, from Appleseed and Ghost in the Shell 2: 
Innocence (both in 2004) and beyond.  With each text, new monsters come to our 
screens. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The writing of this thesis has been informed by twofold passions: an interest in 
what is happening in visual culture – especially in cinema – at the moment, and a 
love of the Frankenstein tale in all its manifestations.  The points at which these 
two personal passions converge have become the points of energy around which 
this project is structured.  “Why Frankenstein?” is a question that I have been 
asked on numerous occasions, giving me plenty of opportunity to ruminate on 
the importance of Shelley’s tale: both the novel that she wrote and the myth, 
constantly “reanimated” in the popular culture of today, that it has become.  It is 
not surprising that theorists write of Frankenstein’s “durability”,
1 its cultural 
longevity and its resonance long beyond the time of its publication.  As a tale 
about embodiment, technology, and the interface between the two, Shelley’s 
novel and its various retellings have functioned as a sort of depository of cultural 
thoughts about selfhood, about what constitutes a person/subject, and about what 
(to call upon Waldby once again) it means “to be embodied when the body 
cannot claim the status of nature”.
2  In the digital age, these are also the sort of 
questions we ask about our media.  What does it mean to be embodied on 
screen?  What does it mean to be a viewing subject?  What role do external 
cultures, technologies, and discourses, including the media, play in shaping our 
selves?  Can we, as embodied subjects, “claim the status of nature” if we are 
                                                 
1 George Levine and U.C. Knoeplfmacher (eds), The Endurance of Frankenstein: 
Essays on Mary Shelley’s Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 
xii. 
2 Catherine Waldby, “The Instruments of Life: Frankenstein and Cyberculture”, 
in Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, eds. Darren Tofts et al 
(Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2002), 33.   242 
constantly interfacing with media technologies, if we are reproduced and even 
replaced by them?  Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the Frankenstein 
tale has been reworked in the digital age to address such questions. 
 
Across the five chapters of this thesis I have examined the filmic “machines” and 
animated “monsters” that appear in cinematic retellings of Frankenstein.  “Filmic 
machine” is a term I have used to describe both the technologies of cinema and 
the body of the monster as he/she/it appears in film.  Largely, these filmic 
monsters are indeed mechanical: in popular cinema we find a technologising of 
Shelley’s Creature that begins with Metropolis and continues with Whale and his 
bolt-necked fiend.  Accompanying these depictions of mechanical monsters in 
the early Frankenstein films is a scene of spectacular electric animation.  The 
Edison film is the exception here: this first version of Shelley’s tale offers an 
uncanny body birthed by alchemical means.  In Chapter Two it was argued that 
all of these films play upon cinema’s own powers of animation and depict 
cinema itself in fantastic terms.  This is not surprising: as we saw in Chapter 
One, Shelley’s novel – a tale of techno-creation – is strangely self-reflexive, a 
story about writing and the production of a “monstrous” text.  We find that such 
self-reflexivity exploded into being when the tale was further technologised: that 
is, when it moved into a filmic space.  As suggested in Chapter Two, the body of 
the monster is central in this metaphoric play.  From the alchemical Creature of 
the Edison film to the robotic Maria in Metropolis, and beyond, these screened 
monsters – uncanny, mediated, mechanically reproduced, and posthuman – are 
spectacular attestations to the cinematic restructuring of human presence. 
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In Chapter Three I argued that, in the digital age, these filmic monsters become 
simulations, cyborgs, replicants, avatars, genetically-engineered or otherwise 
artificial beings.  This shift away from animation and electricity occurs as part of 
a need to address new concerns pertaining to digital culture and the media 
“world” of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  In Blade Runner 
and Strange Days we see the monster rewritten as the replicant and the cyborg: 
mechanical and/or artificial bodies positioned to confront problems of memory, 
mediation, and spectatorship.  Similarly, films like The Fifth Element and The 
Matrix offer variations on the Frankenstein myth by exploring constructed bodies 
of a different sort: bodies that are coded with digital, genetic, or media “life”.  
The imprint of cyberculture, digital media, and developments in biotechnology is 
clearly visible on these fantastic films of the 1990s; other films of this period like 
Spielberg’s Jurassic Park would offer closer adaptations of Shelley’s tale while 
still operating in the shadow of these new concerns. 
 
Spielberg’s dinosaurs are the crossover figures in this thesis: iconic figures in the 
history of special effects, they are digitally animated “monsters” that operate 
within the spaces of a live-action film.  It was argued in Chapter Three that the 
Frankensteinian monster as technological “other” becomes, in the digital age, the 
effects-enabled villain of science fiction, horror, and fantastic film; the otherness 
of digitality itself is inscribed onto the bodies of these new monsters.  We can 
also describe the animated heroines Aki Ross (from Final Fantasy) and Kusanagi 
(from Ghost in the Shell) in terms of this digital otherness: Aki is a digitised 
presence who incites cultural anxiety, and Kusanagi is an on-screen body who   244 
acts as other to the cinematic (she vanishes, fragments, changes, and is 
repeatedly deconstructed). 
 
Adam Roberts tells us that otherness or “alterity” is always involved in science-
fictional depictions of technology, because technology itself:  
 
is something with which we are simultaneously familiar and already 
estranged from; familiar because it plays so large a part in our life, 
estranged from because we don’t really know how it works… What this 
means is that technology focuses our attitude to difference.
3 
 
If we can apply these words to cinema – a technology we are “estranged” from 
because we don’t always “know how it works” – then clearly we can also apply 
them to digital effects, which mystify and enchant us and from which we are 
similarly estranged.  Herein lies the metaphoric power of Frankenstein, a story 
about what Roberts calls “the encounter with difference”.
4  This, indeed, is what 
filmic and digital monsters have in common: if the monster of the 1910 Edison 
film or the robotic Maria in Metropolis embody the otherness of filmic presence, 
then many of the animated monsters that appear on our screens today are 
emblazoned with the otherness of digital presence. 
 
This project has culminated in a discussion of such animated “monsters”.  I have 
argued that the fantastic qualities of animation as a medium open up a space 
where the Frankenstein tale can be imaginatively and spectacularly retold; I have 
also suggested that technologies of animation – both old and new – create 
fascinating variations on the myth of techno-production and on the 
                                                 
3 Adam Roberts, Science Fiction (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 147. 
4 Ibid., 54.   245 
Frankensteinian relationship between body, technology, and organic world.  In 
her 1831 introduction to Frankenstein, Mary Shelley offers us the image of her 
monster, the “hideous phantasm”, lying lifeless “and then, on the working of 
some powerful engine, show[ing] signs of life, and stir[ring] with an uneasy, 
half-vital motion”.
5  Drawing on these words, Telotte reminds us that cinema, 
too, is “a powerful engine for crafting new images of the self”.
6  However, the 
“new images of the self” that can be crafted via the “powerful engine” of 
animation are just as interesting, and often (if we look to the bodies of fantastic 
and science-fictional anime) more monstrous.  As Susan Napier observes, “the 
animated space becomes a magical tabula rasa on which to project both dreams 
and nightmares of what it is to be human, precisely as it transforms the human 
figure”.
7  Such dreams, nightmares, metamorphoses, and speculations on 
(post)human-ity link anime like Akira and Ghost in the Shell – which epitomise 
Napier’s claim – to Shelley’s novel and to the Frankenstein myth in general. 
 
This link between Frankenstein and animation was discussed in Chapters Four 
and Five with particular reference to digital animation and computer-generated 
presence.  We find glimmers of the Frankenstein myth in our very need to create 
these animated bodies, our desire to view them, and the anxieties they instill in 
us; in the questions they evoke not just about “what it means to be human” but 
about the relationship between organic presence and technology, about what it 
means to be “embodied”, and about the body’s link with its origins in “nature”.  
                                                 
5 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions, 1993), 4, my emphasis. 
6 J.P. Telotte, Replications: a Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 76. 
7 Susan J. Napier, Anime: From Akira to Princess Mononoke - Experiencing 
Contemporary Japanese Animation (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 36.   246 
My analyses of Kusanagi and Aki Ross have taken place within the framework 
provided by these questions and concerns.  Like the Creature of Shelley’s novel, 
these two animated figures are imbued with the problem of “life”: Aki, of course, 
is not always as “animated” as she needs to be, while Kusanagi – whose “life” as 
a cyborg spectacularly begins and ends on-screen, exposed for us to witness – is 
constantly pondering the existence of her “soul”.  Both characters are objects of 
cultural fascination due to the pioneering modes of mechanical reproduction that 
created them; they are also invisible and/or vanishing characters who must 
seemingly “make way” for these technologies, which often become the most 
interesting or spectacular aspect of the texts they enable. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have been concerned with the areas where cinema and 
digitality bleed into one another.  This is plausible given that I am writing on the 
cusp of the postcinematic future: filmmaking today encompasses, is transformed 
by, and exists alongside cutting-edge modes of digital production.  Like others 
before me, I am also interested in what is post-human about this future.
8  Digital 
modes of production give us posthuman modes of representation: new bodies, 
new expressions of “life”.  Much of the relevance of the Frankenstein tale for 
digital filmmaking thus lies in its imagining of a posthuman condition.  
Nevertheless, we should remind ourselves that there are posthuman elements to 
                                                 
8 In this thesis I have quoted from theorists who write about the relationship 
between digital filmmaking and representations of the human, and/or those who 
discuss a collapse of the posthuman and the postcinematic.  In particular, this is 
discussed by Garrett Stewart in Between Film and Screen: Modernism’s Photo 
Synthesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and “Body Snatching: 
Science Fiction's Photographic Trace”, in Alien Zone 2: The Spaces of Science 
Fiction Cinema, ed. Annette Kuhn (London and New York: Verso, 1999), 226-
248.  Stewart’s work is cited and built upon by Charles Tryon in “Virtual Cities 
and Stolen Memories: Temporality and the Digital in Dark City”, Film Criticism 
28, 2 (2004): 42-62.   247 
cinema (in its photographic sense) as well.  Cinema has always mechanically 
tampered with organic presence, as Walter Benjamin reminds us.  This, indeed, 
is why the figure of the Frankensteinian monster – a posthuman figure from the 
realm of Gothic literature, emerging from the imagination of a young woman in 
nineteenth-century England – is such a cinematic figure; this might even be the 
reason behind cinema’s long-standing fascination with the Frankenstein tale. 
 
An overarching theme of this thesis has been the problem of “origin stories”, a 
problem that Shelley’s monster negotiates and that allows Shelley’s own writing 
to function in dialogue with that of recent theorists such as Donna Haraway.  As 
suggested in Chapter One, the artificial, mechanical, or scientifically 
reconstructed body can be read as a body in negotiation with lost or problematic 
origins in nature.  Let us briefly return to the image of Benjamin’s “angel of 
history”
9 and to Mark Poster’s “High-tech” but backward-looking 
“Frankenstein”
10; both are figures in dialogue with the (organic) past that lies 
behind them.  This too is the monster as Shelley wrote of him, a de-historicised 
being who, rather than celebrate his post- or super-human status, longs for what 
he does not have.  His desire for a “mate” can be read as an expression of such 
longing; a desire to approach organic status.  Throughout this project, I have 
attempted to interrogate this relationship between mechanical presence and 
organic origins, questioning what it might mean for us in the digital age.  While 
theorists like Poster examine the construction of new media identities and 
                                                 
9 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1969), 257-258. 
10 Mark Poster, “High-Tech Frankenstein, or Heidegger Meets Stelarc”, in The 
Cyborg Experiments, ed. Joanna Zylinska (London and New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2002), 30.   248 
posthuman subjects in this so-called digital age, I have limited my investigations 
to filmic presence and to the filmic or digital body-on-screen.  If Frankenstein is 
a tale about embodiment (or techno-embodiment), I have argued, then its filmic 
adaptation has allowed for fantastic representations of various cinematic modes 
of embodiment: spectacular depictions of what cinema does to the body, of how 
we might relate to cinematic bodies in the digital age, and of the “origin story” 
behind the cinematic image itself. 
 
In conclusion, if Frankenstein is a story about the postorganic body and its “lost 
origins in nature” then what we find at the heart of this story is a crucial absence.  
What defines the Frankensteinian monster, in other words, is not just his/her/its 
monstrous and fragmented presence but the absence of organicism in his/her/its 
body.  This sense of loss and absence lingers into the digital age and, in the 
context of digital modes of production that reconstruct and overwrite the organic 
world, becomes the most important feature of the tale.  As I have argued 
throughout this project, an awareness of such loss – and the anxieties and desires 
it evokes – is what cinema in the digital age brings to the ever-evolving 
Frankenstein myth.  This is confronted in various ways in the films I have 
discussed within: from the photograph scene in Blade Runner, which addresses 
both the re-membering (the replication) and the remembering (the reduction to 
memory) of organic presence in an age of genetic/digital engineering; to The 
Matrix, with its image of the digitally overwritten body, an image accompanied 
by anxiety and a potent nostalgia for organicism; to Clover’s reading of this film 
as a “foreshadowing of the future of the actorless movie”;
11 to Final Fantasy, an 
                                                 
11 Joshua Clover, The Matrix (London: BFI Publishing, 2004), 19.   249 
actorless movie, and to the traces (or memories) of organicism that constitute 
motion-capture actress Aki’s “presence” on screen; to Ghost in the Shell, to 
Kusanagi’s resonant line of dialogue – “how much of your original body do you 
have left?” – and to the image of her disappearing body.  These films give us our 
monsters for the digital age; they depict the disappearance of organic presence 
from both our worlds and our screens. 
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